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In August 2006, Bolivia witnessed a historic event, the inauguration of the Con-
stituent Assembly, a convention of popularly elected delegates to rewrite the con-
stitution and “refound the nation.” For many, this was the culmination of centuries 
of indigenous struggles against domination by white–mestizo elites. Colonized 
by the Spanish in the 1500s, Bolivia’s native peoples endured centuries of oppres-
sion and exploitation and were barred from cultural and political participation in 
colonial administration and later national affairs. Since the founding of the Re-
public of Bolivia in 1825, the white–mestizo political elite had written all the fol-
lowing constitutions, without meaningful representation by the indigenous poor 
who make up the majority of Bolivia’s population. But starting in 2000, the tables 
have begun to turn. A series of massive popular protests against neoliberal policies 
staged by indigenous peoples, peasants, and the urban poor forced the resigna-
tion of President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, and in 2005, Bolivia elected its first 
self-identifying indigenous president, Evo Morales. Morales and his Movimiento 
al Socialismo (MAS; Movement towards Socialism) party gained the largest elec-
toral majority since Bolivia’s return to democracy in the early 1980s, representing 
a sea change in the country’s political landscape. Claiming to represent Bolivia’s 
excluded peoples, Morales promised his government would inaugurate a “cultural 
democratic revolution” (Morales 2006). The next year, he convened the Constitu-
ent Assembly, a constitutional convention to rewrite the constitution, a long-held 
demand by indigenous organizations, to begin this revolution and codify into law 
the “process of change” that would lead to a decolonized Bolivia.
The Constituent Assembly began on August 6, the day on which Bolivians cel-
ebrate independence from Spain, in the beautiful colonial city of Sucre, where the 
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country’s original constitution had been written in 1825. The city was filled with 
delegates, visitors, media, and large contingents from each of Bolivia’s thirty-six 
indigenous groups, mingling in the noisy fiesta in the central plaza. My anthro-
pologist credentials got me a press pass, so I was able to observe the ceremony with 
journalists from around the world. It was an amazing performance of indigenous 
pride and power. Right above us, from the balcony of the Palacio de Justicia, Presi-
dent Morales oversaw the festivities, flanked by his vice president, Álvaro García 
Linera, and various international luminaries, including the Nobel Peace Prize win-
ner and Guatemalan indigenous leader Rigoberta Menchú. The president of the 
Assembly, Silvia Lazarte, a former domestic worker and union leader, called the 
Assembly to order. The most striking part of the day was the introduction of the 225 
delegates, many of whom were dressed in clothing marking them as indigenous. 
As the roll call of clearly recognizable indigenous names rang out, it became clear 
that the authors of this constitution were very different from those of previous 
constitutions. “Mamani? Presente! Quispe? Presente!” Many of the delegates re-
sponded in their native tongues: Aymara, Quechua, Guaraní. All around me, faces 
were wet with tears, as we witnessed what would have seemed almost impossible 
ten years earlier: indigenous people making a new state. Vice President García 
Linera congratulated Bolivia’s indigenous peoples for “reclaiming their place in 
society not with bullets, but with votes and words.” He said Bolivia’s strength is 
its “communitarian capacity,” from which the rest of the world could learn. “The 
jacha uru, the great day, for the indigenous peoples has arrived,” declared President 
Morales (Spinelli 2006). Then a rowdy parade began, made up of all the different 
social movements whose struggles had made this day possible: indigenous peoples 
in colorful traditional clothes, labor and peasant unions, women’s organizations, 
students, and miners with their hard hats. With enormous pride, marchers sang 
and played traditional instruments, carrying signs encouraging the delegates to 
refound the nation and to begin the process of decolonizing Bolivia. “¡Nunca Más 
sin Nosotros!” declared the signs, “Never Again without Us!” The whole day, the 
descendants of those excluded for centuries past marched through the streets de-
claring that it was their turn to write the future.
Over the next two years, Bolivia’s Constituent Assembly would be the site of 
tremendous conflict as its delegates struggled to rework the model of the state 
and the role of indigenous peoples within it. The resulting constitution, passed in 
a national referendum in 2009, declares Bolivia to be a plurinational, communi-
tarian state, and establishes a series of rights for “indigenous originary and peas-
ant peoples and nations,” including rights to autonomy and self-government, to 
culture, recognition of their institutions, and the consolidation of their territories 
(Bolivia 2009: Article 2). More importantly, it declares the fundamental goal of the 
new plurinational state to be “decolonization.” Article 9 of the new constitution 
codifies the idea into law, specifying the first goal and essential function of the 
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state as being to “constitute a just and harmonious society, cemented in decoloniza-
tion, without discrimination or exploitation, with full social justice, to consolidate 
plurinational identities.”
This is the promise of the Morales government: to create a new form of state 
that will inaugurate a new kind of decolonized society. What does “decoloniza-
tion” mean? How has the Morales government instituted this revolutionary idea 
and what have the effects been for Bolivia? Has the Morales government been able 
to fulfill the promises of this revolutionary idea? These are the questions this book 
seeks to answer. In this ethnography of indigenous state-making, I examine the 
discourses, policies, and practices of the Morales government to see what differ-
ence it might make for formerly oppressed groups to take state power. The Bolivi-
an experiment inspired people across the world because it promised an alternative 
to both neoliberal economic policies and Western colonial legacies, especially 
racism. Because it drew from the repertoire of indigenous values and practices, 
Figure 2. Guaraní women at the inauguration of the 2006 Constituent Assembly. Credit: 
Nancy Postero.
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it challenged the fundamental tenets of liberalism, offering a chance to overturn 
them or at least modify them for the twenty-first century.
Yet my research shows that this did not happen. While the Morales government 
did enact policies that greatly benefited Bolivia’s indigenous citizens, the “indig-
enous state” continues to be fundamentally liberal, and the country has not only 
continued but expanded its reliance on market capitalism. Indigeneity and de-
colonization were the rallying cries for the Morales revolution, serving as what the 
French political philosopher Jacques Rancière terms an emancipatory “politics” 
(Rancière 1999). Yet, as the MAS government consolidated its control and defeated 
its political adversaries on the right, its support for indigenous self-determination 
waned. Morales continues to invoke indigenous history and culture, but he does so 
in performances of a state-controlled version of indigeneity that legitimizes state 
power. The new constitution subsumes indigenous local autonomy rights under a 
liberal government in which the central state retains decision-making power over 
Figure 3. Celebrating the inauguration of the 2006 Constituent Assembly. Credit: Nancy Postero.
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most significant matters, especially as regards the extraction of natural resources. 
Moreover, the MAS government has made it clear that it will sacrifice some indig-
enous communities to its national development project.
The central argument in this book is that indigeneity has been transformed in 
Bolivia from a site of emancipation to one of liberal nation-state building. Since 
Morales came to power, inclusion and citizenship have increasingly been articu-
lated in terms of class rather than of ethnicity. In recent years, Morales has argued 
for Bolivia’s “economic liberation,” blending anti-imperialism with market devel-
opment. This new discourse is especially popular among the emerging indigenous 
middle class, who have benefited from the expanding economy. Yet it is not shared 
by all indigenous people. I document a number of sites where local indigenous 
communities are reasserting centuries-old demands for indigenous sovereignty in 
opposition to this conjuncture of liberalism and development.
Throughout this book, I focus on the deep disagreements these circumstances 
produce. In what follows in this Introduction, I introduce four central sites of con-
testation. First, I ask what it means to be indigenous and who counts as indigenous 
in Bolivia. To what extent are the tensions in contemporary Bolivia questions of 
race and racism? Second, I consider the multiple meanings of the idea of decoloni-
zation, and inquire into what a decolonized society would look like. Third, I look 
at the liberal state and ask what alternatives an “indigenous state” might produce. 
Finally, I consider the political struggles under way in Bolivia, introducing a key 
theoretical framework for the book in the form of Rancière’s conception of poli-
tics. For Bolivia’s indigenous peoples, Morales’s administration represents a historic 
change, but there are deep disagreements about whether his government is pro-
ducing an emancipatory politics for indigenous people or whether, like all liberal 
regimes, it is introducing a new form of policing. This fourth section investigates 
performance as a key tool of both politics and policing, showing how the struggles I 
describe—for control of the state, for decolonization, and for local autonomy—are 
enacted at the discursive and symbolic level, including spectacular political perfor-
mances and rituals that invoke Bolivian history, religion, and culture.
THE MEANINGS OF INDIGENEIT Y
Evo Morales is Bolivia’s first “indigenous” president. I put the word indigenous 
in quotation marks, because defining and representing indigeneity is a subject 
of great debate in Bolivia, as elsewhere in the world (see, e.g., Albro 2005, 2007; 
 Canessa 2006, 2012; Postero and Zamosc 2004; K. Webber 2012, 2013). In Morales’s 
life and political identity, we can see the complex intersections between race and 
class that characterize indigeneity. He was raised in a family of Aymara-speaking 
highland peasants, but he spent most of his life in the Chapare region of the low-
lands, where he rose to be the president of the coca-growers’ union. As a cocalero 
6    Introduction
leader, he originally emphasized class distinctions and anti-imperialism rather 
than ethnic demands, but during the multicultural 1990s, Morales gradually “In-
dianized” his position, making indigeneity a central part of his public persona 
and political agenda (Albro 2005). Yet he was careful in his 2005 electoral cam-
paign to build a platform based on both class and ethnic demands, framing it 
in what Raúl Madrid has called “ethno-populist” terms (Madrid 2008). Robert 
Albro has demonstrated that one of the strengths of Morales’s MAS party was 
its ability to bridge between local, collective, and culture-based indigenous com-
munities and identities, on the one hand, and an urban pluralist recognition of 
indigenous heritage not tied to specific localities, on the other (Albro 2005: 449). 
This gave indigenous politics a “new articulatory power” and made it an “effective 
tool for broad based coalition building,” since it linked the common lived experi-
ences of displaced indigenous peasants, urban workers in the informal sector, and 
poor mestizos, all of whom were suffering the effects of neoliberal restructuring 
(449–50; see also Postero 2007a).
Once in office, Morales began to portray himself and his government as repre-
senting indigenous peoples, emphasizing indigeneity over class. Beginning with 
his Andean inauguration at the pre-Inca religious center of Tiwanaku in January 
2006, where he was blessed by Aymara spiritual practitioners and recognized as 
Apumallku, or the highest authority (Postero 2007b), Morales has trumpeted his 
own indigenous identity and made indigeneity a central icon for his adminis-
tration’s radical reforms. Over the years, he gradually formulated what Andrew 
Canessa calls the “new language of national political identity,” a discursive rep-
resentation of indigeneity as the solution to domestic and global problems (Can-
essa 2006). In international fora, Morales proclaims indigenous values like suma 
qamaña (living well), a model of sustainable development based on respect for 
Mother Earth, to articulate agendas on climate change and coca production (Pos-
tero 2012). At the domestic level, Morales has passed an important anti-racism law 
and established a Vice Ministry of Decolonization to put into effect a “process of 
change” to cleanse Bolivian society of racism and patriarchy and to recuperate in-
digenous identities and customs (Cárdenas 2011: 16). I concur with Canessa’s argu-
ment that in Bolivia, “political legitimacy rests on being indigenous.” He notes that 
Morales has positioned indigeneity as a site from which to defend and protect the 
nation’s national resources and to push for social justice. “In short,” he concludes, 
“indigeneity is the foundation of a new nationalism” (Canessa 2012: 17–18).
How has indigeneity taken on such a positive valence, and how is it defined? 
Who counts as “indigenous” in any society is a fundamentally political ques-
tion, since such representations emerge from struggles over particular social, 
cultural, environmental, and economic matters at particular moments (García 
2008; Friedlander 1975). It is a historically contingent formulation that changes 
over time. Moreover, indigeneity is relational; like all forms of identity, it emerges 
Introduction    7
from contested and co-constituting social fields of difference and sameness (see 
Bigenho 2007; Fuss 1995 Nelson 1999). As Marisol de la Cadena and Orin Starn 
point out, “indigenous cultural practices, institutions, and politics become such in 
articulation with what is not considered indigenous within the particular social 
formation in which they exist” (2007: 4). Thus, throughout this book, when I use 
the terms “indigenous” or “white–mestizo,” I am referring to social categories that 
take on specific meanings in the Bolivian context.
Race is a central line of fracture in Bolivia, where somewhere between 40 and 
60 percent of people identify in national censuses as indigenous (INE 2003, 2012). 
There is an enormous diversity among this self-identifying group, with big differ-
ences between highland and lowland communities and between urban and rural 
residents. Yet the dominant class has grappled with “the Indian question” in every 
era—trying to determine the proper role of indigenous people in society and the 
economy (Postero and Zamosc 2004; Zavaleta Mercado 1986). In some eras, this 
question was explicitly tied to race; in others, it was described in terms of ethnic-
ity or subsumed under class. Following Peter Wade (1997), I use the terms “race” 
and “racism” to describe relations between Bolivia’s native peoples and the whites 
and mestizos who dominated them for centuries. Needless to say, scientists now 
agree that there is no basis for describing human differences in terms of race, but 
in Bolivia, indigenous people have been and continue to be subjected to overt rac-
ism. Thus, describing these relations as “racialized” draws attention to the ways 
creating and enforcing categories of difference can act as a form of domination. 
In Bolivia, racialized difference was created historically in part through long-term 
extractivist patterns of development that tore native peoples from their lands, ex-
ploited their labor, and denied them full membership in the polity (Galeano 1973; 
Larson 2004; Platt 1982). Racism in the form of discourses about the inferiority, 
savagery, and childishness of Indians justified this violence, but racism was also 
produced in the practices and power relations that resulted. That is, in wielding 
power over indigenous peoples and claiming the right to exploit their territories’ 
resources, white–mestizo elites enacted the situated practices of domination I am 
referring to as racism.
In the Bolivian case, Thomas Abercrombie argues that the colonial opposition 
of “Indian” to “European” was always a semiotic construction based in a system of 
inequality (Abercrombie 2001: 97). Before contact with Europeans, of course, no 
such overarching category united native communities and groups. Beginning in 
the colonial era, Indians were forced to pay tribute taxes and to work in near-slav-
ery conditions on colonizers’ haciendas and in silver mines, the profits of which 
helped fuel Europe’s industrial revolution (Galeano 1973). In the lowlands, native 
peoples were forced into servitude during the rubber boom. In the colonial period, 
difference was explicitly racialized; the casta system, based on “blood purity,” de-
termined status. After the conquest, and with colonization by the Spanish, already 
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fragmented Andean communities underwent radical transformations—their 
ritual-economic-political systems were replaced by Christian practices, and their 
noble authorities by town councils. These changes may have eliminated the differ-
entia of Indianness and produced what Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui calls a “cultural 
mestizaje”(1993: 64), but Abercrombie argues that the invented category persisted 
because it was the foundation of both Spanish landholders’ claims to labor and, 
ironically, for native peoples’ claims to limited autonomy (Abercrombie 2001: 104). 
These stereotypes were “invested with terrible power” (ibid): those categorized as 
Indians were forced to provide labor and tribute and restricted from living in cer-
tain places, like city centers (Platt 1982; Harris 1995). Aníbal Quijano concludes 
that these colonial structures of political and cultural domination established new 
racialized social identities based on the distribution of work, which set in place a 
long-term system of classification and knowledge production he calls the “coloni-
ality of power”(Quijano 2007). In Bolivia, Rivera Cusicanqui argues, this colonial 
opposition was a dialectical process. Through permanent confrontation of images 
and self-images, three fundamental identities were forged: indio (Indian), q’ara 
(white), and cholo (mestizo), the latter being a category filled with ambiguity and 
discursive insecurity (Rivera Cusicanqui 1993: 57–60).
The oppositional categories were both exacerbated and then reformulated as 
a result of the “age of insurrection” in the 1780s, when Andeans mounted a for-
midable rebellion against Spanish colonial power, and then again after the 1898 
civil war, when the Aymara cacique Pablo Zárate (dubbed el temible Willka—“the 
frightful Wilka”—by the local press), who fought with the Federal army, pro-
voked a rising in the Altiplano against the liberal government in La Paz. After a 
massacre of whites and mestizos by Willka’s followers, fears of “race war” caused 
Bolivia’s mestizo–Creole elite to rethink the position of indigenous populations 
vis-à-vis the state (Bigenho 2006: 267; Egan 2007). In their search for enlightened 
methods to control the native population, Bolivian artists, intellectuals, and writ-
ers developed a “discourse on the autochthonous,” expressing “ambivalent racial 
sentiments of pride, nostalgia, and fascination with the Indian” (Sanjinés 2004). 
 Gabrielle Kuenzli documents, for instance, how intellectuals and local communi-
ties reworked the meaning of Aymara identity, seeking to cleanse it of its “barba-
rism” by projecting fictional links to a noble Inca past (Kuenzli 2013). Known as 
indigenismo, this new vision sought to bring Indians into the nation by disciplin-
ing, improving, or assimilating them.
After winning independence from Spain in 1825, Creole elites exploited native 
peoples in different ways, arguing that indigenous collective landholding was an 
obstacle to the creation of a modern nation-state. Legislation deprived Indians of 
their lands and drove them into exploitative labor relations with rich landown-
ers. A small cadre of mestizo families controlled the mining sector, also fueled by 
indigenous labor (Rivera Cusicanqui 1983 [2003]; Larson 2004; Zavaleta Mercado 
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1986). Dissatisfaction with these patron–peon patterns contributed largely to revo-
lution in 1952. Peasant uprisings and land takeovers pushed the new government 
to put an end to the system of large landowning, called latifundio, and to imple-
ment a wide-ranging agrarian reform to give the indigenous peasant farming class 
access to land. After the 1952 revolution, the category of Indian was erased and 
rural people were all considered simply as campesinos, or peasants, their differ-
ences elided in an effort to produce a mestizo nation. In this period, the category 
of Indian was buried in the discourse of class, but racism did not disappear. If the 
category of campesino was intended to resolve the “Indian question” by drawing 
attention away from race or ethnicity, in practice, indigenous peasants continued 
to feel the effects of racism. The reforms after the revolution were intended to re-
verse some of the worst of these abuses, but they made only slight inroads into the 
structured poverty that resulted from the colonial land grabs.
As Michelle Bigenho explains, indigenismo was critical to this effort as well, 
as staged performances of Indian culture and folklore contributed to a reformu-
lation of indigeneity. As the elite appropriated and enacted Indian customs and 
culture in order to domesticate and incorporate them, the fictional and essential-
ized boundaries between Indians and Europeans became blurred, transforming 
indigeneity from a despised category into the basis of a reconceptualized mestizo 
nation ( Bigenho 2006: 274). Meanwhile, the liberal form of citizenship instituted 
after 1952 relied on a “cultural package of behavioral prescriptions designed to 
turn the unruly but ‘passive’ Indian into an active mestizo ‘citizen’: property-own-
ing, integrated into the capitalist market, and ‘castilianized’ (speaking Spanish)” 
( Rivera Cusicanqui 2010b: 33). Mestizaje thus became the dominant paradigm for 
the  Bolivian nation. This meant, in part that the status of mestizo became blurred 
with whiteness, as the educated and elite classes identified themselves as mestizos. 
I use the term “white–mestizo” to refer to this group, who may be seen by indig-
enous people as q’aras, or whites, but may see themselves as mestizos. But as Rivera 
Cusicanqui makes clear, the integrating mechanisms of school, army barracks, and 
union also generated new forms of violence and exclusion, simultaneously recom-
posing the devalued categories of cholos and indigenous (Rivera Cusicanqui 1993: 
78). During the years of dictatorship that followed, these structures were further 
exacerbated, as elites expanded their cattle, logging, and agribusiness empires, tak-
ing over indigenous lands throughout the lowlands.
Andean intellectuals began rethinking this politics of race and class, and in 
the 1980s, the Aymara-based Katarista movement pushed a more nuanced revo-
lutionary vision, characterizing oppression of indigenous people as the result of 
both their ethnicity and their class (Hurtado 1986; Reinaga 1969). They began not 
only to struggle for economic justice but also to push for the recognition and de-
fense of their history, values, and language. Lamenting the paternalism of Bolivian 
 society and the humiliating poverty in which they lived, they called for indigenous 
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peasants to organize as a people (pueblo) whose most important resource is its 
culture. While not explicitly referring to race, the Kataristas spoke of oppression, 
racism, human rights, and the liberation of the Indian peoples (Hurtado 1986).
The term “indigenous” that we hear today became dominant in the 1980s, 
sparked in part by an international discourse of indigenous rights (Postero and 
Zamosc 2004; Tsing 2007). Responding in part to marches and increasingly public 
demands by indigenous peoples inspired by the new discourses of identity politics 
and the long historical memory of resistance, in the 1990s, the Bolivian government 
implemented a new scheme of neoliberal multicultural citizenship, which includ-
ed expanded political participation, intercultural education, and collective territo-
rial titling. The category of “indigenous people” (pueblos indígenas) became the 
term of choice for lowland peoples, and “originary peoples” (pueblos originarios) 
for highland peoples. For neoliberal politicians, the answer to the Indian question 
was to transform unruly Indians into disciplined political participants and respon-
sible managers of their own territories and communities (Postero 2007a). In this 
era, difference was overtly recognized and tamed: Indians were now indigenous 
citizens, but this citizenship was limited. Indigenous citizens could participate in 
local government as long as they were carefully inserted into the neoliberal system 
of governance (Hale 2004; Postero 2007a). Lowland groups took up the indige-
nous label to organize demands for territory, relying on international conceptions 
of indigenous rights such as the International Labour Organization’s 1989 Indig-
enous and Tribal Peoples Convention (No. 169), which was adopted by  Bolivia in 
1991. Highland groups were less enthusiastic about this new framing, since many 
of them had successfully organized as peasant unions (Rivera Cusicanqui 1983 
[2003]). Katinka Webber shows how even in the lowlands, some groups never self-
identified as indigenous, but did adopt the category in order to make claims on the 
state or access legal rights such as territorial titles (K. Webber 2012). Nevertheless, 
62 percent of the adult population reportedly self-identified as indigenous in the 
2001 census (INE 2003). Yet despite this seeming advance in the recognition of op-
pressed peoples, the neoliberal period of privatization and structural adjustment 
did little to change their economic situation. A World Bank study indicated that 
52 percent of Bolivia’s indigenous peoples still lived in extreme poverty in 2004 
(World Bank 2005).
The Bolivian case demonstrates that, rather than being a static identity, indi-
geneity is a contested and changing “relational field of governance, subjectivities, 
and knowledges” (de la Cadena and Starn 2007: 3). The Morales victory in 2005 
represented a historic chance to rewrite the national narrative and to provide new 
answers to the persistent Indian question. Thus, while the Morales administra-
tion was concerned with restructuring the economy, launching a new national 
development model, and rolling back two decades of neoliberalism, it was also 
engaged in a critical battle over the meaning of indigeneity. From the beginning of 
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his administration, Morales took on the role of representing indigenous people in 
this historic reconfiguration. Through political spectacles and speeches invoking 
his Andean ancestors, Morales made clear that his administration was fundamen-
tally committed to changing the position of indigenous people in Bolivia. He has 
continued this role throughout his time as president, invoking indigenous history 
and customs as the backbone of the new Bolivia and the source of the new decolo-
nized society.
The Morales government has brought about enormous changes for Bolivia’s 
 native peoples. First, having an indigenous president has been a source of great 
pride for Bolivians who identify as indigenous or of indigenous heritage. Second, 
the MAS government has overturned many of the neoliberal economic policies, 
notably by “nationalizing” the hydrocarbon industry and returning a significant 
portion of the profits to the country’s poor in the form of infrastructure proj-
ects and cash transfers. The government’s continued adherence to a development 
model based on extraction of natural resources has many critics, especially among 
those whose lands continue to be sacrificed to it. However, many see sharing 
the benefits of Bolivia’s “patrimony” with the poor and indigenous as a sort of 
pachakuti, or radical reversal of Bolivia’s history. But perhaps the most important 
changes have been constitutional and legal. The 2009 constitution declares Bolivia 
to be a plurinational, communitarian state, and establishes a series of rights for 
“indigenous originary and peasant peoples and nations,” including rights to au-
tonomy and self-government, to culture, recognition of their institutions, and the 
consolidation of their territories (Bolivia 2009: Article 2).
In practice, however, the meaning of indigeneity and the claims of indigenous 
people remain sites of bitter contestation. As Anna Tsing suggests, “powerful 
frames for indigeneity are also spaces for disagreement. Not everyone can fit into 
these frames” (Tsing 2007: 52). Critics argue that the emancipatory language about 
indigenous rights in the constitution obscures the more important results of the 
constitution: the overarching power of the central state in the new model (Tapia 
2010; Regalsky 2010). At the Constituent Assembly, the MAS, which controlled 
the majority of the delegates, vetoed indigenous activists’ proposals for indigenous 
self-determination and finally passed a much-reduced version of indigenous au-
tonomy with limited authority and resources (Garcés 2011). Many indigenous ac-
tivists, especially from the lowlands, are now opposed to the MAS, claiming that it 
has abandoned the revolutionary promise of plurinationalism and instead institu-
tionalized a liberal, reformist, centralized state (Regalsky 2010). A second example 
of this contestation is the recent conflict over the government’s proposed high-
way through the Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Secure (TIPNIS; 
Isiboro Sécure Indigenous Territory and National Park), described in chapter 5. 
The TIPNIS case shows the stark contrast between the government’s internation-
al claims to put into effect a development model based on indigenous Andean 
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cosmovisiones (worldviews), on the one hand, and state practices that harshly im-
pact indigenous lands and livelihoods, on the other.
DEC OLONIZ ATION:  DISC OURSE AND PR ACTICE
The fundamental means by which Morales and the MAS government have both 
claimed and reworked the meaning of indigeneity is through the use of the dis-
course and attendant policies of decolonization. Decolonization is not defined in 
the constitution, but the term is used widely in Bolivia, often to refer to efforts 
to overcome the legacies of colonial forms of domination to enable a new society 
based on social justice. For some, it means ending racism (Chivi 2011b). For oth-
ers, the main goal is to overturn structures of inequality built into the political and 
landownership systems (Portugal 2011). Yet others point to the need to make visible 
the multicultural and plurilinguistic character of Bolivia (Vega Camacho 2011) and 
to democratize the country by creating equal opportunities for all (Patzi 2009). I 
consider decolonization to be a form of transitional justice, a term I borrow from 
the human rights literature (e.g., Arthur 2009), where it is used to refer generally to 
mechanisms to move post–civil war societies past the horrors of war and to create 
new patterns of peaceful coexistence. I see decolonization in that way, as an effort 
to move beyond racialized systems of servitude and structural inequalities to a new, 
more equitable society. These goals are, of course, horizons, and this book traces 
the difficult and often contested efforts of the Bolivian state and its citizens to move 
towards them. The discourse of decolonization is a way of representing or orienting 
these efforts, by drawing attention to past injustices and the forms of knowledge, 
power, and subjectivities that persist into the contemporary era.
In the Bolivian public sphere, several overlapping lines of thought that come to-
gether in these definitions can be identified (see Portugal 2011a and Zuñiga 2014). 
All of them begin with colonization, the violent system of genocide, dispossession, 
and exploitation imposed by the Spanish crown. The first is a very local “Indiani-
sta” perspective put forward by Bolivian indigenous intellectuals and others who 
consider decolonization as the necessary overturning of foreign control over na-
tive lands. Inspired by Fausto Reinaga, who declared in La revolución india (1969) 
that the only solution to the Indian problem was emancipation, these thinkers, 
many of them from the Katarista movement, look to the history of oppression 
and land dispossession as the key to decolonization. The Aymara intellectual Pe-
dro Portugal Mollinedo personifies this trend, arguing that decolonization is “the 
process by which the peoples who were stripped of their self-government by the 
foreign invasion recuperate their self-determination” (2011: 65). For him, decolo-
nization is a “concrete historical and political process” that “liquidates the colonial 
system” and returns territory to the original owners (66). This is a primarily politi-
cal approach, focused on taking control of state and territory.
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A second important line of thought comes from subaltern studies (see Guha 
1983), focused on revolutionary decolonizing efforts in other formerly colonized 
countries like India and Algeria. A key influence for this perspective is Franz 
Fanon, who argued that decolonization was an inherently violent process through 
which the entire society would be transformed and new decolonized subject would 
be born (Fanon 1963). This focus on the “subjectivity of the colonized” calls on 
colonized subjects to decolonize themselves and their ways of thinking. It also calls 
attention to the question of internal colonialism, a topic of continuing interest to 
Bolivian scholars (Cárdenas 2011; Chivi 2011a; Rivera Cusicanqui 1983; Zavaleta 
Mercado 1986). The postcolonial studies of academics such as Walter Mignolo 
(2000), Aníbal Quijano (2007), and Catherine Walsh (2007) offer a third important 
line of thought. While there are many differences among these thinkers, their col-
lective contribution to this debate is a focus on the relation between power, knowl-
edge, and culture. They point out how colonial forms of domination obscured 
indigenous ways of thinking and knowing, privileging Western categories and 
epistemologies—what is termed “coloniality of knowledge” (Quijano 2007). A fun-
damental aspect of this critique is a recognition of the ongoing nature of this distor-
tion in what is termed “modernity/coloniality,” thus calling for a rethinking of the 
binaries between nature and culture that underlie capitalism and development (see 
Escobar 2007, 2008, 2010; Blaser 2010; de la Cadena 2010, 2015). In this view, de-
colonization requires thinking and speaking from a different locus of enunciation, 
claiming a new epistemological relation to the state, and recuperating non-Western 
culture, language, cosmology, and forms of being. A Bolivian example of this per-
spective is the Aymara philosopher Rafael Bautista, who argues that the central 
feature of colonial domination is the still powerful myth of white superiority, which 
devalued indigenous cultures, religions, languages, and ways of life. In his view, 
to decolonize Bolivian society is to cleanse it of these dangerous foundations and 
recuperate indigenous pride, forms of knowledge, and practices (personal commu-
nication, August 22, 2012). The new society will involve a new “ethical structuration 
of the subject,” based on the principle of vivir bien (living well) and the protection 
of Mother Earth (Bautista 2010b). While this approach is often criticized as merely 
culturalist or for failing to combine these insights with the political urgency of en-
gaged social movements (see Rivera Cusicanqui 2010: 58; Portugal 2011), it remains 
an important rationale in most debates in Bolivia (see, e.g., Burman 2011b; Viaña 
et al. 2010). The Aymara feminist Julieta Paredes concludes that while decoloniza-
tion must also address the material aspects of colonial domination, a central task is 
“create a new imaginary, a new concept of culture.” During the neoliberal era, much 
of the nation’s creative work was taken over by the middle class, she told me. De-
colonization now requires reconceptualizing society in ways that “decolonize both 
heads and bodies, but mostly heads, ways of thinking.  .  .  . We Indians ourselves 
have to be creating, producing poetry” (personal communication, July 2012).
14    Introduction
DEC OLONIZING THE STATE
The MAS government has produced several documents that provide guidelines for 
how decolonization should orient state action. Its 2006 Plan Nacional de Desar-
rollo (PND; National Development Plan) mandated that the state dismantle the 
colonial state apparatus and eliminate colonial forms of domination in all social 
spheres (Bolivia 2006: 14). This would require a transformation of the state, a rec-
ognition of the political, economic, and cultural practices of previously excluded 
peoples, and a focus on representations, discourses, and ideological structures of 
race and ethnicity. Idón Chivi, a key spokesperson for the Vice Ministry of Decolo-
nization, suggests that decolonization must be carried out in multiple dimensions, 
intervening at the political level through state policies, programs, and legislation, 
as well as at the cultural level, remaking the Bolivian imagination (Cambio 2011).
The MAS insists that by exposing coloniality in all its aspects, the state can con-
struct a just society (Mamani and Chivi 2010: 25). Taking a cue from Aníbal Qui-
jano, Bolivia’s Viceministro de Descolonización declared that “decolonization is the 
concentration of state energies to combat racism and patriarchy (the substrate of 
coloniality), and it is accomplished by critically establishing the functioning of the 
coloniality of knowledge, power, and being” (ibid). It promises to do this by estab-
lishing new normative models, redesigning institutions, and projecting new horizons 
and life goals for the new generation (24–26). In chapter 3, I focus on efforts to gener-
ate changes at the symbolic and cultural levels. Using the example of a spectacular 
“collective wedding of our traditions” that the Vice Ministry held in 2011, I examine 
how decolonization works to foment alternative positive visions of indigeneity and 
how the state relies on idealizations of indigeneity to justify its own agendas.
This brings us to the fundamental question of the state. The central paradox 
of the decolonization process in Bolivia today is the tension between the desire 
to overturn coloniality and all its legacies and the use of liberal state mechanisms 
to do so. In this book, I trace the ways the Morales government uses the tools 
and apparatus of the state to advance its anti-colonial agenda and, in the process, 
engages in state formation, constructing a powerful image of a new plurinational 
state and its acceptable subjects. Here, I follow Akhil Gupta, who argues that states 
“are not just functional bureaucratic apparatuses, but powerful sites of symbolic 
and cultural production” (Gupta 2012: 43). The sociologist Philip Abrams has ar-
gued that we should think about the state, not as an ontological reality, but as a 
powerful “idea” endowed with “coherence, singularity, and legitimacy.” The state 
acts as a mask that “prevents our seeing political practice as it is.” Consequently, 
we should suspend our belief in the “state idea” and instead consider how this idea 
and the resulting “state system” (institutional apparatus and its practices) combine 
to legitimize rule and domination (Abrams [1977] 1988: 82; see also Gupta and 
Sharma 2006: 279).
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This has several implications. First, the assumed reality and coherence of the 
state must be questioned. Abrams’s followers use this insight to draw attention 
to the fact that states are “imagined”: they are “entities that are conceptualized 
and made socially effective through particular imaginative and symbolic devices” 
(Gupta 2012: 43; Krupa and Nugent 2015). This calls for us to study the apparatus 
of the state to discover how this idea is mobilized, represented, and imbricated in 
state institutions and practices, such as bureaucracy, state rituals, and so on (Gupta 
2012: 43). Second, the understanding of the state as created calls our attention to 
the processes by which this occurs and the effects this has on the subjects of the 
state. Following Abrams, Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer (1985) make clear that 
state formation is a “cultural revolution.” “The repertoire of activities and institu-
tions conventionally identified as the state,” they argue, are “cultural forms,” “state-
ments that define, in great detail, acceptable forms and images of social activity 
and individual an collective identity. . . . [They] regulate much of social life” (3). 
We can thus understand the state as a “performative category,” an idea that is per-
formed and reiterated, creating new forms of subjectivity in the process (Blom 
Hansen and Stepputat 2005: 7).
In the Bolivian case I describe here, I begin by demonstrating the lack of coher-
ence in the MAS state. Chapter 1 describes the diverse and often conflicting ideolo-
gies and agendas of those who brought the MAS to power and took places in the 
state apparatus. These divisions, especially between indigenous activists pushing 
sustainable development based on native cosmovisiones, and leftists pushing in-
dustrialization, have proved long-lasting. Chapters 4 and 5 return to these schisms 
and the bitter disputes over national development models based on resource ex-
traction. Yet a key contribution of the book is showing how, at least in the first 
years of their administration, Morales and his MAS party officials engaged in state 
formation by mobilizing a discourse of decolonization. The Bolivian state is not 
coherent by any means, but its actors engage in a wide range of “decolonizing” 
activities, ranging from legislation and policy to public speeches and spectacular 
performances. I observe how these constitute a “cultural revolution,” and how they 
seek to form certain acceptable subjects of the plurinational state. Yet, as Abrams 
insisted, the point here is to understand the disunity and struggle concealed by 
the mask of a coherent state (Abrams [1977] 1988: 79). Throughout the book, I 
show how the discourse of decolonization operates to enable certain practices and 
to silence others. This offers a challenge to those who hold out decolonization as 
an incontrovertible good, asking us to see what is produced by its invocation and 
what is obscured.
One of the greatest disagreements the Morales government has had to face has 
to do with what form the state should take. When Morales came to power, his 
“democratic cultural revolution” proposed a new kind of state. Exhausted by cen-
turies of liberal government, which had benefited the white–mestizo class, many 
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indigenous activists hoped to refound the state and create a regime based upon 
indigenous customs and ontologies, or ways of understanding reality. In their 
view, the indigenous Bolivian state offered an exciting challenging to the liberal 
state. Liberalism is a complicated concept, with a long history, both economic and 
political dimensions, and multiple interpretations (see Brown 2003). Restricting 
ourselves here to the political dimension, we can say that liberalism’s central tenet 
is individual liberty. As Wendy Brown puts it, “liberalism signifies an order in 
which the state exists to secure the freedom of individuals on a formally egalitar-
ian basis” (ibid.). A liberal state can have a variety of differing economic poli-
cies, leaning towards Keynesian welfare policies to maximize equality or towards 
the maximization of free trade and competition. Regardless of which economic 
policies are favored, however, liberalism requires constitutional constraints on the 
arbitrary exercise of governmental authority. “The sine qua non of the liberal state 
in all its varieties is that governmental power and authority be limited by a system 
of constitutional rules and practices in which individual liberty and the equality of 
persons under the rule of law are respected” (Gray 2003: 71–72). Yet scholars have 
long noted that liberalism’s embrace of individual liberty is based on systematic 
exclusion of those not deemed worthy of rights (Mehta 1997). As is well known, 
the foundations of liberalism were established in the French and American revo-
lutionary constitutions, which summarily excluded slaves, women, and the illiter-
ate from citizenship (Holston 2008; Dubois 2004). In Bolivia, liberal citizenship 
schemes since the republican era excluded the large indigenous majority (Postero 
2007a). Even after universal suffrage was officially granted after the 1952 revolu-
tion, indigenous people lacked substantive citizenship rights and protections. 
Thus, liberalism offers little inspiration for most indigenous Bolivians.
The Portuguese scholar Boaventura de Sousa Santos has documented the excit-
ing turn to refound the state across Latin America, and to imagine alternatives to 
liberalism, colonialism, and capitalism. He points to a central tension across the 
region between those who think that the liberal state is so linked to the colonial 
past that it cannot be redeemed, and those who believe that if reformed, the state 
can be part of the solution (Santos 2010: 63). In Bolivia, for instance, the Aymara 
intellectual Pablo Mamani has argued that trying to use the power of the liberal 
state to reorder society is an inherently colonial move that does nothing to alter 
the ontology of power. Santos argues that the central question remains whether 
the liberal state, long an instrument of racialized and class hegemony, can become 
a counterhegemonic instrument. Can social movements seeking justice find use 
in the tools of liberalism, like representative democracy, the rule of law, human 
rights, and constitutionalism? (67).
There are no simple answers to Santos’s question. The Morales government has 
found itself caught between its critiques of previous liberal states and its own em-
brace of liberal democracy. The MAS came to power through peaceful elections, 
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and it continues to legitimize its rule as democratically elected. Yet at the 2006 
Constituent Assembly, the MAS was accused of illiberal and anti-democratic pow-
er grabs. Moreover, the new liberal Bolivian state, controlled by a political party 
intent on consolidating its power, also posed obstacles to the demands for libera-
tion proposed by indigenous peoples. The MAS’s choice to condense power into 
the central state forms the basis of vehement dissent, as social movement actors 
lament the foreclosing of popular and communal forms of political practice in 
favor of state institutions. The Bolivian case analyzed here confirms that the reality 
of political practices is disunity, even in an indigenous-led state.
POLITICS,  DISAGREEMENT,  AND PERFORMANCE
Throughout this book, I draw inspiration from the French political philosopher 
Jacques Rancière, who defines politics as a process of emancipation brought about 
by disagreement. Rancière’s terms feel somewhat awkward in English translation, 
but I find them useful in understanding how those excluded from power can be-
come legible political subjects. He distinguishes between two terms. “Policing” 
is the implicit law or order that partitions out places and forms of participation 
and exclusion in the world. This partition creates coordinates whereby some peo-
ple have recognizable “parts” in society, while others are “the part with no part.” 
“Politics,” on the other hand, involves calling attention to the “scandal” of this dis-
tribution and to the exclusions it creates (Rancière 1999). The essence of politics 
thus resides in acts that challenge the seemingly natural order of bodies in the 
name of equality and, in the process, reconfigure the existing order (Rancière 2006 
[2004]: 90) By emphasizing these disagreements, it becomes possible to interpret 
the ongoing forms of contestation that animate contemporary Bolivia as its peo-
ple attempt to decolonize, develop, and refashion their country as a plurinational 
 indigenous state.
Using Rancière’s terms, we can think of indigenous organizing over recent de-
cades as an emancipatory politics intended to draw attention to the “miscount” or 
exclusion of indigenous peoples from the nation. By making their presence vis-
ible, this “part without a part” demonstrates the “wrong” committed by the police 
order, or the structures of society. There is little doubt that during the “water war” 
in 2000 and the “gas war” in 2003, Bolivia’s excluded indigenous and poor inhab-
itants made themselves visible, claiming their rights as citizens, and demanding 
to be taken into account (Postero 2007a). Yet as the colonial studies approach to 
decolonization makes clear, this recount does not happen only at the institutional 
or legal level, but also at deep cultural and even psychological levels. Rancière de-
scribes this in terms of aesthetics, explaining that a fundamental way that society 
is ordered is through a “distribution of the sensible.” By this he refers to the ways 
in which certain people and certain voices are neither seen nor heard: they are 
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simply not perceived. It is only through disagreement, through polemically insert-
ing their voices into what is supposed to be a common sphere, that the order can 
be changed and the previously excluded be perceived (Rancière 1999: 41).
But how do those seemingly invisible “parts without a part” make themselves 
visible? Judith Butler argues that much of what we see as political activism is in fact 
performative. Building on Hannah Arendt’s notion of the “space of appearance” 
(Arendt 1958: 198), Butler says: “when bodies assemble on the street, in the square, 
or in other forms of public space . . . they are exercising a plural and performative 
right to appear, one that asserts and instates the body in the midst of the political 
field, and which in its expressive and signifying function, delivers a bodily demand 
for a more livable set of economic, social, and political conditions no longer af-
flicted by induced forms of precarity” (Butler 2015: 11). Butler argues that through 
the performative act of “appearing,” what she calls “enactments”—some through 
language, and others through the body—even the most disenfranchised can “re-
claim or resignify” existing social relations, thus exposing and, sometimes, trans-
forming the limits of the political. In this view, we can see the efforts of the state, 
and especially the Vice Ministry of Decolonization, to make coloniality visible as 
an ongoing “politics” with a goal of reordering the distribution of the sensible. 
Throughout Bolivia’s history, indigenous peoples have been discursively opposed 
to whites and mestizos and depicted as savage obstacles to modernity and prog-
ress. The fundamental task of decolonization is to change these ideas, held at the 
deepest aesthetic levels. The political theorist Benjamin Arditi evokes the image of 
the “awkward guest” who calls on “the disruptive noise of the people,” disregarding 
the “table manners of democratic politics” (Arditi 2007: 78). Decolonization can 
act this way, too. Vice Minister of Decolonization Félix Cárdenas told me in 2011 
that his job is to “dismantle and deconstruct the colonial state . . . to make everyone 
uncomfortable, to question everything” (personal interview, August 2011).
Following Butler and Rancière, then, we can see that a central role of decoloni-
zation is to provide a “space of appearance” for those rendered invisible by colonial 
legacies. Discursive battles over names and images do some of this work. As I de-
scribe in chapter 1, for instance, the government has taken great care to name new 
public works after indigenous heroes. The Túpac Katari communications satellite 
launched in 2013, named after the leader of anti-colonial insurrection in 1781, is a 
prime example. However, throughout the book, I also focus on the realm of per-
formance, and especially on the highly contested sphere of political ritual. Diana 
Taylor argues that performances function as “vital acts of transfer, transmitting 
social knowledge, memory, and a sense of identity” through reiterated behaviors. 
“Embodied practice,” she says, “offers a way of knowing” (2003: 2–3). While there 
are many sorts of performances in the public sphere, she especially focuses on the-
atricality and spectacle, where actors draw from the ephemeral repertoire of em-
bodied practices and knowledge such as spoken language, dance, and ritual (19). 
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I use this notion of performance to demonstrate how the actors on all sides of the 
Bolivian political spectrum use their bodies and charged symbols of indigeneity, 
history, and the nation in public performances. Morales is especially adept in his 
performance of indigeneity, gaining legitimacy for his government agenda, but, as 
becomes clear in my analysis of the TIPNIS controversy (chapter 5), performances 
and claims about indigeneity also bolster the claims of state critics, disrupting the 
police order.
I have suggested that we can see decolonization as a form of emancipatory poli-
tics. Returning to Rancière, I want to propose that the discourse and practices of 
decolonization can also act as a form of “policing.” That is, the state can utilize the 
ideas and rhetoric of decolonization to legitimate its own power, turning decolo-
nization from a call for alternative epistemologies into a state-sponsored form of 
multicultural recognition. The state has enormous power to engage in what Cor-
rigan and Sayer call “moral regulation” (1998: 3–4). As described in the previous 
section, the Morales state has engaged in an active campaign to represent indige-
nous peoples, in the process defining acceptable versions of indigeneity. Through-
out this book, however, I explore the possibility that the decolonization discourse 
linked to a generic form of indigeneity acts to consolidate state power. By silencing 
the heterogeneity and disagreement about indigenous life and throwing the weight 
of the state behind a particular vision of indigeneity, the state acts as if there were 
a consensus about what decolonization is and who counts as the subjects of it. To 
the extent that this succeeds, we can characterize it as “post-political,” a term po-
litical philosophers use to describe practices of governance that operate through a 
prefigured consensus surrounding the seemingly politically neutral fields of inter-
vention (Rancière 2006; Swyngedouw 2009, 2010; Žižek 1999, 2006; Postero and 
Elinoff, forthcoming).
However, as this book demonstrates over and again, indigeneity and decoloni-
zation are not neutral fields, but sites of overarching tension and contradiction that 
have been reworked and recontextualized in the Morales era. In the second half of 
the book, I argue that as the Morales government has continued and expanded its 
dependence on extractive development, these organizing frameworks have been at 
the center of enormous public battles over national development models and race. 
In chapters 4 and 5, I describe how the government tries to balance the tensions 
between capitalist notions of industrialization and extraction and alternative vi-
sions of development based on indigenous customs and values.
I argue that the resulting contestations are contestations over race. On the one 
hand, the government’s agenda sparked a strong, violent racist countermovement 
from elite white–mestizo agribusiness in the eastern lowlands for regional au-
tonomy and independence from the central state. On the other, notwithstanding 
government rhetoric to the contrary, the country’s extractivist development model 
adversely affects indigenous communities. Furthermore, This tension came to a 
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head in the controversy over the government’s plan to build a highway through the 
TIPNIS national park and indigenous territory, which illuminates how indigenous 
peoples’ bodies and territories continue to be the site of political and economic 
violence by both the Left and the Right.
In chapter 6, I argue that in recent years, indigeneity and decolonization have 
undergone yet another recontextualization. I show how since 2011, decolonization 
and indigenous culture have been displaced by a new discourse of “economic lib-
eration,” through which the state has combined its earlier demands for economic 
justice with an emphasis on national sovereignty. Through a case study of three 
local indigenous communities, I show how in some circumstances, ethnic identi-
ties are giving way to class alliances as indigenous groups press for justice. In the 
final chapter 7, I describe the determined efforts of one indigenous Guaraní com-
munity, that of Charagua, to make strategic use of the discourses of decoloniza-
tion and the new tools in the plurinational constitution to work towards long-held 
goals of indigenous autonomy.
This study of the confusing and exhilarating world of indigenous state-making 
in Bolivia focuses precisely on the blurry boundary between politics and policing, 
illuminating the tensions within liberalism, the continuing costs of capitalist de-
velopment, and the promises of a decolonized Bolivia. The cover of this book—a 
satellite image of deforestation in the department of Santa Cruz, the product of 
the expansion of agriculture, ranches, and neighborhoods into the zone’s tropical 
 forests—attempts to articulate these tensions. Is it beautiful or terrifying—or both?
SITUATING THE AUTHOR
Before going further, I want to take a moment to situate myself and to give the 
reader a way to fit this book into the larger trajectory of my research. It builds on 
over twenty years of research in Bolivia. I first traveled to Bolivia as a radio jour-
nalist in 1990, working on a series called Vanishing Homelands that was aired on 
National Public Radio (see http://homelands.org/projects/vanishing-homelands). 
That series focused on the relation between development, indigenous peoples, and 
the environment, and took me all over Latin America. But it was Bolivia that cap-
tured my passion. While producing stories about indigenous peoples and mission-
aries in the Bolivian tropics, and the informal market in Cochabamba, I learned 
about the growing indigenous peoples’ movement in Bolivia and their revolu-
tionary demands to transform Bolivian society. I was determined to follow—and 
understand—this fascinating process. I entered graduate school in 1994, seeking 
theoretical tools to help me do so, and began research for my dissertation in 1995. 
Since 1995, I have divided my time between California and Bolivia, where I lived 
for extended periods between 1997 and 2000, and have subsequently returned ev-
ery year or two for summer fieldwork.
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In Bolivia, to understand national-level politics, I work in the nation’s capital, 
La Paz, but my home base is in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, the capital of the lowland 
state of Santa Cruz, where I have worked with the Guaraní indigenous organiza-
tion, the Capitanía Zona Cruz, since 1995. The Guaraní’s struggles for recogni-
tion are at the center of my dissertation and my first book, Now We Are Citizens: 
Indigenous Politics in Post-multicultural Bolivia (2007a). In it, I examine the ways 
in which Bolivia’s neoliberal multiculturalism created new forms of citizenship 
for Bolivia’s indigenous people. Tracing the long arc of citizenship regimes across 
Bolivia’s history, I argue that neoliberal citizenship of the 1990s created an expecta-
tion of citizenship, but did not resolve the demands for self-determination indig-
enous peoples had made since colonial times. I ended that book with the election 
of Evo Morales and the exciting promise of the post-multicultural era his presi-
dency inaugurated.
The present book brings me full circle to evaluate those promises. It brings 
together much of the work I have done over the intervening years, studying the 
historic Constituent Assembly of 2006, the new constitution, the tensions result-
ing from the national development agenda, and the discourses and policies of the 
Morales government. Over these years, I have carried out new fieldwork in the 
highland communities of Tiwanaku and El Alto (chapters 3 and 6) and in Chara-
gua, in the Chaco region (chapter 7), as well as returning regularly to the Guaraní 
communities of “Bella Flor” and “El Futuro,” where I did my original disserta-
tion research (chapter 6). Thus, I hope this book provides a comprehensive view 
of contemporary Bolivia. But, as with my first book, my primary lens onto these 
subjects is through the perspective of my indigenous friends from the Guaraní 
communities in the lowlands. I have remained in close contact with them, and 
their vision of the Morales state is central my analysis here. My own research and 
observations are augmented by the opinions of my fellow Bolivia scholars, the 
many brilliant Bolivian intellectuals I consult, dedicated NGO workers who are 
closest to the struggles on the ground, and committed government officials who 
have chosen to work from within the MAS state. My Guaraní contacts give me a 
decentered analysis—what Veena Das and Deborah Poole (2004) would call from 
the “margins”—that never ceases to impress me with its grounded, historic, pa-
tient understanding of Bolivian politics. I hope my analysis here does justice to 
their continued friendship and trust in me. Like them, I look towards the horizons 
of possibilities the Morales era has initiated. I hope my work here contributes to 






As the preceding Introduction makes clear, Evo Morales’s administration has 
gained an international reputation for upholding indigenous rights and making 
decolonization the central framework for the “process of change.” Perhaps noth-
ing symbolized this intention better than the format of his inauguration as the 
first indigenous president of Bolivia in January 2006, which took place in two very 
different venues. On January 21, he participated in a popular ceremony at Tiwa-
nuku, a pre-Inca site near La Paz, where, after walking barefoot over coca leaves, 
he was blessed by Andean religious leaders and recognized as their Apumallku, or 
highest authority. To the thousands of admirers shivering in the freezing altiplano 
morning, he declared that “a new millennium has arrived for the original peoples 
[pueblos originarios] of the world” (La Razón 2006a).
The next day, his official inauguration took place in the Congress building in 
Plaza Murillo in La Paz. He began with a moment of silence for the “martyrs of 
liberation,” such as indigenous insurrectionists of the colonial period, intellectuals 
and priests killed during the dictatorship, coca growers fallen in the struggles over 
drug eradication, and urban activists killed during the struggles against neolib-
eralism.1 Then he described his plans for a new Bolivia, saying that he planned a 
“cultural democratic revolution” that would be a continuation of the struggle of 
anti-colonial insurgency leader Túpac Katari to restore Tahuantinsuyo (the Inca 
empire), of Simón Bolívar to found a patria grande, and of Che Guevara to estab-
lish “a new world in equality.” Five hundred years of resistance by indigenous peo-
ples, blacks, and the popular sectors was enough, he said. Now began the next five 
hundred years, in which indigenous Bolivians and workers could end the injustice 
they had suffered as Aymaras, Quechuas, and Guaranís (which he compared to 
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South African apartheid). In conclusion, quoting the spokesman of Mexico’s Za-
patista Army of National Liberation, Subcomandante Marcos, Morales promised 
to “rule by obeying” the Bolivian people (Morales 2006).
In this rainbow of revolutionary representations, Morales committed his Mov-
imiento al Socialismo (MAS; Movement towards Socialism) party and the new 
government to fight against neoliberalism and for indigenous cultural and po-
litical rights, national and territorial sovereignty, human rights, workers’ rights, 
and socialism. This chapter analyzes the emergence of the MAS and its efforts to 
articulate three very different lines of struggle—for indigenous rights, economic 
justice, and popular democracy. In the process, the formerly dispossessed and 
 excluded of Bolivia formed an alliance that enabled them to take state power and 
then defeat the various opposition groups, particularly the elite from the lowlands.
I begin by briefly tracing efforts at social reform from Bolivia’s 1952 revolution 
until 1985, a period in which activism generally took the form of either Marxist-
oriented struggles for labor rights or indigenous demands for recognition. Sub-
sequently, during the 1990s, the cocaleros and the MAS inherited the mantle of 
the labor struggles of the neoliberal era, and labor activists of various tendencies 
came together under the MAS’s banner, creating tensions in the Morales govern-
ment. The MAS made productive use of these tensions, tacking back and forth 
between strategies focusing on mass activism and parliamentary politics. As a re-
sult, it managed to unite its heterogeneous constituencies around a core agenda 
that could be called “indigenous nationalism.” Although this fragile alliance was 
subject to significant contestation, it provided a strong basis for Morales’s popular-
ity among the country’s rural poor and urban indigenous populations, his main 
constituency. To use Rancière’s terminology, the MAS used contestations over race 
and class to construct an emancipatory “politics” (Rancière 1999).
Subsequent chapters will show how the MAS state utilized the discourses of 
 indigeneity and decolonization to consolidate power and put into place a national 
development plan. Like any form of nation-building, it excluded certain groups and 
categories in the process of creating ideal national subjects. In the final  chapters, I 
argue that once the MAS consolidated its power, concern for indigenous rights gave 
way to an agenda focused on economic development, and emancipatory politics 
gave way to policing.
MOVEMENT S FOR SO CIAL JUSTICE IN B OLIVIA:  
A BRIEF HISTORY
Two facts about Bolivia are important to this history. First, Bolivia’s population 
is and has always been predominantly indigenous. According to the 2001 census, 
nearly 62 percent of its people claimed to be native speakers of an indigenous lan-
guage (INE 2003; World Bank 2005). While the meaning of the term “indigenous” 
is under debate, as described in the Introduction, there can be no doubt that it is 
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a central category around which a large sector of Bolivians have organized and 
made political and cultural claims in the past few decades (see Albro 2005; Can-
essa 2006). Second, the two main historic sources of production and income have 
been peasant agricultural workers and miners exploiting subsurface resources, no-
tably silver during the colonial period and tin during the modern era. (In contem-
porary Bolivia, two important new sources have emerged: revenues from natural 
gas and remittances from migrants abroad.) My framing of these facts—the first 
from the perspective of race/ethnicity and the second from a political economy 
focus on class—and their interrelations—reflect the two ways Bolivian movements 
for social change have been organized in the country’s recent history.
Beginning in the 1930s, Bolivia’s miners were the most important civil society 
protagonists, organizing for workers’ rights and fighting repression by the mining 
companies. As they formed federations across the country and allied with other la-
bor organizations such as factory workers, they established the union, or sindicato, 
as the primary form of political and economic resistance. Organized armed miners 
were instrumental in the MNR party’s victory in the revolution of 1952, and the Cen-
tral Obrero Boliviano (COB; Bolivian Workers Central) governed the country jointly 
with the MNR for the first few years after the revolution. As a result, unions became 
the primary legitimate form of accessing political rights, which were negotiated and 
struggled for through a collective union-driven process (García Linera et al. 2004: 42). 
The unions’ relations to the state necessarily changed over time as control over the 
state shifted from left to right, sometimes working with the state, and sometimes 
against it, as during their historic protests against the military dictatorships. What 
is important, however, is the way the sindicato model fused citizenship and labor 
rights, through a unifying discourse focusing on the historical and national value of 
labor (44). Moreover, the miners stood in for all Bolivians, because their struggles 
often went beyond their own material interests to demands for democracy and hu-
man rights. It is also worth noting that popular movements chose the union as the 
privileged form of organizing over political parties, which were seen as controlled by 
the elite (Stefanoni 2003). This line of organizing was deeply influenced by a Marx-
ist analysis of history, based in an ideology which privileged industrial moderniza-
tion and state control of the ownership and distribution of resources (García Linera 
2010). This sector was known for its radical consciousness and militant struggles, the 
legacy of which continues in contemporary organizing (J. Webber 2007).
The other important sector of the labor movement was made up of campesi-
nos, the mostly indigenous peasant farmers of the highlands. In the 1940s, radi-
cal sindicatos campesinos began organizing against the latifundia system, taking 
over large haciendas, and demanding the return of their collective lands, echoing 
indigenous demands since the colonial period (Rivera Cusicanqui 1983; Gordillo 
2000). Campesinos also supported the MNR at the time of the revolution, and 
were rewarded with a number of important reforms in the new postrevolution-
ary state: universal suffrage, rural education programs, and most important, an 
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agrarian reform that gave out land to thousands of campesinos. The MNR pro-
gram was paired with a new discourse of campesino identity: indigenousness was 
submerged in a class-based identity and mediated by a patron state through client 
unions. The national federation of sindicatos campesinos, the Confederación Sin-
dical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB; United Confedera-
tion of Peasant Workers of Bolivia), allied with the COB as representatives of the 
masses. Yet throughout its history, the CSUTCB reflected a continuous tension 
between leftist worker-based ideologies and a more ethnically based set of de-
mands that recognized the indigenous nature of most of its members. In many 
areas of the highlands, as Xavier Albó has noted, the sindicato took on many of the 
features of the traditional Andean sociopolitical organization, the ayllu, blending 
the boundary between Indian and peasant (Albó 2000).
Labor and the state had made class the dominant form of expression of social 
identity, but there were also activists making renewed claims based on indige-
nousness. The most important of these were the young urban Ayamara intellec-
tuals of the Katarista movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s who embraced 
anti-colonial heroes like Túpac Katari and his spouse Bartolina Sisa and orga-
nized around the demand for bilingual education and other cultural aspirations 
(Hurtado 1986; Rivera Cusicanqui 1983). As the movement developed, it argued 
that the problems of indigenous peoples must be viewed through the “theory of 
the two eyes”—pointing out that indigenous peoples were doubly oppressed as an 
exploited class and as a dominated ethnic group (Sanjinés 2004). The Kataristas’ 
important  Tiwanaku Manifesto (1973), which declared indigenous people to be 
“economically exploited and culturally and politically oppressed,” set the stage for 
demands we now characterize as multiculturalism.2 This was in essence a “rein-
vention of  Indianness . . . as a subject of emancipation . . . and a political project” 
(García Linera 2008). The Kataristas were also influential in the campesino move-
ment, pushing the CSUTCB to gradually become more and more “indigenized.” 
They eventually split into two groups. One, headed by Victor Hugo Cárdenas, 
worked in a limited and ultimately unsuccessful way within the political system to 
push for reforms. Cárdenas later served as vice president under Gonzalo Sánchez 
de Lozada, where he headed efforts to institutionalize state-led multiculturalism. 
The other group opted for a more exclusionary radical path of Aymara national-
ism, and formed a guerrilla army led by Felipe Quispe (el Mallku). Álvaro García 
Linera, the current vice president, was a member of this latter group.
THE NEOLIBER AL ER A:  THE RISE OF NEW SO CIAL 
MOVEMENT S
This tension between race and class continued through the 1970s and 1980s until 
1985, when what we might call the neoliberal era began in Bolivia. Bolivia returned 
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to democracy in 1982 with the end of the military dictatorship and by 1985, the new 
elected government, again led by the MNR party, began to institute the aggressive 
economic reforms that were the conditions of loans from the IMF and the World 
Bank. Central to this “New Economic Policy” was the closing and privatizing of 
the tin mines, whose profit margins had fallen during the preceding years as world 
tin prices collapsed. This meant the firing, or relocalización, of thousands of min-
ers, which amounted to the effective silencing of the most combative segment of 
civil society. This was combined with a liberalization of trade and a deregulation 
of labor laws to allow industries to be competitive on the global market, further 
weakening the position of unions. While unions and merchant associations con-
tinue to be a fundamental form of organizing, especially among campesinos and 
workers in the urban informal markets (see Lazar 2008), the neoliberal era dealt a 
harsh blow to the power of sindicatos.
This had several important consequences. “Relocated” miners migrated to cit-
ies like El Alto, where they became involved in urban political struggles, or, most 
importantly, to the tropical Chapare area of Cochabamba, where they began to 
grow coca and to organize in what became Bolivia’s most important new social 
movement, the cocaleros, or coca growers’ union. In essence, this was what several 
scholars refer to as an irradición, or outward radiation, of the old workers’ ideol-
ogy to new forms under new conjunctures (García Linera 2003; Stefanoni 2003). 
The historian James Dunkerly characterizes this new formation as a deindustrial-
ization that reversed the “normal” historical evolution. He argues that “modern” 
wageworkers were thrown back into social circuits associated with other historical 
epochs, combining a legacy of proletarian organizations, a new enforced engage-
ment with agriculture, and market rationalities (Dunkerly 2007: 40). If the old 
discourse of worker citizenship was based on labor, the new discourse of cocalero 
solidarity was based on a strong anti-imperialism stance and an increasing rec-
ognition of the importance of ethnic demands (reivindicaciones). The cocaleros 
came of age in a low-intensity war on drugs led by the U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Agency, whose drug eradication efforts linked the cocaleros and their leader, Evo 
Morales, to “narco-terrorism.” The cocaleros fought back with a repertoire based 
on traditional union strategies—blockades, demonstrations, and hunger strikes—
combined with new claims that the coca leaf was sacred according to Andean cos-
movisión (worldview). This latter claim worked especially well in the international 
sphere, where cocaleros jumped on the bandwagon of the international indigenous 
movement (see Albro 2005). The drug wars of the 1990s cost many cocaleros’ lives, 
but their movement gained strength, emerging as a renewed and recontextualized 
organization firmly opposed to U.S. imperialism and neoliberal economic policies.
The second important process that Bolivia saw in the 1990s was the rise of 
the national indigenous movement, led largely by groups from the eastern low-
lands, or Oriente, whose lands were being invaded by loggers, cattle ranchers, and 
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colonizers from the highlands. Influenced by the growing international indige-
nous movement, and supported by NGOs, anthropologists, and progressive Jesu-
its, indigenous groups began organizing in the 1980s. By 1990, they had formed 
a national organization called the Confederación Indígena del Oriente Boliviano 
(CIDOB; Indigenous Federation of Eastern Bolivia), which began articulating 
new demands for indigenous recognition and for collective landownership, which 
was expressed under the rubric of territorio (territory). This new social movement 
was very different from both the sindicato model and the Katarista demands that 
linked race with class. Instead, it relied on identity politics, in which culture and 
ethnic difference were the most salient basis for rights, and did not make any radi-
cal challenges to capitalism. The lack of a class component made it particularly 
amenable to being incorporated into the neoliberal government’s new forms of 
governance, which others and I have termed neoliberal multiculturalism (see Hale 
2002, 2004; Postero 2007a). In the mid 1990s, the Sánchez de Lozada government 
deepened the economic restructurings of the 1980s, while at the same time pair-
ing them with a series of reforms that explicitly recognized indigenous demands. 
These multicultural reforms included an agrarian reform that allowed for collective 
titling of indigenous territories, the establishment of intercultural, bilingual edu-
cation, and the Law of Popular Participation, a form of decentralization that rec-
ognized indigenous groups and their leaders as actors in municipal development 
decisions. I have argued that this form of state-led multiculturalism had important 
symbolic effects in that it created a powerful discourse of indigenous citizenship. 
Nevertheless, my research showed that Bolivia’s neoliberal multiculturalism was 
more effective as a politics of recognition than as a politics of redistribution. It 
did not substantially alter the structural inequalities facing indigenous peoples. 
Rather, it was a top-down effort by the neoliberal state to incorporate indigenous 
peoples into the national project as responsible, docile neoliberal subjects (Postero 
2007a). As the events since 2000 have shown, however, this was not the result.
THE MAS PHENOMENON: A NEW PLEBIAN B OLIVIA
The failure of the multicultural reforms to substantially alter the endemic racism 
that marks Bolivian society or to curb the power of the elite-led political parties 
had a surprising result. In the mid 1990s, indigenous organizations began to put 
up candidates from their own political parties, the most successful of which was 
the MAS, headed by the cocalero leader Evo Morales. The MAS took shape in the 
mid-1990s in the congresses of the Asamblea por la Soberanía de los Pueblos (ASP; 
Assembly for the Sovereignty of the People), a loose federation of campesino and 
cocalero unions. The ASP formed what was called the Instrumento Político por 
la Soberanía de los Pueblos (IPSP; Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the 
People) and borrowed the name and legal identity of an existing political party, the 
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Movimiento al Socialismo, or MAS, from the Falange Socialista Boliviana, origi-
nally a far-right party.3 So, from the beginning, while this group intended to inter-
vene in electoral politics, they did so through a very different form of organization 
that reflected both the syndical logic and the heterogeneity of its constituency. As 
Morales often reminded people, the MAS-IPSP is not a traditional party, but the 
political instrument of the social movements that form its base. And that base 
is eclectic—campesinos, the landless movement, leftist lawyers, women’s groups, 
some lowland indigenous leaders, and assorted Trotskyites. That means that the 
MAS does not have a defined ideological base, but, as the anthropologist Robert 
Albro has pointed out, relies instead on “tactical flexibility,  .  .  . extra-political 
sources of legitimacy, successful cross-sector alliances, emphasis on ‘works’ over 
‘ideas’, and the use of Andean cultural frames” (Albro 2006: 420).
An influential group of Bolivian scholars called the Comuna Group, which in-
cluded Vice President García Linera, argued—compellingly, I think—that this sort 
of fragmented “multitude” is the form working-class demands took in Bolivia at 
the turn of the twenty-first century. Following the insights of the Bolivian politi-
cal scientist René Zavaleta Mercado (1986), they argue that Bolivia is a formación 
abigarrada, a motley or multicolored formation, in which several very different 
forms of social and economic relations coexist in an unequal and disarticulated 
way. They suggest that in the past, as traditional structures of production gave way 
to modernity, unions represented one means by which subalterns struggled for 
inclusion and social protection. With the demise of the union under neoliberal-
ism and post-Fordism, however, a new form of plebian organization evolved, in 
which preexisting forms of organization such as guilds and peasant organizations, 
“rooted in local spaces and concerns,” played a greater role, bringing collective de-
mands and forms of knowledge to the fore. In their view, Bolivia’s new “multitude” 
formations are not as rigid as previous union-style formations, but rather bring 
together people and groups in “affiliational relationships” and “assembly style de-
mocracy.” In contrast to traditional forms of association, which control and mobi-
lize their members, they suggest, these forms maintain their power through moral 
authority, relying on participants’ conviction in the cause. This is the new plebeya, 
or plebian Bolivia (García Linera 2004; see also Gutiérrez et al. 2002; Tapia 2002; 
Dunkerly 2007: 38–40).4
In fact, local forms of organizing have proved essential to the transformations 
in Bolivia that this book describes, as well as to the many disagreements that fol-
lowed. From 2000 to 2003, resistance to the effects of neoliberalism grew across 
the country, resulting in an outpouring of demonstrations, beginning with the 
“water war” in Cochabamba, where residents protested the privatization of water 
resources, and culminating in the now famous “gas war” of 2003, when President 
Sánchez de  Lozada was forced to resign after six weeks of demonstrations against 
a proposed plan to transport natural gas from Bolivia’s Oriente across Chile and 
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to the United States (see Postero 2007a). The union leader Oscar Olivera was the 
head of the Coordinadora en Defensa del Agua y de la Vida (Coalition in Defense 
of Water and Life) that organized the 2000 Water War. In 2012, he told me that the 
water war had planted two important seeds in Bolivian society. First, he said it drew 
attention to the neoliberal economic model that perpetuated the colonial and neo-
colonial pattern of territorial occupation and expropriation. The water war not only 
broke with that model, it did so by putting forth a simple idea based on indigenous 
understandings, “that water was a living being, and a resource for life.” Second, 
it began a profound rethinking of who gets to make these important decisions. 
The protestors said, for this first time, “we want to decide.” This was the beginning 
of what he considers a “new form of popular power based fundamentally in new 
forms of organization that had nothing to do with traditional union organizing,” 
instead recuperating ancestral communitarian practices. This “reconstitution of the 
social fabric,” he told me, was essential for the coming together of the MAS, and 
eventually for Morales’s election (personal communication, August 2012).
With this fragmented “plebian” organization in place, MAS candidates began 
to win local elections in 1995, especially in the Chapare, and by 1997, six MAS 
candidates won seats in Congress, including Morales. The MAS articulated a fairly 
radical discourse at that point, reflecting the combined anti-government senti-
ments of its wide base. In 2002, Morales ran for the presidency, coming within a 
few points of Sánchez de Lozada, who became president through a pact between 
parties. From that point, the MAS began to change strategies, moving from the 
position of outsider social movement to that of a vocal opposition party inside 
the parliamentary process. Many on the left feel that the MAS lost its revolution-
ary potential at that point, arguing that it changed into “a reformist party bent 
on winning elections through the courting of the middle class” (J.Webber 2007; 
see also Petras 2008). There is some evidence for this position. Neither Morales 
nor the MAS were actively involved in either the gas war or the water war, both 
of which arose from local grassroots organizing. As Jeffrey Webber has forcefully 
argued, Morales supported a constitutional exit from the crisis in 2003, and then 
formed a temporary alliance with Sánchez de Lozada’s successor, Carlos Mesa, 
who continued many neoliberal policies until he was forced to resign by popular 
demonstrations in May–June of 2005 (J. Webber 2006; see also Petras 2008). This 
pact with Mesa was deeply contested by labor, peasant movements, and the water 
war Coordinadora (Olivera, personal communication, August 2012). Webber sug-
gests that Morales and the MAS then took advantage of this historic shift in the 
structure of social forces to win the 2005 presidential campaign, incorporating the 
language of indigenous liberation of the popular struggles, but abandoning the 
revolutionary project at its heart (J. Webber 2006).
Was this reformism or savvy politicking? I agree with Webber that Morales 
backed away from a revolutionary position in 2005, but I am convinced that part 
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of the reason Bolivia did not spin completely out of control in 2005 was precisely 
because Morales and the MAS existed as an official political party with sufficient 
legitimacy to hold out the promise of a liberal but transformed state. This paved 
the way for the peaceful takeover of the state by the MAS and their efforts to imple-
ment what many see as a transformative agenda. Nevertheless, Webber’s argument 
draws attention to the deep tensions between a revolutionary aim to decolonize 
the state and society and overturn neoliberalism, on the one hand, and the liberal 
state-building project the MAS chose to accomplish this agenda, on the other. This 
tension is at the heart of the political struggles I analyze in the following chapters, 
and we see a distinct shift over the decade of MAS rule. In the early days, indige-
nous activists held more power in the MAS alliance and were able to push forward 
policies intended to decolonize the state and institute indigenous rights, while in 
later years, as I document in the second half of this book, these gave way to a de-
velopment agenda focused on resource exploitation and centralized state power.
THE MAS GOVERNMENT:  AN UNSTABLE 
C ONFEDER ATION?
In his 2005 presidential campaign, Morales laid out the elements of the “revolu-
tionary” agenda. Articulating concerns of class and race, he claimed to represent 
the Bolivian people (el pueblo boliviano), which was both poor and indigenous: 
his party’s motto was “Somos pueblo, somos MAS” (We are the people, we are 
MAS [more]). He did this by focusing on three things. First, he promised to make 
the Bolivian state truly participatory, by allowing the social movements, most of 
whom represented indigenous Bolivians, to be the base of his new government. 
Second, he argued that neoliberalism was a fundamental cause of the shared suf-
fering of Bolivians, and promised to reverse it. Finally, he promoted a national 
sovereignty free from the strictures U.S. imperialism and neoliberal capitalism 
had imposed. National dignity would allow Bolivians the right to grow the sacred 
coca leaf of their ancestors and to take control of their natural resources. Taken 
together, this platform amounts to what Stefanoni calls an indigenous nationalism 
(Stefanoni 2006a).
It is one thing to propose such an ambitious agenda, and quite another to put 
it into practice. First, it is important to point out that despite the desires for inde-
pendence from global capitalism and imperialism, Bolivia must also respond to a 
global context where powerful interests place limits on change and development. 
This is not to excuse the Morales administration, but merely to highlight that de-
cisions and directions are not always set domestically. As such, Morales and his 
team must negotiate a complex international sphere, making pragmatic decisions 
to maximize the income and opportunities they can provide for the country. As I 
explain in greater depth in chapters 4 and 5, Bolivia’s economy relies on selling its 
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natural resources, especially hydrocarbons, on the global market, and this “path 
dependency” makes radical changes very difficult.
Moreover, this radical agenda had to be implemented by a state administered 
by a very diverse MAS coalition. The “indigenous state,” it turns out, was never 
just that. Instead, as the Argentinian scholar and journalist Pablo Stefanoni has ar-
gued, the MAS was an “unstable confederation of ideological factions” (Stefanoni 
2006a). The Bolivian political scientist Roberto Laserna suggested that from the 
start, it was made up of “three tendencies with projects that are not necessarily 
coincidental or harmonious, united by the personal leadership of Evo Morales” 
( Laserna 2010). The groups Laserna identified were: an indigenista group, a social-
ist group, and a populist group. I think the lines between these categories were 
more blurred than Laserna suggested, but his analysis provides a helpful way to 
see how the historical forms I have just traced came together in the first Morales 
administration. I identify these as a way to see the complexities of the so-called 
indigenous state, recognizing that they are abstract categories that do not map 
perfectly onto individuals. Also, as time passed, there were substantial ruptures, 
since many early supporters of the MAS agenda departed, expressing deep dissent 
and disappointment at the way the MAS state developed.
The first group we can identify is the indigenista group, led by the minister 
of the exterior, the Aymara intellectual David Choquehuanca. This group, which 
had most visibility internationally, saw the government’s main role as decolo-
nizing  Bolivian society and bringing about the “cultural and democratic revo-
lution”  Morales spoke of in his inauguration. It carried the demands and ideas 
of the Katarista movement of the 1970s, pushing for indigenous rights and rec-
ognition, and was active in what Laserna calls the “symbolic spaces, providing 
symbols and references to the discourse of the president, and projecting a highly 
charged international image of the government” (Laserna 2010: 40, my transla-
tion).  Choquehuanca and the first MAS minister of education, the Aymara so-
ciologist Félix Patzi, utilized idealized versions of Andean culture to project an 
indigenous image onto the government’s economic projects, arguing that Bolivia’s 
indigenous peoples have solutions to the ills caused by Western capitalism (see 
Postero 2007b). This group used the media, especially a network of government-
funded community radios, to elaborate this “symbolic and cultural discourse.” 
The indigenistas were also very important during the Constituent Assembly (CA), 
where popularly elected—and mostly indigenous—delegates gathered to rewrite 
the constitution. The influence of this tendency can also be seen in Morales’s ap-
pearances in international fora, such as his 2008 declaration at the United Nations 
that the best way to resolve the global climate change crisis was to end capital-
ism and to adopt a more harmonious, indigenous, relation to the earth (El Deber 
2008a). Choquehuanca remains in his position as of this writing (2016), but Patzi 
served only until 2007. He gained further notoriety in 2010, when after an arrest 
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for drunk driving, he relied on indigenous justice codes, paying his debt to society 
by making adobe bricks by hand. He formed a new political party and in 2015 was 
elected the governor of the department of La Paz, handing the MAS a resounding 
defeat in what some called an “Aymara rebellion” (Molina 2015). Some suggest he 
might be a viable presidential candidate in a post-Evo era.
A second sector Laserna identified is that led by President Morales. This pop-
ulist group emphasized the strong role of popular sector social movements, es-
pecially the sindicatos campesinos (peasant unions), and juntas vecinales (urban 
neighborhood associations). This group urged a radical transformation of Boliv-
ian politics, reversing the traditional hold the political elite had on public deci-
sion-making. This tendency is the glue that bound the party together originally, 
and had a strong presence both in the MAS party and in the Congress. Laserna 
says this group was “not defined by its political orientation of ideology, but rather 
by its method: el basismo (populism, or grassroots politics). Its fundamental prin-
ciple, which the president repeats with frequency, is that ‘la voz del pueblo es la 
voz de dios’ (the voice of the people is the voice of God)” (Laserna 2010). The 
strength of this sector was in its ability to mobilize its constituency and take over 
the streets. Morales certainly benefited from his populist image as an indigenous 
man of humble origins with years of service to the movement. Morales actively 
cultivates this image, continuing to attend union congresses and popular meetings 
throughout his presidency, renovating the charismatic face-to-face links he has 
with the public (Stefanoni 2006a: 40). As a result, he could call upon the base to 
quickly take to the streets to support him when challenged. During the conflicted 
months of the Constituent Assembly in 2006–7, MAS supporters from across the 
country mobilized to Sucre, offering the right-wing opposition a clear sign of Mo-
rales’s popular support.
Of course, here we see how Laserna’s categorizations are blurred in practice. 
Morales has had such strong support from his bases largely because of the ways 
he and the government have used indigenous history and bodies in political per-
formance, borrowing heavily from indigenous social movement tactics and strat-
egies. As Linda Farthing and Benjamin Kohl (2013) note, the robust rural oral 
history traditions in Bolivia facilitate cross-generational transmission of past 
injustices, transforming storytelling, commemorations, and rituals into criti-
cal sites for political mobilization. Morales has been particularly adept at these 
sorts of performances. For every critical legislative reform, Morales rallies support 
through spectacular events mobilizing indigenous history and tales of oppression 
and injustice. For instance, when Morales passed the New Agrarian Reform law 
in 2006, he organized social movement activists in the city of Peñas, the site of 
the brutal death of the eighteenth-century anti-colonial Aymara rebel Túpac Ka-
tari. Addressing thousands of peasant farmers, he declared: “I stand before you 
today . . . at the site where Julian Túpac Katari, one of the few literate Indian slaves, 
Figure 4. President Evo Morales at an “Andean” ceremony at Tiwanaku in 2015 celebrating his 
2014 reelection. Credit: U.S. Embassy in La Paz, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0.
Figure 5. Depiction of the anti-colonial leader Túpac Katari at the 2015 celebration at 
 Tiwanaku. Credit: David G. Silvers–Cancillería del Ecuador. https://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-sa/3.0.
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was descuartizado [quartered]. . . . We are here to liberate our country, and Katari 
is the principal reference point for the indigenous struggles in Bolivia and a con-
stant reminder of the obligation to decolonize Bolivia” (La República 2006).
He has repeatedly used the venue of Tiwanaku to cement his indigenous pedi-
gree, building on his 2006 inauguration. In 2015, he held yet another “ancestral” 
ceremony there to mark his victory in the 2104 elections. This time, the walls of 
the archaeological site were covered with a massive representation of Túpac Katari, 
Bolivia’s most famous indigenous anti-colonial rebel (see Figures 4 and 5).
Through these symbolic and performative events, Morales creates new “figura-
tions,” to use Donna Haraway’s terms, “potent fictions” that draw the public into a 
redemptive narrative (Haraway 2004: 243). He embodies the spirit of Katari as the 
leader of a movement liberating the country from a colonialist and racist history. 
Here we see the hegemonic redemption story of the new state, which promises to 
put the evil of colonialism in the past and lead the way to a future of justice (see 
Meister 2011). “Gathering up” past and contemporary struggles over land and ter-
ritory, Morales makes his national project of decolonization seem universal and 
uncontestable. He also incorporates stories of social movement struggle into his 
own person, becoming a figure who represents all Bolivians, and especially all in-
digenous peoples. After Morales’s 2014 election, enormous billboards announced 
“Yo soy Evo / Nosotros somos Evo” (I am Evo / We are Evo).
Laserna’s third tendency consisted of leftists, led by Vice President Álvaro Gar-
cía Linera. This group saw the role of the government as reversing the neoliberal 
years, and forging a state that takes a strong protagonist role in the economy, es-
pecially “recuperating natural resources as a basis of accumulation for national 
industrialization.” This group included both old-style Marxists who urged a tran-
sition to socialism and technocrats who wanted to rework the Import Substitu-
tion Industrialization (ISI) strategies of the 1950s and 1960s (Laserna 2010). García 
Linera was outspoken about the need to overturn neoliberalism. In a 2007 speech, 
he argued that neoliberalism “signifies a process of fragmentation—structural 
disintegration—of support networks, solidarity, and popular mobilization.” It 
reduces and deforms the state, setting out to destroy the “notion of the state as 
collective or commonwealth, in order to impose a type of corporate ideology call-
ing for appropriation and squandering of collective wealth.” The new socialist Bo-
livia, he argued, must work to overcome this fragmentation, re-socialize collective 
wealth privatized over the past few decades, and empower the state with econom-
ic, cultural, and political strength so that it can “provide a protective shield for 
the social movements, an international armor for growth of the social struggles” 
(García Linera 2007). The left/socialist tendency controlled government economic 
policy and administration, as well as a large part of the MAS’s representation in the 
Senate, and oversaw the 2006 nationalization of the natural gas industry and the 
telecommunications sector.5 In later years, this wing grew in strength, and leftist 
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technocrats held leading positions: Carlos Romero Bonifaz served as minister 
of the Presidency and then of the Government, and Luis Alberto Arce Cotacora 
served as minister of the Treasury and then of economy and public finance. This 
team tends to be pragmatic about engaging with capital markets and to see extrac-
tivism as an essential platform for national development.
It is helpful to contrast Morales’s performative indigeneity with the Marxist 
ideology of García Linera in order to appreciate the contrasting logics and strat-
egies that co-existed within the MAS. Applying a neo-Marxist indigenist-cum-
Gramscian approach to analyses of the MAS and its struggle to take power in 
Bolivia, García Linera has described five phases of the struggle. In the first, the 
contradictions in the forces of domination became visible. The second was a “revo-
lutionary epoch” of contestation in which there was a “catastrophic draw” between 
two opposing blocs of power (García Linera 2010: 15). One fundamental nucleus 
is the indigenous movement, made up of both campesinos and urban workers. 
“Its economic program is centered on the internal market, taking as its axis the 
peasant community, urban-artisanal and micro-business activity, a revitalized role 
for the state as producer and industrializing force, and a central role for the in-
digenous majority in driving the new state” (García Linera 2006: 83). At the other 
pole is the “ascendant agro-export, financial, and petroleum business bloc,” which 
favors the subordination of the state to private enterprise and the preservation, or 
restoration, of the old political system. This political polarity is further structured, 
he suggested, by three underlying cleavages: “ethno-cultural (indigenous/whites–
q’aras-gringos), class (workers/businessmen), and regional (Andean west/Amazo-
nian crescent).” In this highly political field, both tendencies pushed for solutions, 
but neither managed to construct a bloc with a majority capable of a long-term 
hold on state power. García Linera saw two alternatives from the point of view of 
the social movements in 2006: either an insurrection for revolutionary change or 
“a path of gradual, institutional change by electoral means led by Evo Morales.” 
The second, for which he advocated, would require an electoral bloc, negotiated 
with other leaders and movements, that would “generate a unified popular and 
indigenous pole with the ability to rule” and attract the consent of the middle class 
(84). In the third period, social movement mobilization was converted into state 
power. This described the first few years of the MAS government, and especially 
the convening of the Constituent Assembly. The fourth he called the “point of 
bifurcation,” in which the two polarized blocs came to an irreconcilable confronta-
tion, leading to the triumph of the popular bloc.
A final phase, in García Linera’s view, is “the emergence of creative contradic-
tions” (2012c: 23). Here he explains the dissent against the MAS state that grew 
as it consolidated its power. Even people supportive of and working within the 
MAS became extremely critical of the way Morales and his tight inner circle 
made the majority of important decisions. The minister of hydrocarbons, Andrés 
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Soliz Rada, for instance, resigned in 2006, claiming Morales had tied his hands 
( Stefanoni 2006b). Raúl Prada Alcoreza, the political philosopher who served as 
a key MAS delegate to the Constituent Assembly, and then as the vice minister of 
strategic planning in the Ministry of Economy and Finance, resigned and, along 
with several other key intellectuals, issued a manifesto decrying MAS policy and 
practice (Manifiesto 22 de Junio 2011). Among the indigenous base, many began to 
feel depoliticized and locked out of the decision-making. For instance, a Guaraní 
leader from Santa Cruz who served as an alternate (suplente) MAS congressman 
complained to me in 2010 that he and his lowland constituencies had been ignored 
completely by the MAS. From his tiny alternate’s office in Santa Cruz, he gestured 
in the direction of La Paz. “They want to control everything, to do everything ac-
cording to their culture, the Andean culture,” he told me. ¨Very little of what we 
hoped for as [lowland] indigenous people is being advanced, only the things that 
Evo wants. . . . No, Evo and his ministers have abandoned us. . . . And those min-
isters aren’t the people who were in the streets with us. They are from the Left. . . . 
Even Evo’s own base is silenced now, saying, ‘Let those ministros parásitos [para-
sitic ministers] defend him!’”
This comment reflects the difficulties the MAS strategy produced at the popu-
lar level. One the one hand, this leader commended Morales for asserting sover-
eignty and nationalizing the gas and then distributing royalty money to the poor 
and the elderly. On the other, he clearly reflects the disappointment and anger he 
and many others felt as their loyalty was disregarded at the whim of the president.
C ONCLUSION
The Morales/MAS government brought together a complex blend of ideologies 
and strategies. Sometimes these provide contradictory results, as when the “in-
digenist” group pushed for rural development in accordance with indigenous 
cosmovisión and the leftists in the Economics Ministry pushed for hydrocarbon 
exploitation and industrialization. This tension will be explored in greater depth 
in chapters 4 and 5, as we see how mega-development projects affect indigenous 
communities. This combination also explains the criticism Morales and the MAS 
receive from all sides. The traditional Left, especially the labor sector represented 
by the COB (which mounted strikes during the summer of 2008 pushing the gov-
ernment for a reformed pension law) argued Morales is just a reformer in league 
with transnational corporations. They argue that Morales’s renegotiation of natu-
ral gas contracts with oil companies fell far short of nationalization. This posi-
tion is echoed by leftist analysts like Jeffrey Webber and James Petras, who argue 
that Morales made pacts with the Right, negotiated joint ventures with oil compa-
nies, and demobilized mass movements in an effort to consolidate political power 
(J.Webber 2007; Petras 2008). The Right, especially the elite in the so-called Media 
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Luna (see chapter 2) saw Morales as reasserting an Andean centralized state power 
over the lowland departments, fueling their massive push for regional autonomy. 
They also criticized Morales as being in league with leftists such as Venezuela’s 
Hugo Chávez and determined to destroy democracy and capitalism. Supporters of 
the previous president, Sánchez de Lozada (called Gonistas), complained that the 
MAS unnecessarily isolated Bolivia from the international community by its belli-
cose relations with the United States, and was unable to administer the state effec-
tively. Perhaps the truth lies somewhere in between: the MAS coalition negotiated 
its contradictions by mobilizing a radical discourse of change and liberation, while 
continuing and benefiting from the extractivist development structures in place.
So, for the first years, tacking back and forth between populist mass activism 
based on indigenous vindications, on the one hand, and classic electoral politick-
ing in the halls of the Parliament, on the other, allowed the MAS to continue insti-
tutionalizing its agenda and consolidating its power. The next chapter turns to the 
2006–9 Constituent Assembly, where the tensions I have described in this  chapter 
were played out on a grand scale in political and ideological battles between the 
MAS, indigenous intellectuals, and the opposition parties on the Right. This 
 chapter has highlighted the differences between the various segments of the MAS 
party; the next focuses on the fundamental tension in the MAS administration 
about how to implement the change it promised: through a liberal nation-state or 
by embracing radical “popular” alternatives to it.
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B OLIVIA’S  “CULTUR AL DEMO CR ATIC REVOLUTION”
In April 2008, Bolivia’s President Evo Morales was invited to address the Perma-
nent Forum for Indigenous Affairs at the United Nations in New York. Addressing 
a group of nearly three thousand delegates on the first anniversary of the Declara-
tion of the Rights of Indigenous People, Morales made a provocative recommen-
dation. He said that the international community should “eradicate capitalism” 
and replace it with “communitarian socialism” if it ever hoped to save the planet 
from dangers like climate change. He blamed the capitalist system for fomenting 
industrialization and consumption based on profit and the exploitation of natural 
resources. He ended by offering a new set of Ten Commandments for the future 
of the earth, inspired by Andean indigenous values. They include renouncing war, 
imperialism, and colonialism; considering water, energy, and education as human 
rights not subject to private business interests; and constructing a communitarian 
socialism in harmony with Mother Earth (El Deber 2008a).
Not surprisingly, Morales gained a reputation, along with Venezuela’s Hugo 
Chávez, as a rabble-rousing socialist leading the continent to the Left. This image 
was reinforced when he kicked the U.S. ambassador out of Bolivia for allegedly 
intervening in an uprising in the lowland capital of Santa Cruz in 2008. He also 
ejected the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, which had been carrying out a long-
term low-intensity war on coca production. Morales’s position as the head of the 
cocoa growers union and his advocacy for the “millennial leaf ” did not endear 
him to U.S. officials.
But Morales did not gain power through an armed revolution or an illegal coup. 
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democratic terms. He called his government a “cultural democratic revolution” 
and emphasized that he and his party gained power as a result of popular elec-
tions, where he gained the greatest majority in Bolivian history. This reflects a 
larger trend: in recent decades, social movements across Latin America traded in 
the Marxist-based ideologies of class warfare that motivated 1970s movements for 
social change for a decidedly liberal framework tied to international discourses of 
both human rights and indigenous rights. Social movements across the continent 
turned to the framework of citizenship and rights to seek recognition and resourc-
es from the state (Alvarez et al. 1998; Postero and Zamosc 2004; Speed 2008). This 
was made possible by a convergence of two important trends, what the Brazilian 
scholar Evelina Dagnino has termed a “perverse confluence” (2003: 7). On the one 
hand, she suggests, social movements and civil society empowered by the return 
to democracy demanded more meaningful participation in society. On the other, 
neoliberal governance passed on many of the responsibilities of governing from 
the state to “responsible” neoliberal citizens (see also Peck and Tickell 2002).
In the Bolivian case, as I have previously argued (Postero 2007a), in the mid 
1990s, the neoliberal government instituted such a set of political reforms aimed 
at ending what it saw as an inefficient, conflictive corporatist form of civil soci-
ety. Through the medium of “neoliberal multiculturalism,” it offered a new form 
of citizenship based on a decentralized system of “popular participation” in mu-
nicipal development decision-making. Many indigenous and poor people ended 
up frustrated by the failure of these political reforms to overturn the underlying 
racism of the country—as well as by the terrible social costs of the accompany-
ing neoliberal economic restructuring—but they did take on the idea that liberal 
institutions could be transformed to meet their interests. One response was the 
formation of the MAS, which, after the gas war of 2003, brought Morales to power.
Since his election in 2005, Morales and his MAS party used liberal electoral 
politics to push forward a two-pronged agenda. First, through executive decrees 
and laws passed by the MAS-controlled congress, they substantially reworked the 
relation between the state and market, making the state once again a primary actor 
in economic development. I describe this effort in greater detail in chapters 4 and 5. 
Secondly, and potentially more important, the MAS government implemented 
an experiment in direct democracy, a popularly elected Constituent Assembly 
(hereafter, CA) to rewrite the constitution and refound Bolivia as a decolonized, 
plurinational nation. In January 2009, Bolivians passed a national referendum 
approving the new constitution, which enacts fundamental changes in the form 
of the state; grants autonomy to departments and indigenous communities; rec-
ognizes indigenous cultures, languages, and customs; and institutionalizes a new 
land reform program.
I suggest that these two stances—a push for social justice to overcome both 
colonialism and neoliberalism, on the one hand, and the embrace of liberal 
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political institutions (like elections, constitutional conventions, and direct pub-
lic referenda) to do so, on the other hand—are the source of a profound ten-
sion within the Morales administration. In this chapter, I take a close look at 
some of the conflicts that his administration has produced as it tries to balance 
these two frameworks, pointing out some underlying tensions within liberal-
ism itself that sometimes make it a difficult vehicle for social change. I trace 
indigenous challenges to liberalism at the CA, and show how, ultimately, the 
Morales government opted to dilute the indigenous alternative, maintaining the 
sovereignty of the central state. The resulting constitution does provide new re-
sources for peoples dominated and oppressed for centuries. For instance, one 
indigenous community in the lowlands used the new rights established in the 
constitution to convert their town into an “indigenous autonomy,” a form of 
indigenous self-government. I describe these efforts in chapter 7. However, the 
history of Bolivia’s CA raises questions about the relation between liberal politi-
cal institutions and decolonization. Can the liberal state decolonize itself from 
within, using these mechanisms? That is, can liberal norms such as the rule of 
law, which emerge from Western notions of democracy, accomplish the trans-
formations required to overcome centuries of racialized domination? Can the 
liberal nation-state form accommodate the forms of self-government that are at 
the heart of indigenous communities’ demands for decolonization?
To think through these difficult—and probably undecidable—questions, I take 
inspiration from Jacques Rancière, who defines politics as a process of emancipa-
tion brought about by disagreement. As described in the Introduction, Rancière 
distinguishes “policing,” the implicit law or order that partitions out places and 
forms of participation and exclusion in the world, from “politics,” disagreements 
that call attention to the exclusions it creates (Rancière 1999). The essence of poli-
tics is found in acts that “challenge the ‘natural order of bodies’ in the name of 
equality and polemically reconfigure the distribution of the sensible” (Rancière 
2004: 90). Through such acts of politics, actors can “crack open the unity of the 
given” and “sketch a new topography of the possible,” a new “distribution of capac-
ities and incapacities” (Rancière 2004: 49). By emphasizing these disagreements, 
it becomes possible to see the ongoing forms of contestation that animate contem-
porary Bolivia as its people attempted to decolonize, develop, and refashion their 
nation as a plurinational indigenous state.
Rancière is helpful here because he argues that political subjects come into 
being by creating a “scandal” about the “miscount” upon which the existing so-
cial order is based. For centuries, indigenous and peasant peoples in Bolivia have 
been challenging the coordinates that excluded them from political, cultural, and 
economic participation. John Andrew McNeish reminds us that this insurgency 
is a fundamental part of Bolivian society, because of the embedded nature of 
prejudice and the social divisions that make a lasting pact between state and its 
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indigenous and poor populations difficult (McNeish 2008: 80). Differing regimes 
of citizenship—from the republican period to the postrevolutionary 1950s to the 
neoliberal era—distributed rights to some, but continued to leave others margin-
alized, as “the part with no part” (Postero 2007a). The revolution that brought 
Morales into power and especially the Constituent Assembly of 2006 was a critical 
conjuncture where the previously impossible—real meaningful citizenship for all 
Bolivians—seemed possible (see Arditi 2007: 88). As McNeish reminds us, this 
was a moment of “insurgent citizenship,” to use James Holston’s term (Holston 
2008). Calling on a tradition of rebellion, indigenous actors decided to use the po-
litical process to go beyond protest to engage with and enter into the state, seeking 
new spaces for “possible alternative futures” (McNeish 2008: 80).
The existential disagreements at the CA were aimed at the question of who 
counts as citizens of plurinational Bolivia and what their rights should be. To un-
derstand their debates, I ask who the subjects of this historical process are and 
what the common project is upon which the nation was being formed. I describe 
the vision of the plurinational state advanced by an alliance of indigenous peoples 
and peasants called the Pacto de Unidad, showing the new distribution of the sen-
sible they proposed. Then, I consider the conflicted process through which the 
constitution was produced. Finally, I show how the approved constitution differs 
from the Pacto’s historic vision, reinforcing a liberal nation-state. Ultimately, I ask 
whether liberal institutions can be part of emancipatory politics or if they can only 
serve as a form of policing, reinforcing systems of inclusion and exclusion.
THE C ONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY
The Constituent Assembly (CA) was not part of the MAS’s original platform. It was 
a long-held demand of indigenous and popular organizations that reemerged as a 
central demand after the 2000 water war and the 2003 gas war (Tapia 2010: 143). 
Many Bolivians felt that during the neoliberal years, public decision-making, espe-
cially about natural resources, had been privatized, and decisions had been made 
by a small elite along with transnational corporations. The CA was supposed to be 
an effort to reverse this, to return this to “the people,” through a process of “direct 
democracy.” Morales holds out his government as “the government of social move-
ments,” but as we saw in chapter 1, beneath his leadership, there is a deep sea of politi-
cal actors pushing towards conflicting visions of a more democratic and just Bolivia.
The Aymara theorist Rafael Bautista argues that to understand the new pluri-
national state, one must ask about the historical contradictions that produced it 
(Bautista 2010a). What was the mode of its historical appearance? How was it con-
stituted? What did it overcome? Most important, who are the historic subjects 
who produced this state? How did they fill the “idea” of the state with “content”? 
Here Bautista uses the framework of the Bolivian political scientist René Zavaleta 
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Mercado, who argued that the previous Bolivian states were failures, only “ap-
parent states” without sufficient “national-popular content” (Zavaleta Mercado 
1986). Zavaleta uses this term to show how the demands or interests of those in 
the poor and Indian populations were excluded from previous forms of the state. 
The liberal nation-state form implies a specific relation between the state and civil 
society, and is based upon an assumption that the state represents the people, el 
pueblo, the nation. The Bolivian political theorist Luis Tapia explains that this is 
based on the idea of a correspondence between a “process of political unification,” 
emerging from a set of institutions that form a single system of administration 
of political power, on one hand, and a “process of homogenization or unification 
of the culture,” on the other (Tapia 2010: 151). Zavaleta argued that the Bolivian 
republic lacked this sort of unity because it was founded, not by the mass of in-
digenous peasant Bolivians, who were the “real” national popular bloc, but by the 
white–mestizo oligarchy, who loathed and feared the indigenous masses and al-
ways felt foreign or alienated from them. This produced the “señorial paradox” 
in which the elite found themselves: to kill the indio was to kill their ability to 
be the señor (lord or master). As a result, the señorial class never “belonged.” It 
was never able to bring about national unity, or imbue the nation with sufficient 
national-popular content (Zavaleta Mercado 1986).
This paradox was not truly resolved by the 1952 revolution, when the MNR-led 
state included indigenous peoples by de-Indianizing them and subsuming them 
Figure 6. Poster for the 2006 Constituent Assembly depicting Simón Bolivar, Che Guevara, the 
Bolivian martyr Father Luís Espinal, and President Evo Morales (on the Wiphala flag representing 
Andean native peoples). Credit: A. Davey. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0.
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into a modernizing nationalist ideology. For Bautista, the only way the new pluri-
national state can overcome the still-existing colonial power relations is by finally 
resolving this vexing question of national unity. This real national content cannot 
come from the top down or from the state as an institution; rather this constitut-
ing act of remaking the state must emerge from self-conscious subjects articulat-
ing their concrete ways of life (modo-de-vida) and the rationalities of their “life 
worlds” (mundo-de-la-vida) (Bautista 2010a: 174). But Bautista’s formulation leads 
to a fundamental and problematic question: how can unity emerge in such a deep-
ly divided society? He suggests that a new, more equitable distribution is bound to 
emerge from revolutionary indigenous subjects who represent the “real” people. 
Here we return to the idea of insurgent citizens. For Rancière, however, such a 
guaranteed outcome is impossible and unknowable. Instead, whatever unity or 
emancipation might be possible can only be determined when actors challenge 
the established framework or police order (Rancière 2004: 90). As this chapter 
demonstrates, that emancipation is always uncertain.
The members of the Pacto de Unidad, the main public advocate for the plurina-
tional state, presented themselves as historic subjects working for this emancipation. 
This alliance of indigenous, peasant, and workers’ organizations formed in 2004 
(before Morales’s election), bringing together social organizations from across the 
country to demand a Constituent Assembly.1 The proposition that the Pacto articu-
lated was a combination of decades—or centuries—of demands from the original 
peoples of Bolivia. I cannot detail here the long history of indigenous experience, 
memory, and claims, analyzed in great depth elsewhere.2 Let me briefly describe 
several important lines of “historic accumulation,” emanating from the differing tra-
jectories of the Pacto’s members, that coalesced into its proposal (Tapia 2010: 136). 
It will have resonance with the makeup of the MAS, as described in chapter 1, but 
it has some significant differences. Beginning in the 1980s and 1990s, there was a 
process of unification among lowland indigenous communities, marked by public 
marches demanding territory and cultural recognition (see Postero 2007a). In its 
fourth march in 2002, the lowland Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia 
(CIDOB; Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia) demanded a Constituent 
Assembly, making clear the need for the state to be radically reformed to include 
indigenous peoples and their cultures (Romero Bonifaz 2005). Their demands for 
expanded notions of citizenship reflected the limitations of the neoliberal multicul-
turalism of the 1990s, and they left an important legacy: characterizing the people 
and cultures of lowland indigenous people as “nations” (Tapia 2010: 138).
The lowland project was linked to a second line, the Katarista movement of the 
highland Aymaras. Since the 1970s, the Kataristas had pushed for recognition of 
indigenous cultures, languages, and organizations from a perspective combining 
class and culture. They argued that indigenous peasants were doubly discriminat-
ed against, both as an exploited class and as a nation and culture (Sanjinés 2004). 
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Tapia suggests that in the multicultural 1990s, Katarista activists and intellectu-
als were central to making Bolivians begin to recognize and accept the country’s 
cultural diversity (Tapia 2010: 139). He argues that organizing around the idea of a 
nation in both the lowlands and the highlands was particularly important because 
it constituted critical new subjects, collectivities, and communities. “[T]he nation 
is a mode of translating into modern terms a process of articulation and politi-
cal unification that articulates economic life, social life, social reproduction and 
forms of government in relation to historic territories.” By considering themselves 
as nations, he argues, these groups positioned themselves as subjects and social 
totalities able to demand reform of the Bolivian state (140).
The final line of political organizing that merged with these two trajectories came 
from the urban popular uprisings beginning in 2000, particularly the “water war” 
in Cochabamba, where a wide coalition of popular movements (farmers, urban 
residents, factory workers, and students) united to protest neoliberal privatization 
of public water services (see Olivera and Lewis 2004). Popular demands included 
the reconstitution of public services, the nationalization of natural resources, and 
the establishment of a Constituent Assembly. Tapia points out that while the di-
verse militants of the water war did not identify as a nation, they were calling for 
the reconstitution of the Bolivian nation through the creation of a plurinational 
state. Thus the desire for a new form of the state emerged not just from indigenous 
people but became a “national necessity” across sectors (2010: 141).
These three trajectories converged in the Pacto de Unidad, in which members 
of all these groups came together to imagine and construct a new Bolivia. In the 
process, to use Rancière’s terms, those who had had “no part” for centuries enunci-
ated their capacity and right to a reordering of society in which they were count-
ed and valued. This was visible at the inauguration of the CA, where indigenous 
groups carried signs saying “¡Nunca Más Sin Nosotros!” (Never Again without 
Us!). Of course the “us” in this declaration was a construction. Lowland indig-
enous groups and highland peasant groups had very different historical and politi-
cal trajectories and had not worked together successfully in the past. So the unity 
of the Unity Pact was more an aspiration than a fact. Yet the historic possibilities 
brought them together in a thrilling political spectacle. I attended meetings of the 
Pacto in Sucre during the first weeks of the CA in August of 2006, and witnessed 
the incredible energy and hopefulness the delegates brought to the encounters. 
On one afternoon, hundreds of delegates, supporters, intellectuals, NGO allies, 
and journalists crowded into a meeting space. The leaders of the Pacto—highland 
peasants in their trademark leather jackets and lowland leaders in embroidered 
shirts—presented their proposal (detailed below), to the crowd, who responded 
with thundering applause. There was an overwhelming feeling that day that these 
were the founders of a new Bolivia, that the Bolivia they had known was from this 
day on going to be the past.
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On the other side of town, however, other delegates to CA had very different 
agendas. These were the opposition groups, who brought together a coalition of 
political and economic elites. The strongest sector was made up of the comites civi-
cos (civic committees) of the lowland departments, which represent the elite land-
owning and business class, which are collectively referred to as the Media Luna, or 
half-moon (so-named because of the shape of this region). The Oriente, or Eastern 
lowlands, is the main economic engine of the country, where the agribusiness elite 
cultivates soy, sunflowers, sorghum, and cattle for the global market. This is also 
the area where Bolivia’s huge natural gas reserves are located. The political lead-
ers of the Media Luna were firmly opposed to Morales’s agenda of refounding the 
nation, and even more firmly against his efforts to overturn neoliberalism, which 
they saw as threatening their class interests. These elite leaders articulated their 
interests through a political movement demanding regional autonomy, meaning a 
system in which departments have the ability to tax, legislate, and make decisions 
about development projects, free from the oversight of La Paz. In the process, they 
mined long-term popular regional resentments against La Paz and racist fears 
(Gustafson 2006). I discuss this in greater detail in chapter 5.
The Bolivian anthropologist and MAS critic Pablo Regalsky argues that the 
MAS ended up in the middle, acting as an arbiter between these two sectors at 
the CA (Regalsky 2008, 2010). Perhaps more important to the concerns of this 
chapter, Tapia characterizes the Pacto as the “collective organic intellectual” that 
imagined and designed the new plurinational state, while the MAS acted to adapt 
this imaginary into the format of a modern liberal state (Tapia 2010). This state-
ment points to the severe tensions that underlay the constituting acts of reforming 
the state and that continue to impact the constitution that was produced.
In an important move that stacked the decks in its favor, Morales opposed in-
digenous organizations’ demands that they be able to send delegates to the CA 
representing their organizations, based on usos y costumbres (traditional norms). 
Instead, the MAS limited the number of indigenous delegates to the CA, and in-
sisted on an election scheme based on political party membership. This allowed 
Morales to control a majority of MAS delegates and to pull indigenous representa-
tives into the CA as their own MAS delegates. The minority opposition parties, 
held together by the lowland civic committees, resisted the MAS actively, boycot-
ting Assembly meetings. In the middle of the CA, they held a referendum to create 
a new legal status of departmental autonomy (even though the Electoral Court 
ruled it illegal). It was in this context of ethnic polarization and political confusion 
that the Constituent Assembly took place.
TROUBLING TACTICS
The August 2006 inauguration of the CA in Sucre—where the first Bolivian con-
stitution was written in 1825 entirely by white, landowning men—was a political 
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spectacle, attended by delegations from all the country’s indigenous groups and 
social movements. There was an incredible feeling of social revolution in the air. 
The MAS delegates, most of whom were indigenous or from the popular sector, 
occupied 52 percent of the seats, physically embodying a startling statement about 
the revolution at hand.
After the heady days of the inauguration, the Assembly began its work. While 
the MAS had a majority of delegates, it did not have the two-thirds majority nec-
essary to approve new articles under the terms of the Bolivian constitution or the 
special law convoking the assembly. As a result, everyone knew the proceedings 
would be contentious. In September 2006, however, MAS delegates voted by ma-
jority to change the rules of debate. In the controversial Article 70, they declared 
the Assembly to be originaria (original)—as opposed to derivada, or derived from 
the previous constitution—and authorized an absolute majority to approve all de-
cisions except the final text, which would still require a two-thirds majority (La 
Razon 2006a). This caused a political firestorm, as people decried what looked like 
a blatant power grab. The right-wing Podemos party leader Jorge “Tuto” Quiroga 
said “the antidemocratic attitude of the MAS is leading to disaster [fracaso]” (La 
Razón 2006a). After months of political mudslinging, the Supreme Court ruled 
that while the original constitution was still in force, the Assembly was in fact 
derived from it and the ley convocatoria (the enabling legislation), and so the del-
egates to the assembly could not depart from this legal framework. MAS delegates 
nonetheless maintained that the assembly was something new, derived from the 
power of the people. “By declaring itself originaria, the Asamblea Constituyente is 
[now] above all constituted power, including the constitution,” the MAS delegate 
Raúl Prada Alcoreza said. This was not a constitutional convention, but a constitu-
ent assembly, an “extraordinary political event that was born of social crisis” (El 
Deber 2006).
This remarkable comment illustrates what the MAS delegates believed was at 
stake in the CA. For them, election to the assembly and the election of Morales 
to the presidency was not just an election in the liberal sense of representation. 
Rather, it was a revolutionary intervention—not just to occupy the old structures 
of power, but to fundamentally reshape them. They did not accept the liberal—and 
neoliberal—notion of the state as a neutral referee or night watchman. Instead, 
they were attempting to call the bluff on this “misrecognition,” to change the very 
nature of the state. This brings us back to Bautista’s argument that these were his-
toric subjects constituting a new state on the basis of their substantive content. 
Yet Morales and his government were in a bind. They had come to power through 
these liberal institutions—and laid claims to legitimacy at the international level 
because of that, declaring that theirs had been a peaceful and democratic revolu-
tion. Yet these “reluctant liberals” keep running up against the difficult fact that 
liberal democratic institutions as they currently existed did not accomplish the 
form of justice social movement activists felt Bolivia needed.
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The assembly was paralyzed for months. Opposition groups held massive 
marches, boycotted the assembly, and in December of 2006 organized a series 
of hunger strikes across the country (see Fabricant and Postero 2013). At one 
point, newspapers estimated up to 1,200 people were on hunger strikes (La Razón 
2006b). Finally, in February 2007, the MAS and the right-wing political parties 
reached a settlement, in which each article would be approved by two-thirds of 
the commissions in charge of it, and then by the entire body, and then pass to a 
public referendum for approval of the full text. (Unresolved articles would pass to 
a committee to be settled, or go to public vote in the referendum.) With this com-
promise, the assembly ended its seven-month impasse and began its work on the 
content of the new constitution.
The tensions that began the CA never diminished, however. Commissions 
assigned to tackle the difficult issues such as land reform, autonomy, and indig-
enous rights worked diligently, but with great divisions (see Schavelzon 2012 and 
Beaulieu 2008 for excellent accounts of the workings of these commissions). Many 
came up with compromise language for the text, but many submitted both major-
ity and minority provisions. Near the end, stalemates over these issues threatened 
the viability of the whole process. Public protest in the streets of Sucre took a vio-
lent turn, when the MAS refused to allow Sucre delegates to propose that Sucre be 
named the capital, as it had been in the early days of the republic. Indigenous del-
egates faced violent and racist reactions from protestors in the streets and feared 
for their lives (Schavelzon 2012; see more about this in chapter 5). Vice President 
 García Linera convened a dialogue with the opposition parties, but made little 
progress. Delegates from the Right began to boycott the Assembly’s commissions 
and meetings, and the MAS delegates faced dangerous street violence in Sucre. 
Finally, Morales and the MAS made a political decision not to let the process run 
aground. They bused many of the delegates—not including those in the opposi-
tional parties—to the nearby city of Oruro, and in a highly controversial special 
session, passed a version of the constitution by a two-thirds vote of those attending.
That text still needed to go before the Bolivian people, which required the 
legislature to pass a bill scheduling the referendum. That proved very difficult, 
inasmuch as the MAS did not control Congress, so for several months the new 
constitution was left hanging in the air. Meanwhile, in Santa Cruz, in September 
2008, what looked like a regional coup began. Autonomy activists took control of 
state buildings, burning several down, and the new prefect/governor declared that 
the department was an autonomous entity with its own laws and leaders. A mass 
of highland indigenous supporters of the MAS headed for Santa Cruz, and many 
believed a showdown was inevitable (El Deber 2008b; Romero 2008a, 2008b). 
Then, in the northern department of Pando, a group of eleven indigenous MAS 
supporters were brutally massacred under the leadership of the prefecto/governor 
(Naciones Unidas Derechos Humanos 2009). The shock of this event turned the 
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tide of public opinion, and led to negotiations between the state and leaders of 
the autonomy movement. In a few weeks, they had come up with a new negoti-
ated version of the constitution, which all parties agreed to put to public vote. 
The MAS made substantial concessions on land reform, grandfathering in exist-
ing large landholdings, and limiting Morales’s ability to hold office indefinitely. In 
exchange, departments won limited autonomy and ability to administer their own 
revenues. The referendum took place on January 25, 2009, and the constitution 
passed by a 60 percent margin.
I discuss the content of the new constitution below, but first I address the pro-
cess by which it was passed, which was very troubling on a number of grounds. 
Many Bolivians expressed serious concern about the seemingly anti-democratic 
way in which the Constituent Assembly was run, the attempted “power grab” over 
the two-thirds rule, and most seriously, the way the MAS passed the constitution 
in Oruro. As a result, for many, this text was completely tainted. Then, the fact that 
the terms of the constitution, agonizingly negotiated by Assembly delegates, could 
be bartered by Morales and company in a political compromise seemed to make a 
mockery of all the claims to direct democracy. Often, these concerns were voiced 
in terms of the fear of an authoritarian or populist form of government. (A popu-
lar banner in Santa Cruz demonstrations declared: Evo asesino de democracia: 
“Evo, Assassin of Democracy.”) Many white–mestizo Bolivians characterized these 
actions in more ethnic terms, arguing that this was a racial takeover, motivated 
by revenge or reverse racism, while the majority of MASistas saw these events 
as absolutely appropriate actions challenging the long-entrenched power of the 
white–mestizo elite.
What do these tensions tell us about the possibility of balancing indigenous in-
terests in social justice and liberal democratic notions of due process? This draws 
our attention to the complex relationship between populism, pluralism, and de-
mocracy, as well as the difficulties in defining or interpreting the terms themselves. 
In some formulations, populism is seen as external or opposed to democracy, a 
top-down form of government that emerges when political parties or civil society 
are weak or illegitimate, and inspiring leaders stand for the marginalized, excluded 
“people” against the immoral elite. Using a moralistic political style, populist leaders 
often bend the rule of law to establish an authoritarian regime that gathers power 
to itself while claiming to represent the sovereign will of the unitary and virtuous 
people (see de la Torre 1997). In the Bolivian case, this oppositional framing has 
been expressed as a difficult balance between popular participation and authori-
tarianism. Given that liberal democratic institutions have long been used by the 
elite to serve their own interests, some see the authoritarian use of the state to rem-
edy this as an acceptable setting aside of democratic rules (Schilling-Vacaflor 2011). 
Other formulations suggest instead that populism is internal to democracy, as its 
redemptive face through which authentic popular will is expressed (Canovan 1999). 
52    Chapter 2
Noting that populism is both constituent of democracy and also the site of vio-
lations of its norms, many scholars conclude that populism has an ambivalent 
relation with democracy (de la Torre 2007; Mouffe 2005). I am compelled by Ben-
jamin Arditi’s characterization of populism as the “internal periphery” or “spec-
ter” of democracy. Here he draws attention to the region where the distinction 
between inside and outside is both blurred and a matter of dispute (Arditi 2007: 3). 
For Arditi, the democratic aspect of populism and its possible ominous tones are 
“undecidable,” and only become visible through polemic or disagreement (7). 
Some forms of populism are compatible with democracy, indeed necessary for it; 
others put it in danger. Thus, says Arditi, we can think of populism as a “symptom 
of democracy,” a paradoxical element that can both disturb and renew democratic 
politics. Ultimately, he says, populism “functions as a mirror, through which de-
mocracy can look at the rougher, less palatable edges that remain veiled by the 
gentrifying veneer of its liberal format” (60)
There clearly is a lot at stake: the MAS was using this liberal democratic pro-
cess to operationalize its larger agenda of transforming the relation between the 
state, the market, and society. Market processes are surrounded by and enacted 
within a web of social and political relations, which act both to restrain and pro-
duce economic and industrial development. Orthodox neoliberal theorists push 
to disembed capital from all such constraints, arguing that capital must be allowed 
unfettered access and mobility (Harvey 2005: 11). Many critical of neoliberalism’s 
caustic effects have argued that this narrow version of liberalism obscures social 
relations, excludes concerns about welfare, redistribution, and equity, and ulti-
mately fails to offer a satisfying resolution of the antagonisms that are at the heart 
of contemporary society (see Brown 2003; Lazar 2004). This is precisely the posi-
tion Morales and the MAS took. Their goal for this “radical anti-neoliberal democ-
racy” was to embed the economy and market processes in social and cultural webs 
in such a way as to move towards greater equality.
The dispute over these procedures made it clear that these historic subjects did 
not feel bound by the constraints of existing forms of liberalism. Instead, they 
posed procedural and substantive challenges that drew attention to several limita-
tions inherent in liberalism. First, liberalism’s insistence on the rule of law can act 
as an empty formalism concerned with legal procedures over substance or jus-
tice. Laws that appear to uphold the rights of all citizens may in fact obscure—or, 
worse, reinforce—underlying inequalities. Citizenship is not a neutral legal status 
inhabited by pre-political subjects, but rather a contested process involving actors 
whose subject positions are not only culturally and politically constructed, but 
constructed in relation to the political process itself. So, who gets to be a citizen 
turns out to be both a procedural and a substantive question. As Rancière would 
suggest, then, it is by calling attention to the unequal effects of existing laws and 
constitutions that newly emerging political subjects enact change. So, for many 
The Constituent Assembly    53
of the delegates in Sucre, the goal of the CA was to make this historical system of 
injustice visible and to overturn it. Their determination to control the Constituent 
Assembly and to dictate the terms of the new constitution was motivated, not by a 
cavalier attitude to the law, but by a desire to change the law to make meaningful 
citizenship possible in the current contexts.
The striking signs declaring “Never Again without Us!” pointed to a second 
limitation indigenous delegates challenged: the fact that liberalism is based upon a 
Western hegemonic notion of the universal. Judith Butler has written compelling-
ly about this, suggesting not only that the “universal” is a contested term subject 
to cultural variability, but also that the scope of what different peoples consider as 
universal is only partly articulated, and under ongoing redefinition (Butler 1996: 
46–47). It is, she suggests, an “open-ended ideal that has not been adequately en-
coded by any given set of legal conventions” (48). Looking at it from this perspec-
tive, we might see the struggles over the CA as disputes over what rights should 
be considered “universal” for all Bolivian citizens. For hundreds of years, Indians 
were not considered legitimate bearers of any sort of “universal” right, because 
they were not considered fully human, rational persons, and because they did not 
meet the requirements to be fully participating citizens (Egan 2007). At the CA, 
the MAS delegates were arguing that the underlying assumptions of universality 
in the previous constitution were no longer valid, and would have to give way to 
new values and procedures. For the indigenous delegates, especially those of the 
Pacto, indigenous values and historic demands—not only Western ideas—formed 
the basis of their emancipatory politics, and they believed those ideas could radi-
cally alter the police order. I turn now to their proposal to describe how they drew 
together indigeneity and decolonization as an alternative to liberalism.
THE PACTO PROPOSAL
The Pacto’s vision for the new plurinational state developed through dialogues 
and intense political debates and was expressed in two documents. After the CA 
was convoked in March 2006, the group that had convened in Santa Cruz in 2002 
sprang into action to prepare for it. They held regional meetings across the coun-
try, which culminated in a National Assembly of Indigenous, Originary, Peasant, 
and Colonists Organizations in May of 2006. The result of their debates was the 
Propuesta para la Nueva Constitución Política del Estado (PNCPE; Proposal for 
the New Political State Constitution) (Pacto de Unidad 2006). This first draft lays 
out the idea of the new plurinational state and the reasons for it, and was intended 
as a tool to help orient the debates at the CA. Over the next year, as the Pacto 
members and advisers participated in the CA commissions and made further al-
liances, their proposal developed into a more polished constitution-like form, a 
May 2007 draft titled the Constitución Política del Estado Boliviano, Propuesta 
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Consensuada del Pacto de Unidad (PCPU; Political Constitution of the Bolivian 
State, Consensus Proposal of the Unity Pact) (Pacto de Unidad 2007). Reading 
them together we can see three interlinking themes: (1) autonomy and decoloniza-
tion, (2) plurality within national unity, and (3) shared decision-making.
In the first document, the authors explain the plurinational state as a “new 
model of the state founded by indigenous, originary, and peasant nations and peo-
ples as a collective subject that transcends the monocultural liberal model based 
upon the individual citizen” (Pacto de Unidad 2006: 4). Detailing the ways the 
Western model marginalized and weakened pueblos originarios’ (original peoples’) 
cultures and political and judicial systems, they argue that only a model of political 
organization based on collective rights will “decolonize our nations and peoples” 
(ibid). Here we see an explicit adoption of plurinationalism over the idea of mul-
ticulturalism. As I have explained above, multiculturalism was the form of inclu-
sion adopted by neoliberal governments across Latin America in the 1990s (Hale 
2002; Postero 2007a). Recognizing the cultural diversity of Bolivia, the neoliberal 
state adopted laws fomenting the political participation of indigenous peoples and 
granting some collective rights, like collective landownership. Will Kymlicka has 
called this form of recognition “liberal multicultural citizenship” (1996). Yet Boliv-
ians found that multiculturalism did not fundamentally change the underlying 
racism or the structure of the state. Thus, the Pacto hoped to refound the state by 
recognizing not just the existence of indigenous peoples, but their sovereignty as 
nations.3
Scholars have defined sovereignty in a number of ways. Foundational accounts 
characterize sovereignty as the mark of state power, evolving from the original 
power of the king to enact violence—the right to kill. Under liberalism, this power 
devolves through a social contract to “the people,” understood as citizens (Hobbes 
[1651] 1971). Building on his definition of the political, which for him lies in the an-
tagonistic relations between friends and enemies, the political theorist Carl Schmitt 
argued sovereignty was the power behind the law, that is, the power of a political 
entity to decide who counts as friends or enemies and what counts as law (Schmitt 
[1932] 1996). Recent scholarship has tried to disentangle sovereignty from state 
power (Blom Hansen and Stepputat 2005: 11). Foucault famously contrasted sover-
eign power to biopower, arguing that instead of the sovereign’s right to kill, modern 
forms of power center on life, especially that of the population (1977). Bringing 
together Schmitt and Foucault, Giorgio Agamben argues that sovereign power of 
violence continues to be constitutive of the political community in contemporary 
period. Describing the sovereign sphere as a “state of exception,” he showed how 
sovereign power can render certain people “bare life,” excluded completely from 
legality (Agamben 1998). These theories have led Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn 
Stepputat (2005) to conclude that sovereignty and the violence that marks it should 
be studied as “practices dispersed throughout and across societies” (3). They argue 
The Constituent Assembly    55
that sovereignty is a social construction, a “tentative and unstable project whose 
efficacy and legitimacy depend on repeated performances of violence and a ‘will to 
rule’” (ibid). These performances are historically and culturally specific, they say, 
but they always construct their authority through a “capacity for visiting violence 
on human bodies” (ibid). Pierre Clastres rejected such “ethnocentric” notions of 
political power, which he argued were based solely on Western societies. He ar-
gued that not all societies allowed political institutions or leaders to exercise such 
power. The “primitive” indigenous societies he studied in the Amazon region of 
Latin America refused to allow this potential for violence to be possessed by any 
one leader. Instead, in these “societies against the state,” society as a whole was 
the site of political power, and leaders acted as mediators to promote harmony 
rather than to exercise command over others. Individual people and communities 
maintained autonomy, only giving power to leaders in emergencies like times of 
war (Clastres [1974] 1989).
The question of sovereignty takes on a specific valence in postcolonial settler 
states, of course. Robert Meister (2011) argues that in nation-states founded in 
the wake of settler colonialism, the claim of settlers to self-determination was at 
fundamental odds with the parallel claim of aboriginal peoples, resulting in the 
removal or elimination of those native peoples, and their erasure as peoples or na-
tions. Thus, for most indigenous peoples, national sovereignty has always entailed 
their rendering as bare life. Claims of indigenous sovereignty can therefore act as a 
stark challenge to national sovereignty, both laying bare the violent dispossessions 
on which it is based, and proposing an unthinkable notion of indigenous peoples 
who claim membership in their own sovereign nations (Simpson 2014). Across 
Latin America, indigenous activists have pushed back against liberal multicultural 
notions of inclusion, arguing instead for self-determination and territorial control 
as nations.
In the Pacto’s proposal, the key mechanism to accomplish this decolonized 
form of sovereignty is autonomía indígena originaria y campesina (AIOC; in-
digenous originary peasant autonomy). Seen as a path to autodeterminación 
(self-determination), autonomy will allow indigenous peoples to “define our com-
munitarian politics, social, economic, political and juridical systems,” and “reaf-
firm our structures of government, election of authorities, and administration of 
justice, respecting different ways of using space and territory” (Pacto de Unidad 
2006: 4). This autonomy is “the condition and principle of liberty of our people 
and nations” and the keystone of decolonization (10).
In this description of autonomy, one can already see how it is linked to the 
second theme, plurality. It is because colonial structures tried to erase plurality 
that autonomy is necessary: to recognize and support those original peoples who 
resisted and still maintain their identities. But this requires a radical reform of the 
state. Where the liberal nation-state imagined a unified homogeneous Bolivian 
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people, the proponents of the plurinational model make a very different assump-
tion: they argue that the underlying pueblo is plural and diverse. The authors argue 
for plurality in several forms. First, they recognize the presence of the country’s di-
versas naciones, pueblos, y culturas (diverse nations, peoples, and cultures) (Pacto 
de Unidad 2006: 4). Second, they call for juridical pluralism, defined as “the coex-
istence, within the plurinational state, of indigenous originary and peasant juridi-
cal systems, on a plane of equality, respect, and coordination” (4, n. 4). Third, the 
plurinational state should respect diverse forms of government and democracy. 
Thus, liberal institutions of participatory and representative democracy should 
co-exist with indigenous forms of communitarian democracy and mechanisms 
of participation such as assemblies and cabildos (mass meetings). Leaders should 
be elected either by universal vote or through traditional mechanisms called usos 
y costumbres (6). These plural enactments are to be given respect, but also equal 
legal and political value.
These calls for and recognition of plurality are not phrased as separatism, 
but rather as the basis of a common and unified nation. The diverse nations and 
peoples have the right to convivencia solidaria y pacífica (solidary and peaceful 
co-existence), and to achieve this, the authors propose a “unitary plurinational 
state” (4). The fundamental principles of this state are “juridical pluralism, unity, 
complementarity, reciprocity, equality, [and] solidarity . . .” (ibid). Throughout the 
proposals, the authors link plurality to unity, making clear that this vision of plu-
ralism will be the “motor of unity and social well-being for all Bolivians” (ibid). In 
his analysis of the Pacto’s proposals, Luis Tapia emphasizes the importance of reci-
procity as a way to mediate the seeming tension between the need for a common 
government and the need to recognize difference. This, for him, is the key to de-
colonization: the complementary and reciprocal recognition and inclusion of those 
formerly depreciated by colonialism and later global capitalism (Tapia 2010: 145).
Rafael Bautista makes a similar argument. He argues that what is exceptional 
about the pluri in the plurinational is not just the recognition of difference or the 
diversity, but the historical process by which the diverse converges into community. 
So, rather than being simply a “culturalist” additive, the notion of the pluri acts as 
a critique to the devalued form of modern liberal politics, which privatizes and 
reduces public decision-making to the univocal colonial state. The pluri demands 
a democratization of the decision-making sphere, overcoming the false opposition 
between the state and society, making possible a congregation of all into what he 
calls común-unidad (common-unity). But this unity is not a given; it emerges in 
the process of recognition of the Other as a subject, as a human being with dignity 
and rights. Based in this reciprocal recognition, the pluri makes a fundamental 
claim: that unity is based in community or it is nothing (Bautista 2010a: 185–87).
This, then, brings us to the third axis of the Pacto’s proposals: shared decision- 
making. The authors describe a form of government in which autonomous 
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indigenous originary and peasant communities govern themselves at the local 
level and are actively involved in the state’s decision-making about national issues, 
where they are to “co-administer and co-manage” resources (co-administración y 
co-gestión). Their draft called for 70 of the 167 delegates to the Plurinational As-
sembly (the Congress) to be elected by indigenous originary and peasant nations 
and pueblos. The plan to share decision-making is especially notable in the sec-
tions on natural resource exploitation, where local peoples will “participate in the 
making of decisions about exploration, exploitation, industrialization, and com-
mercialization of non-renewable resources in their territories” (Pacto de Unidad 
2006: 12). They would be consulted in advance about such development, and this 
consultation would be vinculante, or binding. Overall, the documents call for “di-
rect representation” of indigenous originary and peasant peoples and nations in 
the administration and running of the plurinational state (4, 12). The plurinational 
state, then, was envisioned as a mechanism for the plurality of the Bolivian people 
to participate directly in “public power” (4). In the final draft, this was expressed 
by saying that both sovereignty and constituent power reside in the “indigenous 
originary peasant nations and peoples and in the culturally diverse population 
of the countryside and the city,” who must exercise their power directly through 
participation in decision-making.
THE PLURINATIONAL STATE C ODIFIED
The Pacto’s proposed constitution was substantially modified in the political 
struggles between the Pacto, the MAS, and the opposition parties, first at the CA 
and then in the negotiations after the CA had concluded. The reasons for these 
modifications are complex and the subject of continuing debates. Clearly, the MAS 
was forced to negotiate with the opposition parties, whose stalling techniques had 
made the CA almost unviable. The comites civicos (civic committees), the site of 
local oligarchic and agribusiness power in the lowlands, were adamant about cer-
tain issues, such as limiting land reform and privileging departmental autonomy 
over indigenous autonomy. MAS concessions on these issues sparked accusations 
that they had betrayed the revolutionary potential of the CA. Instead, say critics, 
the “reformist” MAS failed to confront the economic power of the Santa Cruz oli-
garchy and chose, instead, to support the capital-intense forms of agricultural pro-
duction and natural resource extraction that bring in the majority of the country’s 
income (J. Webber 2011, 2012; see Postero 2012). Again, we must remember that 
since Bolivia’s economy is deeply entangled with global and regional markets, Mo-
rales may have had less choice in all this than his critics gave him credit for having.
But the modifications cannot all be blamed on the need to assuage the Right or 
global capital. The MAS agenda was always different from the Pacto’s. As Devin 
Beaulieu (2008) makes clear, the MAS’s goal was always state capture. That is, the 
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MAS chose to use the political openings of the neoliberal period, particularly elec-
toral politics, to gain control of the state, so as to be able to restructure the national 
development model and then redistribute the benefits of Bolivian patrimony to the 
Bolivian people. Beaulieu frames the MAS agenda in Polanyian terms, characteriz-
ing it as part of the “double movement” to complete the neoliberal promise of mul-
ticulturalism and redistribution. However, he argues, the limitations of that form of 
power constrained social movements’ abilities to change it (Beaulieu 2008: 55). This 
brings us back to the central question of this chapter: the possibilities and draw-
backs of a strong liberal state. The MAS chose to embrace a model of the state that it 
felt would give it as much power as possible to accomplish its goals, while protecting 
its political hegemony (Garcés 2011: 63; Schilling-Vacaflor 2011). The result is a text 
that is not entirely coherent (Tapia 2010: 157). It contains much of the liberatory lan-
guage of the Pacto’s draft, especially in those sections that recognize the precolonial 
existence of indigenous Bolivians. However, the state form remains fundamentally 
liberal and reserves the majority of the power to the central state, allowing only 
limited forms of autonomy and decision-making subordinated to the central state.
The preamble, already cited, and the first and third articles echo and codify the 
“plurality within unity” theme we saw in the Pacto proposal:
Article 1. Bolivia is constituted as a state that is unitary, based on the rule of social 
law, a plurinational communitarian state, free, independent, sovereign, demo-
cratic, intercultural, decentralized, and with autonomies. Bolivia is founded in 
plurality and in political, economic, juridical, cultural, and linguistic pluralism, 
within the integrating state process.
Article 3. The Bolivian nation is made up of the totality of Bolivianas and Bolivia-
nos, the indigenous originary peasant nations and peoples, and the intercultural 
and Afro-Bolivian communities that as a whole constitute the Bolivian people.
Throughout the constitution, plural cultures are recognized and given value. In 
Article 8, the constitution makes indigenous moral principles the underlying ethi-
cal bedrock of the new state. Moreover, the notion of vivir bien or suma qamaña 
(living well) is held up to be the ideal form of society and forms the basis of the 
state’s economic and welfare policies.
The second article takes up the demands for autonomy:
Article 2. Given the precolonial existence of the indigenous originary peasant 
nations and peoples and their ancestral dominion over their territories, their 
self-determination is guaranteed within the framework of the unity of the state, 
consisting of their right to autonomy, to self-government, to their culture, to rec-
ognition of their institutions, and to the consolidation of their territorial entities, 
in conformity with this Constitution and the law.
This is the place in the constitution that appears most to embody the ideas put 
forward by the Pacto. It gives indigenous peoples the “right” to autonomy and 
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self- government and the “recognition” of their institutions, but this is a far cry 
from a plurinational state based on the equal co-existence of plural forms of de-
mocracy and governments. Indeed, the rest of the constitution lays out what Tapia 
calls a “constitutional hierarchy” (2010: 157). That is, we see many elements of a 
traditional liberal state model, with pretensions of universality and general valid-
ity, on the one hand, and a secondary rung of different normative systems that are 
recognized and allowed, but under the supervision of the dominant system, on the 
other. This, says Tapia, is merely the sort of multicultural recognition enacted in 
Bolivia in the neoliberal period (156).
The Pacto proposal imagined indigenous autonomy (AIOC) as the central form 
of political organization in the country, making indigenous institutions parallel to 
the central state. In the new constitution, and particularly as it was implemented 
in the later law on autonomies, however, the category of indigenous autonomy is 
greatly reduced, or “domesticated” as Fernando Garcés puts it (2011). First, they 
are not open to all forms of indigenous originary or peasant organizations, but 
only to those municipalities or established territories (TIOCs) with majority in-
digenous populations that follow constitutionally approved norms and procedures 
(Bolivia 2009: Art. 293). This means that many long-standing unrecognized de-
mands for territory will not be included. The law also sets out tight bureaucratic 
procedures by which the proponents of an AIOC status may go about claiming 
that status—through a government supervised referendum, and so forth. These re-
quirements are so strict that only eleven municipalities in the whole country were 
able to begin the process in the first round of applications. (Chapter 7 looks at the 
case of Charagua, one of the eleven, and the first to win this status.) In his in-depth 
analysis of the autonomy process and especially the legislation implementing it, 
John Cameron demonstrates how government policies and practices restrict and 
undermine opportunities to exercise autonomy. While the MAS officially supports 
the conversion to AIOCs, it has provided only minimal funding for the Autonomy 
process. More important, in many of the communities considering conversion, the 
MAS has made it known to its supporters that they will not receive government 
support if they push for autonomy. It is clear that the state sees indigenous control 
over natural resource extraction as a threat to its own power (Cameron 2013).
This brings us to the second way in which autonomy has been diminished. 
While the idea of the AIOC was to allow original peoples the possibility of gov-
erning themselves —libre determinación—the constitution establishes a clear hier-
archy of jurisdictions, with the central state carrying out the seemingly universal 
work of governing the country and the people, and the AIOCs making decisions 
that only apply to their community and do not contradict the central state (Bolivia 
2009: Art. 290). In Art. 30 of the Constitution, the section dealing with indigenous 
rights, this is echoed: indigenous peoples have the right to their political juridical 
and economic systems. Most important, the constitution eliminates the heart of 
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the plurinational proposal: shared decision-making. Nowhere does it mention co-
administration or co-decision-making. Instead of giving a large number of special 
congressional seats to indigenous representatives, the constitution delegated the 
decision about how to proportion seats to the Plurinational Assembly, which was 
to draft the Electoral Law. In 2011, over huge protests by lowland groups, the As-
sembly settled on a tiny number: seven special seats. Perhaps most important, in 
the fundamental sections on natural resource exploitation (Art. 30, 15; Art. 348ff.), 
the central state retains exclusive control over decision-making.
Article 349. Natural resources are the property and direct, indivisible, and 
 inalienable dominion of the Bolivian people, and it is the state’s responsibility to 
administer them for the collective interest.
Article 351. The state will assume control and direction over the exploration, 
exploitation, industrialization, transportation, and commercialization of strategic 
resources . . .
And, in place of the consulta previa vinculante, the binding consultation pro-
cess envisioned by the Pacto, the new constitution only guarantees a previous and 
informed consultation, with no possibility of the veto power hoped for in a pluri-
national state co-administered by complementary others (Art. 30, 15). As we will 
see in chapter 5, where I describe the controversy over the TIPNIS national park 
and indigenous territory, this has become a source of enormous contestation, call-
ing into question not only the government’s commitment to due process but also 
its claims to decolonization.
THE EMANCIPATORY POTENTIAL OF DISAGREEMENT
The struggles of the Pacto de Unidad delegates to enact their vision of a plurina-
tional state illuminates the tensions at the heart of the new Bolivian development 
model, where the need to develop natural resources conflicts with the interests of 
the local peoples to govern themselves according to their own customs. These are 
made visible in the stark gap between the shared decision-making the Pacto pro-
posed and the centralized decision-making the final constitution enabled. Despite 
all the inspiring language about recognizing and respecting the plurality of the Bo-
livian pueblo, the power to decide for the pueblo remained in the hands of the cen-
tral state, demonstrating the continued colonialism of what I see as a profoundly 
liberal state. Finally, those inclined to characterize Morales as an anti-democratic 
populist leader might see in the constitutional process another example of how he 
consolidated state power.
The contestation over decision-making also reveals something else: the pro-
found and continuing tensions within liberal democracy itself, which take on par-
ticular valences here as Bolivians balance liberalism with indigenous visions of 
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self-governance. In every state, the notion of “the people” is a constructed one, 
and the state must claim to legitimately represent that people, whether it be uni-
tary or plural. Throughout his administration, Morales has held himself out as 
representing the sovereign will of the people—as all presidents do. His notion of 
who exactly this pueblo is has, naturally, varied depending upon his audience. At 
some points, he characterized “the people” as both poor and indigenous; at oth-
ers, he has focused on more unifying notions of Bolivians. But who counts as the 
people and what rights they have or should have is the fundamental “political” 
question always at play. In the Constituent Assembly, the Pacto put forward a new 
vision of how Bolivia should be ordered, with a radically different “count” of who 
should have a part in the nation’s political, cultural, and economic order. As much 
as Morales identified publicly with the indigenous agenda of pluralism and evokes 
indigenous cosmovisión (worldview) in all his international talks, it is clear that the 
Pacto’s call for a recount severely threatened the order policed by the MAS. Mo-
rales and the MAS have worked hard to achieve the power they have, fighting off 
right-wing opposition parties and leftist critiques. Moreover, the Morales regime 
has invested enormous energy in a new “distribution of the sensible” in which the 
language, epistemology, and aesthetics of indigeneity are central to state legiti-
macy. In the next chapter, I show one way the MAS state has done this, describing 
a spectacular wedding held by the Vice Ministry of Decolonization and the mean-
ings participants make of it. Thus, we can say that the MAS regime has already 
carried out a recount, making “the indigenous” visible—and valorized.4 This has 
been one of the MAS’s greatest successes, in fact, giving indigenous and peasant 
peoples a vastly increased sense of belonging and citizenship.
Yet the disagreements visible in the struggle at the Constituent Assembly show 
that the MAS’s positive resignification of the category of indigenous was not a 
sufficiently meaningful recount for the Pacto activists. For them, the questions at 
hand were not merely about recognition of their indigeneity, but about what that 
category actually means. For the Pacto visionaries, recognition of Bolivia’s plural-
ism involves the right of that plurality to make decisions. In essence their disagree-
ment is a disagreement about the form democracy will take in Bolivia. Is this going 
to be a classic liberal state where the central state retains the power to decide such 
things as resource extraction (or highway placement, as we will see in chapter 5) or 
is this going to be an “indigenous state” where local communities have autonomy 
to decide such things for themselves? These are not just symbolic questions. The 
new constitution highlights the complex material and epistemological implica-
tions of a state that is at once indigenous and developmentalist.
Such fundamental disputes are clarified when political subjects, like the Pacto 
activists, draw attention to a new set of emancipatory possibilities through dis-
agreement. Rancière notes that such acts are tenuous, precarious, and not likely 
to alter the status quo; rather, what they do is open the possibilities to the future. 
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Benjamin Arditi suggests that the Occupy movement in the United States per-
formed a similar function, providing a “passageway to the future” simply by 
drawing attention (“We are the 99%”) to the miscount (Arditi 2015). The Pacto’s 
proposal was emancipatory precisely because it interrupted the way things were 
ordered or policed, and produced a “body and a capacity for enunciation not 
previously identifiable.” This, in turn, reconfigures the field of experience (Ran-
cière 1999: 35). What is this new body and capacity? It is the plural body of the 
pueblo boliviano, the people “of a plural composition” described in the constitu-
tion and given voice and action by these “speaking beings” (30). This is not a new 
category, of course, but a persistent category put forward for centuries by indig-
enous people, and miscounted over and over again by the dominant orders. The 
disagreements over the constitution—both the activists’ demands and the state’s 
response—demonstrate that the category still remained miscounted in the MAS 
era, despite the rhetoric of plurinationalism. Now, however, regardless of the out-
come in this case, this category has taken on greater political meaning. McNeish 
concludes that while it did not meet all the demands of its insurgent proponents, 
the CA process did form a “general and irreversible acceptance of the need to 
accept plurality as part of the national identity” (2008: 93). That is, the plurality 
expressed in the constitution is not just a rhetorical abstraction in the text, but an 
active force made up of those historic subjects Bautista referred to who are push-
ing the state to continue to evolve and respond. Now the state must respond to ac-
cusations of colonialism carried out by the so-called decolonizing state. Now the 
state is held accountable for the gap between its discourse about the pachamama 
(Mother Earth) and its practices on the ground. And here, we must acknowledge 
an important difference between the indigenous activists I describe here and the 
Occupy movement: while they both call attention to the miscount, the Bolivian 
activists also posit a territory, subject, and history from which to “disagree.” That 
is, these speaking beings also assert that they are citizens with rights that emerge 
from their history and the constitution.5
This returns us to the issue of whether the MAS is a populist regime. To what 
extent does Morales represent the people? Which people? The Bolivian case de-
scribed here makes clear that we can only evaluate the MAS’s actions as part of the 
undecidable tensions between popular will and equality, on the one hand, and the 
seemingly intractable need for the state to exercise its power to manage the coun-
try and the economy, on the other (what Canovan 1999 terms the redemptive vs. 
the pragmatic faces of democratic government). This points out that the dual role 
the MAS government plays. On the one hand, the MAS has practiced an emanci-
patory “politics,” rewriting the constitution, instituting a policy of decolonization, 
and engaging in a campaign of symbolic acts intended to make visible the historic 
racialized miscount of Bolivia’s indigenous peoples. But on the other, by taking the 
mantle of the liberal state, it also acts as the police order, governing through law as 
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well as violence, calling into being other forms of politics. This is the hybrid nature 
of the Morales state.
Did the Pacto activists interrupt the MAS police order? Certainly, the MAS has 
enormous power, but as Foucault explains, government power is never totalizing. 
Rather, governing is the ability “to structure the possible field of action of others” 
(Foucault 1982: 221). Thus, while the MAS may structure the field, it does not com-
pletely limit the ways social movements can contest its power. Clearly, the Pacto 
was not able to make all the radical changes it envisioned, but it did plant seeds 
that may develop into a real and active plurinationalism over time. The Guaraní 
leaders pushing indigenous autonomy in Charagua, described in chapter 7, are 
working to make this a reality. The Bolivian theorist Raúl Prada Alcoreza suggests 
that this transition will occur as the constitution is interpreted by legislators and 
put into practice. He predicts that the “pluralist episteme” inaugurated by the CA 
debates and the constitutional text will be developed through the transgressive 
practices of the plural Bolivian multitude, whose collective construction of the 
laws will rupture the government practices (Prada Alcoreza 2014). Both Prada and 
Bautista remind us of what Frantz Fanon (1963) made clear, that decolonization 
is a continuing constituent process carried out by actors whose subjectivities are 
only formed in the process of struggling for revolutionary change. In contempo-
rary Bolivia, we are witnessing precisely that: the ongoing struggle to define who 
counts as el pueblo boliviano and what that means for Bolivian democracy. The 
plurality of answers to these ultimately undecidable questions will only be illumi-
nated by further disagreement.
64
On May 7, 2011, the Depatriarchalization Unit of Bolivia’s Vice Ministry of De-
colonization brought together 355 indigenous couples to be married in a big public 
coliseum, the Coliseo Cerrado, in El Alto, a mostly Aymara city perched on the 
high plateau above Bolivia’s capital, La Paz. There, in a grand spectacle of “indige-
nous” religious and ethnic pride, the couples were wedded in a ceremony officiated 
by Andean religious experts called amautas. President Evo Morales played the 
role of padrino, or godfather, to all the couples. This event was part of the govern-
ment’s central agenda of decolonization, a complex project to overturn the legacies 
of systemic racial domination begun in the colonial period. In the government’s 
view, decolonization requires a new model of the family, based not on the Catholic 
Church, but on indigenous values and practices, particularly the Andean notion 
of chachawarmi, or gender complementarity. Looking out over the sea of couples 
brightly attired in their “traditional” clothing, President Morales congratulated the 
amautas for the beautiful “natural” ceremony and the couples for beginning to 
decolonize themselves.1 “The family is the center of a community, and for that rea-
son, new families will be central for the plurinational state,” he said. “In our fami-
lies, there is shared responsibility between men and women, shared responsibility 
in the community, and in the patria grande, la familia grande [the homeland and 
the big family] that is Bolivia” (Bodas Colectivas 2011, DVD, 1: 48–49).
The next year, in September 2012, Vice President Álvaro García Linera mar-
ried Claudia Fernández, a national television news reporter. García Linera and 
Fernández are both urban white–mestizos with no claim to indigenous heritage. 
Their union, dubbed “the wedding of the year” by the media, was intensely awaited 
and blogged.2 The main ceremony took place in the Cathedral of San Francisco, 
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Bolivia’s most important Catholic Church, but the day before, they participated in 
an “Andean” or “ancestral” wedding ceremony at the pre-Inca temple at Tiwanaku, 
where Morales held his first inauguration in 2006 (see Postero 2007b). Dressed in 
elegant clothes designed to reflect Andean style, with colorful accents and decora-
tions, the pair were “married” by amautas before hundreds of visitors and commu-
nity members. The minister of cultures and his team organized the event, which 
culminated in a ride in a traditional totora (woven reed) boat on a nearby lake.
What was the effect of these spectacular ceremonies? How did they enact or 
produce decolonization? Did they enhance the legitimacy of the “indigenous 
state”? Using anthropological understandings of performance, I examine how 
these state rituals reworked the historical and ongoing tensions in Bolivian society, 
in which the category of “indigenous” has long been opposed to that of “white” or 
“mestizo.” Morales’s government asserted that the marriages were part of a radi-
cal transformation of Bolivian society by positively valuing the indigenous, but 
I show how the rituals fit into a long tradition of cultural performances, such as 
folklore festivals and religious dances, in which elites or the state perform styl-
ized versions of indigeneity in order to incorporate the dangerous indigenous 
“other” into the nation (Abercrombie 2001; Rogers 1999; Rockefeller 1999). Using 
ambiguous polyvalent symbols and spatial effects to mediate between the highly 
charged indigenous–colonizer poles, these wedding rituals performed a managed 
vision of indigeneity that serves as a foundation for the new plurinational state. 
Yet such performances are always subject to multiple, contested interpretations 
by participants and audience members (Bigenho 2006; Mendoza 2000). Using the 
Rancièrian framework laid out in the Introduction, we could say that while the 
weddings enacted emancipatory politics by explicitly encouraging a new valuation 
of indigenous culture and attacking the myths of Indian inferiority upon which 
coloniality is based (Bautista 2010; Quijano 2007), they also worked in parallel 
ways as a form of policing, recontextualizing masculinist colonial state power and 
foreclosing disagreements about the meaning of indigeneity and who is entitled 
to represent it.
DEC OLONIZ ATION AS DISAGREEMENT
In the Introduction, I described the polyvalent notion of decolonization that 
guides the Morales administration’s agenda for the plurinational state. As the pre-
ceding chapters have shown, “decolonization” can mean many things. The Pacto 
de Unidad activists at the Constituent Assembly, described in chapter 2, saw de-
colonization as the creation of a plurinational state based on local self-government 
and shared decision-making. They, along with many other indigenous activists 
also saw decolonization as the radical transformation of national development, 
moving from Western notions of capitalist extraction to ideas of more sustainable 
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development they call vivir bien, or living well. As chapter 4 will show, the Morales 
state’s equation of extractivist development with decolonization underwrote very 
different ideas about development.
Despite the ongoing contestations over the multiple meanings of the term, Mo-
rales and the officials of his government have continued to use the language of 
decolonization to legitimize their policies. The Vice Ministry of Decolonization 
(VMD), a department of the Ministry of Cultures, is headed by Félix Cárdenas, an 
Aymara activist who was a MAS delegate to the Constituent Assembly. The VMD 
is charged with implementing decolonization and seeing to it that other agencies 
are acting in accordance with this overarching mandate. The VMD produces texts 
explaining decolonization and organizes “cultural” events across the country to 
promote decolonization. In the Introduction, I describe several ways of thinking 
about decolonization, emerging from different ideological trajectories. The VMD 
draws most overtly from postcolonial studies, focusing on how colonial forms of 
domination obscured indigenous ways of thinking and knowing, privileging West-
ern categories and epistemologies in what Aníbal Quijano calls the “coloniality 
of knowledge” (Quijano 2007; see also Cambio 2011). In this view, decolonization 
requires thinking and speaking from a different locus of enunciation, claiming a 
new epistemological relation to the state, and recuperating Bolivia’s non-Western 
culture, language, cosmology, and forms of being. Vice Minister Cárdenas often 
explains that the central feature of colonial domination is still the powerful myth of 
white superiority that devalued indigenous cultures, religions, languages, and ways 
of life. For him and other indigenous intellectuals, to decolonize Bolivian society 
is to cleanse it of such colonial devaluation and restore indigenous pride, forms of 
knowledge, and practices (see Bautista 2010; Burman 2011b; Cárdenas 2011).
Here a return to Rancière’s notion of politics is helpful to explain why the Boliv-
ian state has invested so much effort in what many see as propaganda or “merely 
culturalist” efforts. In the Introduction, I proposed that, using Rancièrian terms, 
we can think of indigenous organizing as emancipatory politics intended to draw 
attention to the “miscount” or exclusion of indigenous peoples from the nation 
(Rancière 1999). By making their presence visible, the “part without a part” dem-
onstrates the “wrong” committed by the police order, or the structures of society. 
Rancière describes this in terms of aesthetics, explaining that one fundamental 
way in which society is ordered is through a “distribution of the sensible.” He calls 
attention to the ways some people are not sensed as real or important, just noise 
in the system. In this view, we can see the efforts of the VMD to make coloniality 
visible as an ongoing politics. Given that throughout Bolivia’s history, indigenous 
peoples have been discursively opposed to whites and mestizos, and treated as sav-
age obstacles to modernity and progress, a fundamental task of decolonization is 
to change these ideas, held at the deepest aesthetic and cultural levels. The collec-
tive marriage I describe in this chapter was central to the VMD’s efforts to “make 
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coloniality visible in all its aspects” and to radically transform Bolivian culture by 
making indigenous customs and norms perceivable (Mamani and Chivi 2010: 25).
DEPATRIARCHALIZ ATION
The 2011 collective marriage was intended to project a new horizon for Andean 
families. Why focus on families? Designed by the Depatriarchalization unit of 
the VMD, the weddings were intended to play a part in accomplishing the unit’s 
overarching goals: “to make visible, destabilize, and transform patriarchal social 
relations in the State, society, and economy” (Mamani and Chivi 2010: 10; Chivi 
2011b). According to the VMD, patriarchy is not just machismo, or sexism. Rather, 
it is a broader “system of power relations made in the image and likeness of the 
masculine” (Mamani and Chivi 2010: 28). Writing for the VMD, Amalia Mamani 
and Idón Chivi trace the history of contemporary patriarchy to sixteenth-century 
Spanish colonialism, brought to the Americas by soldiers and Catholic priests 
(29). This follows a large body of feminist scholarship recognizing the ways in 
which colonialism was always gendered (see, e.g., Choque-Quispe 1998; Rivera 
Cusicanqui 1996; Rivera Cusicanqui and Barragán 1997; Schiwy 2007). In her 
analysis of British colonialism, for instance, Anne McClintock argues that “gen-
der power was not the superficial patina of empire, an ephemeral gloss over the 
more decisive mechanics of class or race. Rather, gender dynamics were, from the 
outset, fundamental to the securing and maintenance of the imperial enterprise” 
(1995: 5–7). The precolonial gender system in the Andes has been described as a 
“dynamic and contentious equilibrium,” where women and men had public and 
family rights more or less on par with each other (Rivera Cusicanqui 2010b: 31; 
see also Harris 1978), but María Lugones explains that Europeans brought with 
them a conception of civilization that privileged white men as “the human be-
ing par excellence.” This turned “the colonized woman” into an empty signifier, a 
sort of “non-human” whose sex became a legitimate site of exploitation, violence, 
and terror (Lugones 2010: 744). This was accomplished in part through Christian 
understandings of women’s sexuality as evil (745), and in part through the imposi-
tion of a strongly heterosexual model of the family. Rossana Barragán explains 
how this heterosexual model was further embedded during the republican period, 
when Bolivian legislators adopted a Victorian model of the family in which the 
paterfamilias acted as the sole public representative of the family, subordinating 
wives and children under his authority (cited in Rivera Cusicanqui 2010b: 30)
In 2011, I visited the offices of the VMD and spoke to the director of the De-
patriarchalization Unit, Doña Esperanza Huanca. She, too, had been a delegate to 
the Constituent Assembly, and we remembered meeting in Sucre at the inaugura-
tion in 2006. Now, years later, she worked in the VMD, in the crowded Ministry 
of Cultures building in downtown La Paz. The office buzzed with conversations 
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in various languages, and its walls were covered with colorful posters advertising 
workshops on decolonization as well as important tourist sites. The great majority 
of the officials and employees self-identified as indigenous, and as a result, visiting 
the office is a very different experience than my many interviews of government 
officials in the 1990s. Then, officials were almost all mestizo men, dressed in for-
mal suits. Now, the Depatriarchalization office was filled with indigenous women 
dressed in clothing that marked them as indigenous. A trained eye could identify 
which region and linguistic group each belonged to from their hats, blouses, and 
skirt styles. Doña Esperanza was proud to tell me about the collective marriages. 
Sitting under a poster of Evo Morales smiling down over the office, she explained 
that to confront colonial legacies, the new plurinational state must create new 
families. She pointed to Article 62 of the new constitution, which says that “the 
state recognizes and protects families as the fundamental nucleus of society, and 
guarantees the social and economic condition necessary for its integral develop-
ment.” The collective marriages were an opportunity for the state to help instill 
into these couples these important values of the “new family”: horizontal relations 
of rights and duties as to their children; ending sexual, physical, and psychologi-
cal violence; and shared responsibility for domestic labor (see Chivi 2011a). They 
began this effort with several inspirational talks at preparatory meetings for the 
wedding participants.
Vice Minister Félix Cárdenas was also enthusiastic about the weddings. He be-
gan our 2011 interview by describing his political trajectory from his early work 
as a labor leader in the peasant unions in Oruro to his struggles with the national 
labor union, the CSUTCB, around the 500-year anniversary of the invasion of 
the Americas. He described his experience as a delegate to the Constituent As-
sembly, where he had been the head of the Visión del País (Vision of the Country) 
Commission. Our job, he said, was to ask “what kind of country are we going to 
construct? And to do that we had to understand our identities, our history, and 
the myths we have been told since childhood.” This trajectory, he said, explained 
the excitement and the energy he brought to the VMD, where the first assumption 
was understanding that “today we are a colonial state.” That state is “reproduced 
permanently on the basis of two fundamental axes: racism and patriarchy.” To de-
colonize, then, is to “deconstruct that colonial state, and understand that all the 
institutions of the state are colonial and racist and patriarchal.” So, the weddings 
were intended to begin the process of changing those axes. He told me:
We want to re-position our spiritual thinking, our spiritual practices, and recuper-
ate our ceremonial places and practices. . . . We want to revalorize our amautas, our 
Aymara priests. Through these weddings we are holding, we want to understand that 
[Catholic] marriage has a patriarchal and machista foundation in which the man is 
the owner of the woman, the children, and even the future of the family. We want 
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to put forth a new model of the family, marrying people with our own priests, and 
instituting families that live in complementarity, in solidarity, and fundamentally in 
co-responsibility. (personal interview, August 2011)
This argument faults European-based patriarchy as the source of gender dis-
crimination, and holds out indigenous values as the idealized solutions. But does 
all gender discrimination come from colonialism? Does chachawarmi perhaps 
also conceal an autochthonous form of gender inequality, as Anders Burman sug-
gests (2011a: 75)? These questions have been the subject of substantial debate and 
study across Latin America, as indigenous women have organized and mobilized 
for change (see, e.g., Oliart 2008; Richards 2004; Sierra 2001 Speed 2008; Speed 
et al. 2006). In her review of this now extensive literature, Stéphanie Rousseau 
concludes that indigenous women activists can find themselves caught between 
their support for their movements’ collective projects of decolonization and au-
tonomy, on the one hand, and their critiques of patriarchal practices and norms 
within their communities, on the other (Rousseau 2011: 9). For instance, she sug-
gests that their role as agents for preserving and reproducing the community can 
be empowering, since this strengthens endangered identities, but it can also act as 
an obstacle to full participation in public or political roles. Even more problematic 
is the revaluation of customary law, which does not always embody women’s rights 
(ibid). Yet scholars have documented the creative ways in which these women 
have used indigenous ideas of complementarity to struggle for justice within their 
communities and within their families. While some reject feminism as a West-
ern bourgeois notion and defend indigenous cosmovisiones as a more legitimate 
space of resistance, others have increasingly put forward new forms of “indigenous 
feminism,” in which their positions as both women and indigenous are mutually 
reinforcing (Hernández Castillo 2010; Speed 2008). In a provocative interven-
tion into this debate, the Bolivian sociologist and public intellectual Silvia Rivera 
 Cusicanqui argues that indigenous organizing focused on recovering territories in 
fact ignores the issues most important to indigenous women who live and work in 
cities—exploitative labor and sexual violence. By limiting their activism to ques-
tions of political or territorial rights, she says, male indigenous leaders are miss-
ing broader and potentially more liberatory notions of rights (Rivera Cusicanqui 
2010b: 49–50).
In Bolivia, these debates have revolved mainly around the issue of whether 
Andean culture can be claimed as a source of empowerment or is, rather, just 
another site of patriarchy—precisely the question this collective wedding brings 
up. The Aymara feminist Julieta Paredes told me that there are two forms of pa-
triarchy: an ancestral patriarchy that can be seen from the period of the Incas on, 
and a colonial patriarchy brought by the Spanish. These are linked and reinforce 
each other. For her, depatriarchalization can only be successful if it recognizes 
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both forms, that of the European conquerors towards indigenous people, but also 
that of the indigenous men vis-à-vis indigenous women (personal communica-
tion, August 2012, see also Paredes 2011). The Aymara intellectual María Eugenia 
Choque-Quispe agrees, pointing out that the colonial order radically transformed 
gender relations between indigenous men and women, since the latter were trans-
formed into a commodity whose value hinged on their reproductive capacities 
(Choque-Quispe 1998: 12). As a result, she rejects the concept of chachawarmi, 
characterizing it as a romanticized and deeply conservative notion that serves to 
conceal the ongoing subordination of women in their communities (15). This sen-
timent is echoed by some of the Aymara activists interviewed by Anders Burman 
(2011a), who recognized the gap between the indigenous ideal of chachawarmi and 
the way it is practiced in contemporary indigenous communities—where women 
are often still silenced and subordinated to indigenous men. Nevertheless, they 
still saw great emancipatory potential in revitalizing traditional gender practices 
as part of the decolonizing process. Clearly, the VMD takes this last approach, as 
we see in the collective wedding.
PUT TING ON A WEDDING FOR 355  C OUPLES
The VMD began by broadcasting an invitation on the radio in Spanish and in-
digenous languages on the radio stations that are the main source of information 
in the rural areas. The written convocation said the goal of the marriages was to 
“promote and recuperate the culture of tolerance through the plurinational wed-
dings in order to facilitate the process of the institutionalization of the diversity of 
religious practices, strengthening spiritual beliefs in accordance with the cosmo-
visiones [worldviews] of the indigenous originary peasant nations and peoples, to 
live well in harmony with Mother Earth” (Bolivia 2010).
Besides the opportunity to take part in this unique public celebration of cul-
tural diversity, there were several important material incentives for participating. 
First, the VMD was footing the bill. In Bolivia, there are two forms of wedding 
ceremonies. The first is a civil marriage, called registro civil, officiated by a notary 
public, with two witnesses. Since 1911, this has been all that is necessary for a mar-
riage to be legal and recognized by the state.3 But many people, including many 
indigenous Andeans, also celebrate a religious ceremony in the Catholic Church, 
and have their marriage license signed by the priest. As I describe below, this is 
usually followed by a costly wedding celebration. This expense is a big obstacle 
for poor people who often wait years to gather the funds and social capital to be 
able to hold such ceremonies.4 Many of the couples that participated in the col-
lective wedding had been together for many years and had children, but they had 
never been able to afford to formalize their relationship. So it was significant that 
the state promised to cover the costs of whatever documentation was necessary, 
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such as procuring birth certificates or carnets (national identity cards), as well as 
the cost of the civil marriage registry and all the costs of the collective celebration. 
Every couple I spoke to said the cost was the main reason they participated in the 
collective wedding. I would also suggest that this was an easy pathway to state 
documentation: by participating in this state ritual, they avoided other much more 
complicated and costly bureaucratic rituals.
Potentially more significant was the state’s offer to build each of the couples a 
house. The VMD paired with the Vice Ministry of Housing and Urbanization to 
establish a special program called “El Casado Casa Quiere” based on the common 
saying, “Cuando la pareja joven se casa, casa quiere” (When a young couple 
marries, they want a house).5 In many Aymara communities, the couple’s parents 
and neighbors build the couple a new house. As Denise Arnold has shown, in the 
Andes, the construction of the house and the final roofing ceremony serves to 
weave the house and the couple into the network of the community and the cos-
mos (Arnold 1992). Citing Article 19 of the new constitution, which declares that 
all people have “the right to adequate habitat and housing,” the VMD argued that 
the state, as the “big community,” should support the couples with housing (Chivi 
2011b). This was also part of a larger home building project that the MAS gov-
ernment began in 2006, called the Programa Vivienda Social y Solidaria (Social 
and Solidarity Housing Program), intended to meet the serious problem of lack of 
housing in the rural areas.6
The morning of the wedding, notary publics set up shop in the Coliseo Cer-
rado, allowing those couples not already married under the registro civil to ac-
complish this legal step. As is the norm in Bolivia, notaries required the couples 
to swear before God. Photographs from that morning show couples swearing with 
the common hand gesture of thumb and first finger crossed in the sign of a cross, 
evidence of the continuing influence of the Catholic ecclesiastic traditions. The 
event organizers had been very clear in the pre-wedding meetings that the couples 
should wear “traditional” clothing. What did traditional clothing mean? I asked. 
For Natalia and Crispín,7 a participating couple I spoke with in 2012, it meant old-
style clothing (ropa antigua) made of sheep’s wool. This was not like the Western-
style clothes they wear now in their rural community near Tiwanaku, but rather 
clothing such as their grandparents wore. They had inherited such clothing, which 
they kept for special ceremonial or civic events. Gregorio and Amalia, from an-
other rural hamlet near Tiwanaku, had to buy these clothes, quite an investment, 
but one they were happy to make. They felt that the old customs were being lost, 
so it was fun to be involved in “recuperating” them. For couples that live in the city 
and regularly wear Western-style clothes (de vestido), this meant buying clothes 
marking them as indigenous. Beauticians offered free haircuts and styling, as well 
as makeup for the women. (Rural women rarely wear makeup, something consid-
ered more appropriate for urban women.) Urban women, few of whom wear their 
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hair in the long braids common in the rural areas or in the cholita style in the city, 
had their hair braided by the hair stylists. As several of the couples I interviewed 
told me, the long white wedding dress and suit in which so many people marry 
these days doesn’t suit them. Luis, a neighborhood activist from El Alto, told me 
he was happy to be able to wear these clothes as an example for his children. His 
wife Celestina, an urban merchant who normally dresses de vestido, told me “I 
felt different, I felt good in these clothes!... This was an opportunity to be part of 
decolonization.”
Here we see the critical importance of clothing in marking the categories and 
meanings of indigeneity. Cecilia Salazar has explored how the Indian has been 
continually recreated through the “manipulation of signs and corporalities,” espe-
cially clothing choices. She argues that as biological racism gave way to social rac-
ism, clothing acted as a “second skin” that makes visible class and power (Salazar 
2006: 10). In her analysis of folkloric performances in Ecuador, Rebecca Tolen 
argues that dress is by far the most important icon for portraying the place of 
indigenous people in the nation—tied to a timeless, rural ethnicity opposed to 
civilized whiteness (Tolen 1999). But such signs undergo constant reinterpreta-
tion. Rossana Barragán described how the clothing of the chola paceña—the icon 
of feminine ethnicity in Bolivia—all borrowed from European fashions. The large 
skirts of the pollera, flowered Manila shawl, and Borsalino bowler hat were origi-
nally adopted in acts of cultural mimesis intended to give indigenous migrants to 
the city social mobility and access to markets (Barragán 1992). In recent years, this 
style has been “converted into a form of resistance against cultural assimilation, as 
the clothing items have come to be seen as emblems of an oppressed and subal-
tern ethnicity” (Rivera Cusicanqui 2010b: 46). This is ever more the case since the 
election of Evo Morales, since government ministries like the VMD are filled with 
self-identifying indigenous women in polleras. Yet, as both Rivera Cusicanqui and 
Barragán have pointed out, this donning of polleras by chola women in La Paz 
remains ambiguous. On the one hand, it highlights and negates indigenous dif-
ferences of gesture and conduct, but it may also mask assimilationist aspirations 
and self-perceptions as “mestizas” or “middle-class” women (ibid; Barragán 2006). 
(I return to the complex issue of the intersection of race and class in chapter 6.) I 
suggest the wearing of “indigenous” clothing in the wedding ceremony is equally 
ambiguous, and productively so. While it marks its wearers as indigenous, the 
theatrical context allows the participants to adopt the part for the spectacle, and 
then shed that “second skin” after the event if they want. Nonetheless, as signs of 
a newly valued identity, such clothing can also be enormously meaningful, espe-
cially in a ritual context.
The big event began with the couples entering the brightly decorated Coliseo 
Cerrado in groups, community by community, carrying flowers. They formed 
an enormous circle around the edges of the arena. Then, the amautas—pairs of 
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men and women ritual experts—entered, blowing conch shell horns and burning 
incense. Seated before ritual mesas, small tables with flowers and ritual objects, 
they chanted, invoking the deities of the mountains and the Pachamama. At the 
center of the arena was a dais, where the governor of La Paz, the vice minister of 
decolonization, and the minister of cultures were seated. From a doorway at the 
top of the arena, President Morales descended to the arena, where he greeted all 
the couples, followed closely by the ministry’s video team. Then a collective theater 
group of 120 actors and dancers performed a drama showing the violent process 
of evangelization and colonization by the Spanish. Spanish colonizers and priests 
whipped, kicked, and enslaved the indigenous peoples, until the end, when the 
indigenous peoples rose up, killing the oppressors, to the applause of the audience 
and the president. A final dance showed the return of the Inca gods and warriors. 
Then, the amautas performed the marriage ceremony, giving each couple words 
of advice, blowing incense smoke in their faces, linking them together with ropes, 
and sprinkling alcohol on them and the ground.
Finally, President Morales spoke. Morales, who is single, joked that seeing all 
these families in nuestras vestimientas (our clothing) made him want to get mar-
ried. Calling on the couples to continue to decolonize themselves and be an ex-
ample for their children, he urged them to share responsibility in the home and in 
the big family of Bolivia. The event ended with Morales posing for pictures with 
each community group and then the couples going outside to make offerings at the 
ritual mesas prepared by the amautas.
CULTUR AL PERFORMANCE AND MOR AL 
REGUL ATION
This wedding spectacle provoked all kinds of responses in Bolivia. Anarcho- 
feminists protested the event’s heterosexual privileging.8 Aymara activists from 
the Pukara group argued that this event reduced struggles over fundamental ques-
tions of power and domination to a silly symbolic “culturalist” response, focusing 
on things like dress and music (Turpo Choquehuanca 2011).9 In talking with many 
different Bolivians about these collective weddings, however, the overwhelming 
response I received was one of cynicism: “Es un show, no más” (“It’s just a show”), 
they say. There is no doubt that this marriage was a show. It was intended to be. 
This was a performance carried out by the state, invested with state resources, us-
ing elements of folklore and theater to accomplish a political agenda. But this was a 
special kind of cultural performance: a public performance of a ritual we normally 
associate with private domestic relationships.10 Before analyzing the effects of this 
spectacle, I want to consider first why a state would choose ritual and performance 
to accomplish its political work, and then ask why it might intervene into the fam-
ily sphere. Then I turn to how it used symbol and imagery to accomplish its goals.
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Cultural performances are key sites of meaning making. David Guss defines 
performances as clearly framed events set off from normative everyday reality, 
which involve dramatizations that enable participants to understand, criticize, and 
change the worlds in which they live (Guss 2000: 9). This is possible because such 
performances are profoundly discursive: they are dialogical and polyphonic fields 
of action where competing claims can be challenged and negotiated, producing 
new meanings in the process. This means that cultural performance is not merely 
reflective of social experience, but also productive of it (10). Relying on Clifford 
Geertz’s work on the theater state in Bali (1980) and Emile Durkheim’s work on 
collective consciousness (1915), scholars have demonstrated how political actors 
use ritual and performance to gain legitimacy and to create and strengthen so-
cial solidarity. Festivals and cultural performance have been especially important 
mechanisms for forging new national identities, a sort of “social dramaturgy” in-
tended to instill faith in new states. Nationalism was often supported by invented 
traditions based on forms of commonality imagined to be authentic (Guss 2000: 
13; Anderson 1991; Hobsbawn and Ranger 1992).
Yet the question of authenticity or invention has proved to be a tricky one. As 
Stuart Rockefeller notes, folkloric performances are not really about “truth,” but 
are more productively considered as vehicles for teaching. For him, the question 
is who is making the representations and who is benefiting from them (Rock-
efeller 1999: 124). While performances can produce social solidarity, they can also 
be used to contest power, or as processes of negotiation (Bowie 1997). Especially 
in class-structured or conflicted societies, struggles between different ethnic and 
social groups can result in intense semiotic battles (Lukes 1975: 305; Stepputat 
2004). Jean Comaroff famously argued that in oppressive societies, resistance is a 
“struggle for the possession of the sign” (1985: 196). Yet a fundamental attribute of 
cultural performances is that they often utilize ambiguous symbolic elements that 
can be interpreted in very different ways (Cohen 1982; Guss 2000). This multivo-
cality enables political actors to build solidarity in the absence of consensus, but 
also allows for creative utilization of such symbols to contest domination (Bowie 
1997: 43; Gal 1991; Kertzer 1988: 11).
Rituals are a particularly powerful form of performance. They work by link-
ing political interests to symbols of commonly held values, and especially to the 
sacred (Turner 1967; Kertzer 1988). Here I am defining ritual as symbolic actions 
that give meaning to actions in the here-and-now by linking them to the past (Ker-
zter 1988). Through dense semiotic links between elements internal to the ritual 
scene and others outside it, rituals “make present” something outside it through 
a felt quality of contiguity (Stasch 2011: 161). Thus, rituals can have what Rupert 
Stasch calls a “world-making” effect, as ritual actors “bootstrap into existence” 
the very conditions the rituals represent (163). Another reason for the efficacy of 
ritual is that it unites a particular image of the universe with a strong emotional 
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attachment to that image (Kertzer 1988: 40). As emotions are heightened, people 
focus on a limited range of symbols, and can easily accept the simple and often du-
alistic messages presented, especially imagery defining “us” and “them” (99–100). 
So, when the VMD wanted to challenge the myths of colonialism, it opted for 
a cultural performance combining ritual, pageantry, folklore, and history.11 This 
“intertextual mixing of genres” accomplishes an important “representational shift” 
(Rogers 1999: 5–6; see also Rockefeller 1999). By drawing behaviors and cultural 
matter from one domain of experience, in this case, the sacred space of weddings, 
into another, in this case, a public state-sponsored spectacle, the behavior is “re-
realized” through a mimetic act that reorganizes the world and makes sense of 
what appears to be given (5–6). One result is that the plurinational state is invested 
with a sense of the sacred.
States have enormous power to use ritual and performance to accomplish what 
the historical sociologists Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer (1985) called “moral 
regulation.” This can happen in many ways, but Michael Warner points out that 
marriage is one key “institution by which the state regulates and permeates people’s 
most intimate lives” (1999). For instance, Sara Friedman shows how the People’s 
Republic of China worked to reform “backward” feudal marriage practices, urging 
Figure 7. Amautas, or Andean spiritual practitioners, at an international meeting in Cocha-
bamba in 2012. The Morales government utilizes them frequently to give events an “indigenous” 
identity. Credit: Juan Manuel Herrera/OAS. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0.
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women to form the affective ties necessary to the modern conjugal bond, and, in 
the process, become productive, liberated subjects of the socialist nation (Fried-
man 2005: 312). Similarly, in the Soviet Union, state authorities tried to undermine 
the power of traditional religious systems by inventing new civil ceremonies for 
various rites of passage, such as baptism, funerals, and weddings. “Red wedding” 
ceremonies brought together folkloric elements with overtly nationalistic ones 
(like busts of Lenin) to link the individual and the Soviet state at the most intimate 
and momentous times of life (Lane 1979; McDowell 1974; Schmemann 1983).
State regulation of domestic arrangements like weddings can also act as a site 
of racial and ethnic definition. Gender roles, marriage, and the family have been 
primary foci for nations striving to create a coherent nation out of heterogeneous 
populations (see Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992; Canessa 2005a; Radcliffe and 
Westwood 1996). This has been particularly clear in Bolivia. For instance, Brooke 
Larson and Marcia Stephenson have documented the ways in which moderniz-
ing Andean nation-states struggled to manage their indigenous populations in the 
early 1900s. “Nationalist ideologies,” Larson says, “quickly fastened on the fam-
ily . . . to promote cultural reforms designed to reproduce healthy, efficient, patri-
otic citizen-workers or peasants” (2005: 34). The Bolivian state, worried about the 
rising indigenous insurgency in the countryside, mounted an extraordinary proj-
ect of rural education that focused on el hogar campesino, (the peasant home). The 
child and the family were the “object, mechanism, and rationale for state inter-
vention”—through which “bodily habits of hygiene, consumption, clothing, diet, 
housing, and sexuality were targeted for resocialization with the goal of creating 
docile indigenous subjects (39). All of these inscribed social and cultural mean-
ings on to the body’s surfaces, thereby producing the difference between dirty/
pathological/disordered indigenous bodies, and clean/normalized/modern mes-
tizo bodies (Stephenson 1999: 121). Sometimes elites focused on building a nuclear 
farm family, sometimes on urging indigenous peasants to leave behind their indig-
enous practices so as to take on mestizo status, and sometimes on converting rural 
women into modern domestic housewives. The central goal of all these interven-
tions was to fix “racial, class, and gender hierarchies in ways that subordinated the 
Indian peasantry to the state” (Larson 2005: 35).
As I describe in the Introduction, by the 1940s, this effort to modernize indig-
enous peoples gave way to a more overt and determined effort to make cultural 
mestizaje the central unifying nationalist project. The historian Laura Gotkowitz 
(2007) describes how the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR; Na-
tional Revolutionary Movement) also focused on women to accomplish its goals. 
Instead of targeting indigenous women, President Gualberto Villarroel López and 
the MNR made the “working-class, mestiza mother the icon and vehicle of a strong 
nation” (174). In a key reform of family law, they legalized common-law marriages 
(concubinato), securing legal status for the “self-sacrificing, valiant women” whose 
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reproductive and productive labors formed the basis of the Bolivian nation. Got-
kowitz also documents the ways in which the Villarroel administration used state 
ritual to express this vision of national harmony. In 1944, he made Heroinas (Her-
oines) Day, a regional celebration in Cochabamba honoring a group of mestiza 
market women who fought in the war of independence, into Bolivia’s sole national 
holiday. In a spectacular show, Villarroel appeared at the annual parade sponsored 
by a merchant association, broke ground on several public works projects, and 
called on the heroic women to become the model for the “new Bolivia.” Gotkow-
itz argues that the mestiza market women became the ideal image for the new 
mestizo Bolivia because “they bridged private and public spheres, for they stood 
simultaneously as mothers of a healthy ‘race’, custodians of an abundant market, 
and brave patriots who died defending national independence and honor” (184). 
These studies and others document an unrelenting effort by the Bolivian state to 
use the family as a site of both discursive and institutional interventions to create a 
unified nation. Moreover, we see how the same oppositional elements (indigenous 
vs. white–mestizo, savage vs. civilization, etc.) have been utilized over and over in 
these symbolic battles with a goal of creating a consensus about the position of the 
Indian in the nation.
This can also be seen in the large literature on folkloric cultural performanc-
es in the Andes (Abercrombie 2001; Bigenho 2006; Guss 2000; Mendoza 2000; 
Paulson 2006; Rogers 1999; Weismantel 2001). In these performances, such as 
dance and music festivals, beauty pageants, and folkloric presentations, we find 
multiple actors enacting, reproducing, and contesting images of indigeneity. 
While all these performances begin with the assumptions of separate, coherent, 
and primordial cultural differences recognizable in “indigenous,” “traditional” 
culture and customs, this separation is blurred by the playful dramatizations. In 
performances in the late 1990s described by Mark Rogers (1999) and others, for 
example, participants assumed identities other than their own everyday perso-
nas. White-mestizos took on the roles of indigenous people, and indigenous 
people danced as mestizos but also portrayed stylized versions of indigeneity, 
all distorting reality so that indigeneity was relieved of its threatening compo-
nents and prepared for incorporation in a white–mestizo hegemony (10). Thomas 
Abercrombie’s description of the iconic carnival celebrations in Oruro describes 
how this interchange between supposedly closed cultural systems works. White– 
mestizo participants dressed as wild Indians and pre-Columbian devils dance and 
enact the “Indian within,” until the climax, when they shed their wildness and 
hear mass before the Virgin in the Catholic Cathedral. The suppressed and dan-
gerous identities are enacted, domesticated, and then re-repressed, allowing the 
development of a national identity based on a distinctive Indian past firmly under 
control of a modern nation (2001). What emerges most strongly from this re-
search is a calling into question of essentialized notions of indigenous culture and 
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its opposition to Western culture, and an understanding, instead, of identity as 
constantly being formulated through dialogue in particular and often contested 
political and historical contexts (Tolen 1999).
I want to turn now to how the collective weddings again reproduced and re-
worked these traditional oppositions. I argue the state ritual again put images of 
indigeneity and European in conflict to depict a new Bolivia unified by a strong 
state and a manageable form of indigeneity.
IMAGINARY WEDDINGS
Let us look more closely at the wedding spectacle. First, the event brought together 
couples from three departments: La Paz, Potosí, and Oruro. There was an enor-
mous heterogeneity of cultures, languages, and social status in this group. There 
were Aymara families from communities near La Paz, many of whom are mer-
chants or transporters who live part time in El Alto; monolingual Aymara couples 
from rural communities; Afro-Bolivians from the Yungas area, who speak their 
own Afro-Yungueño dialect and practice African-inspired dances and religious 
rituals; urban Paceños who dress de vestido and speak only Spanish; and an as-
sortment of indigenous groups from Argentina and Chile. Despite this variety, the 
speakers lumped all of them together, referring to “our” tradition, “our” identity, 
and “our” amautas. Here the state was creating a fictional unity for its purposes, 
inventing the sort of commonality often invoked by nation-states (Guss 2000). 
The linguistic references were key to this, as the terms “us” and “our” indexed 
a presumed category into which all the participants fit. This was reinforced by 
the symbolic references to the past, especially the theater production about the 
conquest. There, in dramatic relief, the oppositions between “us” and “them” were 
made horrifyingly clear. “We” are the (good, noble) “indigenous” victims of (bad, 
evil) “them,” the Spanish/whites. The emotions evoked were remarkable: people 
watched with serious, almost scared looks on their faces, and then applauded 
loudly as “we” took revenge. The ritual made it appear that the amautas, the An-
dean spiritual practitioners, were the bearers of the wisdom and teachings of one 
coherent, age-old sacred tradition.
Second, the event created a new marriage ritual and asserted that it represented 
the authentic way of marrying according to “our tradition.” Let me be clear that I 
am not disqualifying this ceremony as inauthentic—as I have made clear above, 
all traditions are invented and constantly evolving. Rather, I point this out to high-
light the particular political configuration in which this new tradition was pro-
duced. But the orchestrators of this wedding did not explain they were creating 
something new, like patching together the remnants of the past to make something 
meaningful and relevant for an indigeneity under construction, as in the case of 
the Colombian indigenous communities Joanne Rappaport describes (2005), or 
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inventing new secular rituals to support socialism, as in the Soviet case Christel 
Lane describes (1979). Instead, they declared that this was a “recuperation” of real, 
past traditions that had survived and resisted the centuries of colonization. In do-
ing so, they not only obscured the practice’s invented nature, but also its political 
implications.
Scholars of Andean cultures suggest that in most Aymara and Quechua com-
munities, marriages are established over time and in several stages. This takes time, 
sometimes years, while the couple is already living together and having children. 
The religious wedding ceremony tends to be the last stage of this longer process 
of becoming married. Customs vary widely from community to community, of 
course, and are changing rapidly as more and more rural people move into the city. 
However, scholars report some general trends across the Andes. The first stage 
of the process is the initiation of the new relationship. Couples make their own 
decisions about whom to marry, and often start sleeping together clandestinely. 
In some places, it is common for the man to “steal” the woman (robo, or rapto) in 
a sort of elopement (Balán 1996: 81).12 Then, the man and his family petition the 
woman’s family, repeatedly bringing food and other material goods to show the 
young man’s intentions and suitability. Once both sets of parents agree, the bride 
and groom move in together, usually into the home of the man’s family (although 
this varies). This begins the second stage, when the couple begins to acquire the 
resources to form their own household and form new kinship relations by finding 
compadres, a respected couple who will help finance the wedding. The sociolo-
gist Jorge Balán explains that this relationship is a lifelong one, tying the families 
together in a complex set of rights and obligations within wide bilateral kinship 
networks (Balán 1996: 72). This period also gives time for the families to prepare 
the gifts of land, animals, tools, and cash necessary for a wedding ceremony, and 
for the construction of a new house (ibid). Couples may legalize their relationship 
through the civil registry during this period, but many do not.
The final stage, which may take place in a year or after many years, is the reli-
gious wedding ceremony. It begins with a mass in the Catholic Church and then 
continues with a (sometimes days-long) celebration and party in the community. 
There may be dancing, music, and processions, depending on the community and 
the customs (Pórcel Gira et al 2002a, b). In many communities, it is crucial to 
demonstrate one’s material success and prestige through extravagant provisioning 
of the party. Such shared consumption is auspicious of a productive and success-
ful future life.13 A fundamental part of these ceremonies is the giving of advice 
(consejos) from the padrinos to the newly married couple, exhorting them to live 
well together, and to remember their obligations to their parents, padrinos, and 
neighbors (ibid). Finally, the new couple may move into a new house, after an 
important collective roof thatching ceremony (Arnold 1992).14 In the process of 
following these steps, the couple moves from adolescence to adulthood, acquiring 
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the status of jaqe, or person, which is only possible as a part of the social unit of 
marriage (Canessa 2005b).
So the collective Andean marriage in El Alto condensed what is often a long, 
socially involved process into a discrete, state-sponsored moment that narrowed 
the range of traditions that normally constitute Andean marriage practices. It was 
also a very strange event for most of the participating couples. The couples I spoke 
with (as well as several Aymara intellectuals in the city) said that Andean ritual 
specialists did not normally play a role in weddings, but were consulted for other 
things, like healing, divination, or potions for luck in love and business. This in-
vented ceremony combined the Catholic weddings they were used to with a new 
sacred and familiar role for the amautas. This was intentional. The VMD overtly 
aimed to create a new role for amautas. But what is interesting is that the new role 
is actually that of the Catholic priest. Symbolically, the amautas had the aura and 
moral weight of religious experts and did what the Catholic priests the participants 
were familiar with had always done in the past: they burned incense, chanted, and 
performed weddings. Although they were supposedly the anti-Church element of 
this rite, the amautas and their words and practices were made to appear sacred 
to the participants by their ritual links to symbols of the Church. Borrowing the 
structural traits and symbols from Christianity lends a sense of permanence and 
timelessness to the amautas’ roles, giving it a sacred feeling (Lane 1979).
This blurring between Catholic and Aymara idioms reprises—but inverts— 
centuries of borrowing since Christian missionaries came to the Americas intent on 
proselytizing local peoples. Scholars have described the ways in which local deities 
were overlain with Catholic saints, creating syncretic religions in which elements 
of both remained salient. Andrew Orta (2004) has traced how Catholic missionar-
ies in Bolivia dealt with co-existing Aymara beliefs and practices. Earlier efforts to 
extirpate native deities gave way in the 1990s to an era of “inculturation,” in which 
missionaries sought to incorporate indigenous understandings and spirituality into 
a Christian identity. He shows how in this period catechists—local Aymaras acting 
as vernacular priests—understood themselves, not as caught between two different 
belief systems, but as situated actors in a coherent, lived social world. When the 
catechists burned candles or made offerings, they, like Aymara healers or yatiris, 
experienced themselves according to Aymara idioms of embodiment and notions 
of obligation to the community. Orta concludes that their interactive orientation to 
the chuyma, the Aymara notion of heart or center, is experienced within a “field of 
entangled revelations” (180). This insight helps us understand the entangled roles 
the amautas played in the collective marriages described here.
THE MASCULINE STATE
What about the goal of reinforcing chachawarmi and attacking machismo? Much 
of the symbolism of the event was, in fact, centered on complementary gender 
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relations. The amautas came in couples, linked together with braided ropes. Even 
the announcers were a pair, a woman and man, who took turns introducing peo-
ple. Both announcers alternated between Spanish and Aymara, making sure all the 
events and guests were presented in both languages. The most important person 
in the auditorium was President Morales, who is single. To have him perform the 
role of padrino not only went against the goal of gender complementarity, it also 
violated Andean custom. In a scathing editorial, the Aymara Pukara collective said 
“[t]he pair of padrinos, in the Andean world, are the authority that as a model 
guides the formation of a new jaqe unit. One is jaqe, that is a human person, only 
through marriage, and whoever is not jaqe cannot attribute to themselves the abil-
ity of being a model or authority for the social edification of the family, that is, 
cannot be the padrino of a marriage” (Pukara 2011). To his credit, Morales did not 
attempt to give the couples advice; he left that up to the amautas.
Nevertheless, Morales is a particularly bad role model in terms of gender equal-
ity. He regularly makes embarrassingly sexist remarks and jokes. During the 2011 
lowland indigenous march over the state’s proposed highway through the TIPNIS 
indigenous territory and national park, Morales suggested that his supporters the 
coca growers go out and seduce local indigenous women to garner their support 
(Erbol 2011). In 2012, he caused a scandal at carnival, when he sang several coplas, 
or rhyming couplets, in which he suggested he could sleep with female ministers 
or social movement leaders (Página Siete 2012). In 2012, while inspecting a petro-
leum well, Morales asked several women employees whether they were perforado-
ras o perforadas (drillers or drilled) (Eju TV 2012a).
Given Morales’s reputation, one can read the tableaux at the wedding differ-
ently. What is striking is the single man, a powerful head of state, giving his sanc-
tion to the ceremony from above on the dais. The spatial arrangement makes clear 
that the male state is above all the people. Morales appears here not as the padrino, 
but as the father figure or priest, the force bringing the couples together. Right 
behind him stands a military official, making clear that this state has all the power 
of the military force behind him. He enacts the plurinational state, performing a 
particular form of nationalism through his own body. Like the amautas, through 
the ritualized event, his position is linked to the sacred, to the moral high ground, 
to collective legitimacy. He emerged from the highest place in the arena like a 
king and received all the pomp and ceremony such a role merited. His speech was 
the climax of the event: his “blessing” linked the plurinational state to the ancient 
powers of the king, of the Church, of the deities. Here, his singleness is no longer 
dangerous or out of place. King and priest embody safe, known forms of power.
These symbolic links can be seen especially clearly when we consider the fact 
that Evo was presiding over a mass wedding. Collective marriages, while rare, oc-
cur in many places across the globe. The Moonie mass weddings put on by South 
Korea’s Unification Church are probably the most famous—although these are not 
actually legal weddings, but simply the blessing of the couples. Elsewhere, such 
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events are sometimes organized to defray costs, but more commonly are intended 
to draw attention to a cause.15 In the Andes, however, collective weddings have a 
history. Reportedly, the Inca state mandated group marriage ceremonies in vil-
lages once a year: “men and women of marriageable age stood facing each other in 
two rows in front of a visiting government official,” Richard Price recounts. “Each 
man, beginning with local dignitaries, selected a girl and placed her behind him, 
with her hands on his shoulders. The couples then received together the official 
blessing of the Inca’s representative. Thus concluded, marriages were completely 
indissoluble, with the imposition of the death penalty even for adultery. The state 
provided a house, tools, and fields for the newlyweds, and the man immediately 
entered the ranks of taxpaying adults” (Price 1965: 312).
The other important echo is with the Catholic Church, which also performed 
mass weddings. Price describes how across the Andes during his fieldwork in the 
early 1960s, itinerant priests would travel to rural communities and bring together 
unmarried couples “living in sin” to marry in collective ceremonies during the 
Lenten season. Local leaders participated in these unannounced round-ups, cap-
turing the couples know to be sleeping together to bring them to the priest. Like 
the spectacular wedding in 2011, these weddings had financial advantages: they 
cost only 10% as much as a large private wedding, because they involved only min-
imal celebrations and no dancing since they always occurred during Lent (318).16
In my reading of this performance, Morales’s presiding over this mass cere-
mony appears to reenact precisely the powerful patriarchal colonial  institutions—
Church and empire—that decolonization claims to dismantle. Feminists like Jenny 
Ybarnegaray Ortiz and Julieta Paredes argue that despite the effort to depatriar-
chalize marriage, nothing the VMD has done—including this event—has changed 
the basic patriarchal form of marriage in Bolivia. Women still take their husbands’ 
names and suffer from profound inequality. The collective wedding did nothing 
but institutionalize the same heterosexual models of the family that the Christian 
church imposed (Paredes 2011). Amautas were substituted for priests, but nothing 
else changed. If they wanted to do away with the colonializing power of the state 
and the Church, Paredes asks, why have the state involved at all in weddings? (per-
sonal communication, 2011).
This is the fundamental question here. Why promote marriages in the first 
place? I suggest that the family continues to be an amenable target for subject 
creation, just as it has been since colonial times. Here, from a wide variety of 
possibilities—the many forms of cultural difference, or “pluriverse” identified by 
indigenous activists—the state appears to be narrowing the options, “fixing” the 
acceptable ways of being indigenous (see Nelson 1999: 28). Through an emotional 
and meaning-filled ritual that enacts a new way to be indigenous—through em-
bracing state-sponsored indigenous cultural forms—the state created new subjects 
who can embody and symbolize its unifying power. At the same time that the 
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state is celebrating gender complementarity, however, it also appears to be giving 
the stamp of approval to liberal state-sanctioned marriages. Delinked from the 
community obligations understood as central to traditional Andean marriages, 
these weddings tie the couples and the family directly to the state. This was accom-
plished not by doing away with the colonial symbols of the Church or empire, but 
instead, by using their symbolic power to legitimize a particular new vision of in-
digenous family relations. By merging Catholic symbols and ritual practices with 
opposing symbols of indigenous practices, the ritual exposes the fundamental ra-
cial conflicts underlying Bolivian society. Like the cultural performances during 
the indigenismo period, this fearful tension is ultimately mediated by a conserva-
tive Christian resolution: a heterosexual wedding overseen by a strong masculine 
state. The “scary” side of indigeneity is domesticated, and no mention is made of 
kidnapping or years of living together before marriage. The result is a performed 
indigeneity that avoids the dangers of the dirty, resistant, or savage Indian—or any 
disagreements they might provoke. Instead, the indigeneity promoted by this pa-
ternal state is orderly, beautiful, and legitimized by its obvious links to the sacred. 
And what it most clearly performed is that the wedding is “ours,” that is, under the 
control of the beneficent state. Charles Hale argues that neoliberal multicultural-
ism produced an indio permitido, a permissible Indian whose cultural difference 
was recognized so long as it did not interfere with the state or with capitalism 
(Hale 2004). I suggest that this ritualized decolonization attempts to create a simi-
lar subject: the descolonizado permitido, the authorized decolonized subject sup-
porting the MAS state.
The vice president’s dramatized dual weddings—one in the Catholic Church 
and the other in a staged “indigenous” space—can be seen to produce the same 
thing. Once again, a mixture of Catholic and indigenous symbols at Tiwanaku 
blended to acknowledge, but at the same time minimize and erase, the extreme 
race and class differences made obvious by the extravagant wedding in the Cathe-
dral. The feminist Maria Galindo captured this perfectly, saying the wedding was 
“Catholic to make the Church and the middle class content,” but also employing 
“a rural and indigenous scene to continue the fetishistic use of the indigenous as a 
sexual and political toy. It shows us that one is not opposed to the other, but that 
they can be perversely complementary and simultaneously useful” (Galindo 2012).
MULTIPLE READINGS?
Like all performances, these spectacles had multiple audiences and could be read 
in many ways. For those self-identified as indigenous Andeans, and especially 
those invested in the state process of decolonization, this ritual performance was 
a chance to reverse the colonial forms of knowledge that continue to erase indig-
enous values and practices. Attending a follow-up with the wedding participants a 
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few months later, I observed the reverence with which VMD personnel and many 
of the participants treated the amautas who inaugurated the meeting. The disjunc-
ture between the crowded city streets of El Alto, where the meeting occurred, and 
the earthy smells of burning wood and incense as the amuatas chanted and prayed, 
called attention to the radical transformation such efforts involve. As Anders Bur-
man (2011b) makes clear, introducing “spiritual” matters into what is normally 
considered “politics” makes visible the effects of colonialism and modernity, and 
the losses they have caused. In his analysis of contemporary Andean curing ritu-
als, he suggests that Aymaras see colonialism as an illness that can be cured by 
cleansing the “strange element” that has been imposed when the ajayu (spirit) is 
lost. That strange element is the “Spaniard within” who must be exorcised to allow 
the spirit to recover (2011b: 465). In this view, decolonization is an ongoing process 
to “transform the state into something less ‘strange’” (469), and ritual practices 
such as the collective wedding and the marriage of the vice president at Tiwanaku 
are essential. For them, these are direct attacks on the coloniality of power, and 
a rethinking of the relation between nature, culture, and politics. In this sense, 
we can see the use of these cultural forms as means to construct a new political 
reality, a horizon or utopia towards which these activists want Bolivian society to 
move. Joanne Rappaport explains that the indigenous cultural activists she works 
with in the Cauca region of Colombia see culture, not as a concrete or preexisting 
thing, but as a tool for delineating a political project: “Essentializing constructs are 
more usefully understood as guides for disseminating cultural policy and engag-
ing in political action than as totalizing truths; they are something to be continu-
ally questioned, redefined, and redeployed” (Rappaport 2005: 38–39). Clearly, the 
indigenous VMD activists are engaged in this form of cultural political action.
How about the participants? A year after the weddings, I asked participants 
what they thought of the whole thing. Had it changed things for them? I met with 
several couples in the city and traveled to a small community outside Tiwanaku 
to meet more.17 All of the couples I spoke with said they were glad they had got-
ten married in El Alto event and they were happy to have supported the president 
in his proceso de cambio (process of change). They had enjoyed the spectacle and 
the excitement of the event, but it was strange, and somewhat disappointing. I 
met one couple, Natalia and Crispín, in the main plaza of Tiwanaku late one af-
ternoon. They had walked the long way into town on foot and brought me some 
cheese made from their sheep’s milk. They had enjoyed wearing their ancestral 
clothes, they said, but they had missed having their family with them. I spoke with 
another couple, Gregorio and Amalia, at their adobe house looking over the long 
valley back into the town of Tiwanaku. Sitting against a wall, we warmed ourselves 
in the afternoon sun. Gregorio said he hadn’t understood exactly what he was 
getting into, and honestly wished the ceremony had allowed him to be married 
and blessed by a Catholic priest. In his community, he said, weddings produce 
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a marriage certificate signed by the priest, and he regretted that theirs did not. I 
asked if they felt the meetings they had attended focusing on gender and equal 
family relations had been of much importance to them. No, they both said, they 
hadn’t really learned anything new there. “We are already living that life,” said 
Amalia. “Nosotros andamos bien [literally, we are walking well]. It is part of our 
Catholic faith, to walk well in life. It shows, if you are happy. If not, people in the 
community will intervene.”
They also pointed out that this wedding did not bring the sorts of social in-
terconnections from which they would have benefitted in a normal wedding. 
President Morales was their padrino, but this was in name only. Gregorio had 
just emerged from a three-week stay in a hospital in La Paz to heal a broken 
leg. “If I had a real padrino, he would have come to help me in the hospital,” he 
lamented. Amalia said the wedding was sad for her, because instead of having 
a long community party, after the ceremony in El Alto, they were alone in the 
city. Fortunately, they had a relative who made them dinner. Other people had 
more humorous takes on this. Virgilio, Gregorio’s neighbor, took time away from 
a neighborhood soccer game to describe his experiences to me. He said that in 
their community they have the custom of going to the padrino’s house once a 
year at carnival time, to check in, take them gifts, and account for their behavior 
over the previous year. “Should I call on Evo this carnaval?” he asked playfully. 
More important to them was the fact that the VMD had not fulfilled its promise 
to build them houses. Natalia and Crispín, mentioned above, described this as a 
great disappointment. They couldn’t believe Don Evo would let that happen. They 
are part of the committee the couples in the Tiwanaku area have formed to push 
their demands that the promise be kept. The VMD told me that this lapse was the 
result of a reorganization of the Vice Ministry of Housing, and they expected the 
program would soon get back on its feet. Whether this is true or whether this is 
another example of government corruption (see Opinión 2012), the newly mar-
ried couples are hoping the government will come through. When I checked in 
with the VMD in 2015 about this, they fumbled around and said they would get 
back to me, but they never did.
The responses from these couples demonstrate the layered and contradictory 
effects such state efforts at cultural hegemony can have. The participants are not 
passive recipients of state-imposed policies, but agents with their own under-
standings and agendas. They understood this event was a show, and they played a 
part in it for diverse reasons—from getting a house to feeling pride in their civic 
role to perhaps having fun playing with the tropes of indigeneity. But many also 
made clear that the various meanings they attached to their participation were 
understood within the context of social and political relationships of clientelism, 
party political militancy, and the MAS’s wider agenda. That is, they saw the wed-
ding as an effort by the MAS government to gain support and legitimacy. This 
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was even truer of the wedding of Vice President García Linera, which was to take 
place in the ceremonial complex in nearby Tiwanaku in the next few weeks after 
my visit. The wedding plans had gotten a lot of publicity. The well-known Aymara 
leader Felipe Quispe said the wedding would bring the sacred place bad luck, 
dirtying it. “No Aymaras marry there,” he said. “García is just pretending [apa-
rentar]. If he wanted to indianize himself, he should have married an indigenous 
woman and not an elite aristocrat of his own caste” (Eju TV 2012b). The couples I 
spoke with were not so dismissive. They were, once again, excited to have such a 
spotlight on their community and wondered if it would help bring in money to lo-
cal businesses. And the vice president’s wedding itself? “Fine [Bien, no más],” said 
Gregorio. “But it’s odd. They’re not even from here. Another show [Otro show]. . . . 
But it makes sense. This is where Evo started his government.” He rightly recalled 
another moment of spectacle in which Morales linked his legitimacy to his indig-
enous heritage.
This draws our attention to the question of who the audience for this spectacle 
was intended to be. The public spectacle nature of the event suggests that it was 
not just intended for the participants. Instead, it was more likely intended for the 
MAS’s electoral constituency, especially the large population of people who have 
indigenous roots, but no longer “identify closely with the lifeways and cultural 
values of their communities of origin” (Canessa 2014: 20). Andrew Canessa argues 
that a large number of people in Bolivia fit into this category, including coca grow-
ers in the Chapare, and the large group of landless peasants, urban merchants, 
and highland colonists in the lowlands. El Alto, where the collective wedding cer-
emony was staged, is the country’s largest concentration of urbanized indigenous 
people, many of whom who make their livings in the commerce, transportation, 
and service sectors. While a large number of Alteños keep close connections to 
the rural communities and bring communal practices into their city lives, as Sian 
Lazar (2007) has shown, others have gradually left these behind as they enter the 
middle class. I take up this new identity in further detail in chapter 6. What does 
the invented and generic version of indigeneity presented in the weddings spec-
tacle offer them?
There is no simple answer. On the one hand, as Canessa makes clear, this group 
has a historical consciousness of racism and injustice. Morales’s election has meant 
that they are now identifying less as mestizos and more as cholos, or indigenous, 
even though they are living urban middle-class lifestyles (Canessa 2014: 20). Mo-
rales’s example and the form of idealized indigeneity he offers allow these “in-
digenous cosmopolitans” (Goodale 2006) a way to deepen this identity without 
returning to the rural community, or to engage in the sort of collective or com-
munity relationships and obligations Gregorio and Virgilio from Tiwanaku de-
scribe. Like the growing celebrations of Andean New Year, which enable urban 
residents and foreign tourists alike to enjoy Andean spirituality (Sammels 2012), 
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the wedding spectacle presented a form of indigeneity easily incorporated into 
urban lives. In 2012, Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui told me that this was one of the pri-
mary appeals of the MAS discourse of ethnicity: “we no longer feel shame about 
our identity.” More important, “Evo gives us an ‘umbrella’ under which we can be 
different. He permits us in some ways to resist the subtle scripts of transnational 
consumer capitalism” (personal communication 2012).18
But accepting this idealized and homogenized version of indigeneity has its 
costs: obscuring the complex reality of indigenous life. The Aymara activist Pedro 
Portugal argues that the focus on a supposed ancient millennial Andean culture 
and rituals is a dangerous mystification of real contemporary Aymaras. He ob-
served that, although Aymaras are a dynamic force for capitalism, industry, and 
progress in Bolivia, pachamamismo — the discourse valorizing Andean cosmovi-
siones, especially those relating to the Pachamama, Mother Earth—makes them 
seem exotic and backward. Not only is this folklorization degrading, it is danger-
ous, because it awakens latent fears among mestizos, who worry that the Indians 
are trying to “flip the tortilla” and return to some irrational past (personal commu-
nication, 2012). Similarly, Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui objects to the “purist” nature of 
this folklorization because it depreciates the existing forms of indigenous religios-
ity. “The majority of indigenous people who practice religion do so with crosses, 
virgins, saints, and chapels; taking that away is taking away their foundation” (per-
sonal communication, 2012). In essence, they are arguing that the Morales admin-
istration is doing what the indigenismo project of the early twentieth century did: 
resorting to a distorted, static, and homogenizing vision of the “authentic” Indian.
C ONCLUSION
These cultural performances act as vehicles for the representation and re-repre-
sentation of Bolivian society’s most enduring tensions. As a result, they sparked 
numerous and contesting interpretations. For some, using these highly charged 
symbolic cultural performances and rituals to make coloniality visible and cel-
ebrate alternative forms of domestic relationships is a prime example of how the 
state can move Bolivian society forward on a path to social justice, countering the 
racism that has relegated indigenous peoples to what Rancière would call “non-
existence.” In this view, these symbolic acts were not frivolous shows, but acts of 
emancipatory politics attempting to radically alter the distribution of the sensible.
For others, however, the weddings called into question the credibility of the 
state’s commitment to decolonization. Instead of promoting a different form of 
knowledge or epistemology—a recognition of different ways of thinking and being 
in the world, which would require a radically different form of indigenous self-
government—these weddings instead acted as further mechanism to cement the 
MAS project of state-making. In this view, the weddings evacuated indigeneity of 
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its complexity and its emancipatory potential, instead reworking it into a folkloric 
national subject position subsumed under the state’s beneficent control. Instead 
of expressing the “disagreement” that characterized indigeneity at the beginning 
of the Morales era, when indigenous actors offered radical challenges to the neo-
liberal system, these performances used the discourse of decolonization to form 
a consensus about what indigeneity means and who speaks for it. Such efforts 
to form consensus is a classic nation-building strategy, inasmuch as nation-states 
are justified by representations—nearly always fictional—of a coherent national 
subject. We might also characterize it as a form of “post-politics,” what political 
theorists call the emerging practices of governance that operate through a prefig-
ured consensus surrounding the seemingly politically neutral fields of technical 
intervention (Swyngedouw 2009, 2010; see also Postero and Elinoff, forthcoming). 
Rancière warns that such practices have the effect of foreclosing the possibility of 
essential disagreements over the existing order (Rancière 2006: 81). Is the Morales 
government engaging in this sort of post-politics by owning decolonization and 
indigeneity? Obviously, this is not the same sort of technical intervention we see in 
other forms of post-politics, like development NGOs or climate change scientists. 
Yet the same result can be seen: the state apparatus produces a seemingly uncon-
testable consensus about indigeneity, which serves to delegitimize disagreement. 
This illuminates how easily politics can be turned into policing, as the state takes 
up the category of indigeneity to justify its own existence. It also raises important 
questions about the possibility of the liberal state’s ability to foster revolutionary 
politics. Can the state ever be the site of politics in Rancière’s sense of the term, or 
is the state always structurally bound to reinforcing the police order? What if the 
police order is already based on an emancipatory recount, as was the MAS’s pluri-
national project? This is the paradox of the MAS state: it is at once an indigenous 
state and a liberal state. Yet, as this chapter has shown, the multiple interpretations 
of the weddings demonstrate not only the blurry boundary between politics and 





THE C O CHABAMBA SUMMIT
In April 2010, Bolivian President Evo Morales held an international conference 
on global climate change near Cochabamba, Bolivia. Representatives, indigenous 
groups, and social movements from 140 countries attended “The World Peoples’ 
Summit on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth” (also known as “the 
Cochabamba Summit”). Bolivia is already experiencing devastating effects of 
climate change. Its Amazonian regions have suffered terrible flooding over the 
past few years, while its desert lowlands have witnessed severe droughts. In the 
highlands, the two main glaciers that provide drinking water are shrinking. The 
Chacaltaya glacier disappeared completely in recent years; others have already 
lost 40–50 percent of their capacity (Democracy Now 2010a; Rosenthal 2009). 
Lake Poopó, near Oruro, has dried up completely. So it was with a great sense 
of urgency that Morales convened the Cochabamba Summit. In a festive air of 
popular democratic participation, some thirty thousand people and seventeen 
working groups met to negotiate resolutions intended to address the problems 
left unanswered by the 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference, held in 
Copenhagen the previous December. In his opening address, President Morales 
set the tone for the meeting: “We are here because in Copenhagen, the so-called 
developed countries failed in their obligation to provide substantial commitments 
to reduce greenhouse gases. We have two paths: either Pachamama or death. Ei-
ther capitalism lives or Mother Earth lives. Of course, brothers and sisters, we are 
here for life, for humanity, and for the rights of Mother Earth. Long live the rights 
of Mother Earth! Death to capitalism!” (Democracy Now 2010a).
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Morales had spent the previous year trying—unsuccessfully—to make these 
points. He began his crusade at the United Nations in September 2009, saying that 
he believed defending Mother Earth had become more important than defending 
human rights. He said that “Mother Earth, Planet Earth, can exist without human 
life, but human life cannot exist without Mother Earth” (Morales 2009). Then, at 
the Copenhagen Conference in December 2009, Morales called on world leaders 
to hold temperature increases over the next century to just one degree Celsius 
(instead of the two degrees Celsius finally agreed upon). Even more provocatively, 
he argued that rich countries should pay climate reparations—what he terms a 
“climate debt”—to those poorer countries suffering the effects of climate change. 
Warning of a “climate holocaust” that will destroy Africa and many island nations, 
he called for an international climate court of justice to prosecute countries for 
climate “crimes” (Vidal 2009).
The resulting “World Peoples Agreement” at the end of the Cochabamba Sum-
mit echoed Morales’s concerns (Cooper 2010). It denounced the Copenhagen ac-
cords, and supported Morales’s call to limit global warming to one degree Celsius. 
It also called for the passage of a Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother 
Earth, the creation of an International Tribunal to prosecute polluters, protection 
for climate migrants, the establishment of an “Adaptation Fund” to help countries 
affected by climate change, and full recognition of the 2007 UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, whose lands and livelihoods are most affected by cli-
mate change. The agreement concluded with the need to hold a global referendum 
to consult with the world’s peoples on all of these issues, combining the fate of the 
planet with the need for global democracy.
THE PACHAMAMA DISC OURSE:  LOVING  
MOTHER EARTH
The Cochabamba Summit cemented Morales’s international reputation, giving him 
a highly visible platform for his long-standing criticism of imperialism, militarism, 
and neoliberalism. One of the most important accomplishments of the summit, 
he told Democracy Now’s Amy Goodman, was that instead of just talking about 
the effects of climate change, this summit examined the underlying cause, namely, 
capitalism (Democracy Now 2010b). Morales has often spoken about the need to 
end irrational consumer-driven industrialization, saying that such forms of capital-
ism are the “worst enemy of humanity” (Democracy Now 2009). To this Western 
form of development, Morales posed a liberatory alternative: a sustainable model 
of development based on indigenous values and reverence for the pachamama, or 
Mother Earth, called vivir bien, to live well. In the first years of his administration, 
Morales often referred to vivir bien, arguing that the only way to end global warm-
ing is to end the “search for living better,” or what he characterizes as the goal of 
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consumerist capitalism. He explained it this way: “Living better is to exploit human 
beings. It’s plundering natural resources. It’s egoism and individualism. Therefore, 
in those promises of capitalism, there is no solidarity or complementarity. There’s 
no reciprocity. . . . Living better is always at someone else’s expense. Living better 
is at the expense of destroying the environment” (cited in Democracy Now 2009).
This discourse has been enormously influential, at least at the symbolic level. 
But while this discourse has increased Morales’s reputation abroad, at home in 
Bolivia, there are ongoing and serious controversies over development. On the 
one hand, Morales and his government have vowed to put into place a sustainable 
development model based on indigenous values. On the other, the government 
continues to exploit its natural resources to bring in the income necessary to re-
distribute the benefits to Bolivia’s poor populations. In this chapter, I demonstrate 
how these two seemingly irreconcilable impulses have been contested, and how 
they are articulated to the MAS state’s notion of decolonization. I trace the ways 
in which the government has theorized indigeneity, vivir bien, and decolonization 
in its official documents, as well as its policies and practices, and show how the 
balance between them has changed over time. Development appears to be a mal-
leable notion that can take on “indigenous” valences when necessary to support 
the overarching agenda of decolonization. Yet, ultimately, the Morales government 
has ignored radical alternatives based on indigenous values in favor of more tradi-
tional ideas of capitalist and extractivist development.
Focusing on the political economy of Bolivia under Morales draws our attention 
to a particular site of politics. In Rancière’s terms, development decisions are a site of 
both politics and policing, just like the collective wedding described in chapter 3. As 
the description of the Cochabamba Alternative Climate Summit makes clear, Mo-
rales and the MAS government have represented natural resources and the environ-
ment as a site of emancipatory politics. Overturning the long history of exploitative 
relations between Bolivia as a producer of raw materials and foreign markets is not 
only a widely popular form of anti-imperialism, but also a form of decolonization, 
inasmuch as it benefits Bolivia’s poor and indigenous populations. Yet this form 
of politics also enables a new form of policing, because the “indigenous” govern-
ment consolidated power over decision-making about national development and 
natural resource extraction. I suggest that over time, the government decided its 
need to continue extractivist forms of development overshadowed other goals. In 
the process, decolonization lost much of its original emancipatory meaning, leaving 
indigenous activists with fewer resources to accomplish their political goals.
THE 2006 NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PL AN
In the first years of Morales’s administration, the MAS government made sig-
nificant steps to transform the relation between the state and the market and 
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overturn the neoliberal project of the previous decades. The MAS aimed to make 
the state a primary actor in the economy, re-embedding economic development 
in the fabric of social, political, and cultural life. This is an overt contestation of 
orthodox neoliberal ideology—but not practices—which urge the separation of 
the economic and the political. Orthodox neoliberal policies attempt to keep the 
state out of the economic sphere, protecting the freedom of individuals to make 
contracts in “free markets” (Harvey 2005). The government issued a road map to 
its plans in June 2006, when it published its Plan Nacional de Desarrollo (PND), 
or National Development Plan (Bolivia 2006). It is worth taking a close look at 
the language of the PND to understand both how the MAS discursively linked 
neoliberalism to colonialism and how it located its alternative project in indig-
enous customs and potential.
The PND describes the goal of national development as “remov[ing], from its 
roots, the profound social inequality and inhuman exclusion that oppress the ma-
jority of the Bolivian population, particularly those of indigenous origin” (1). This 
inequality, the PND makes clear, is the product of colonialism, capitalism, and 
neoliberalism. Colonialism, continuing through the republican period, denied in-
digenous peoples not only their dignity and their labor, but also their right to the 
means of production, especially land. Then, the capitalist primary export model 
of silver and tin mining deepened these inequalities, benefitting a small nucleus 
of oligarchs. Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, most of Bolivia’s 
natural riches were exported to other countries, along with the profits from their 
exploitation. The reforms of the 1952 revolution, including nationalization of the 
mines, were not enough to overcome the original causes of the structural inequali-
ties and social exclusions. Instead, the state capitalism of the second half of the 
twentieth century only gave rise to new regional oligarchs who appropriated state 
patrimony. This period ended in the crisis of external debt and hyperinflation, 
ushering in the neoliberal period (ibid).
The neoliberal model, says the PND, was imposed to resolve the failure of the 
welfare state, which was roundly held to be inefficient and corrupt. “In this way, the 
market took over the role of state, assigning resources for the production of goods 
and services, and also distributing wealth” (2). The result was the exacerbation of 
the concentration of wealth, access to means of production, and jobs to one-tenth 
of the population. This “inequality and social discrimination, called ‘poverty’ by 
neoliberal colonialism,” led to compensatory measures such as the poverty re-
duction policies that often accompanied structural adjustment programs and, in 
2000, the UN’s Millennium Development Goals. Although this amounted to a rec-
ognition of the failure of the market and the need for state intervention, neoliberal 
anti-poverty efforts continued to be subject to the logic of the market. NGOs and 
foreign aid stepped into this void with development projects, but since they did 
not address the fundamental causes, they could not resolve the problems either, 
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instead creating projects catering to foreign objectives, debilitating the govern-
ment, and wasting enormous amounts of money. Thus, under neoliberalism, the 
PDN says, the development of the country was subject to the interests of multilat-
eral organizations and transnational corporations (3).
This model of development failed because it is the product of a “system of eth-
nic, cultural, and political domination, impregnated with racism” (12). So the new 
development plan must have as its object
the suppression of the causes of the inequality and social exclusion in the country, 
which means to change to primary export model and the foundations of colonialism 
and neoliberalism that sustain it. That is to say, to dismantle not only the economic 
mechanisms, but also the political, cultural, colonial, neoliberal ones, erected by the 
dominant culture, which are encountered disseminated in the deepest interstices of 
the organization of the state and also in the minds of people across social and indi-
vidual practices, to the detriment of solidarity and complementarity. (4)
To do this, the PND proposed an alternative model of development arising 
from social demands of the majority of the population whose voices were silenced 
by neoliberalism. Because neoliberalism conceived of development as exclusively 
associated with economic growth, delinked from the state or politics, “it expropri-
ated from the people their right to propose and debate their common future” (9). 
Now, however, this population rejects the neoliberal development model, which 
was based on Western ideas and obscured mechanisms of domination and power. 
Instead the Plan offered a new model based on vivir bien, to live well—what Mo-
rales was referring to in his interview quoted above. Derived from the cosmovisión 
(worldview) of indigenous peoples, it refers to communitarian forms of conviven-
cia, or living together. It implies intercultural respect and symmetries of power: 
“One cannot live well if others live badly” (10). The PND argues that this col-
lective notion of well-being is very different from Western notions of individual 
well-being, which can be obtained at the expense of others or the environment. It 
also differs from Western notions in that it goes beyond the material and econom-
ic to include such values as emotions, recognition, difference, social prestige, and 
dignity (10). Bolivians are not alone in advancing this notion—in Ecuador, where 
it is called sumak kawsay (a Quechua term for “good life”), it is also promoted as 
the basis of alternative forms of development (see Radcliffe 2012).
The PND insisted that to put this alternative form of development into ef-
fect would require the intervention of the state as “promoter and protagonist of 
national development” (4). This is because the state is a “new power that surges 
from the popular and indigenous sectors, from the peasant communities, and 
from the workers of the city and the countryside”(14). It will act to transform 
society and the economy, but “only if all peoples and cultures are present in the 
economic and political decisions of the State” (15). This means that the people’s 
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capacity to decide must be recuperated within a new notion of the nation that 
recognizes the pluri-ethnicity and multiculturality of the country, as well as the 
vitality of the social movements. The PND suggested finally that these newly em-
powered social actors would create a new state during democratic debate in the 
Constituent Assembly. That did in fact happen (see chapter 2), and the language 
of vivir bien was a fundamental part of the constitution that emerged. Bolivia’s 
2009 Constitution reads: “The state is sustained in the values of unity, equal-
ity, inclusion, dignity, liberty, solidarity, reciprocity, respect, complementarity, 
harmony, transparency, equilibrium, equality of opportunity, social and gender 
equity in participation, common well-being, responsibility, social justice, dis-
tribution and redistribution of products and social goods, to live well” (Bolivia 
2009, Art. 8, pt. 2; emphasis added).
The PDN sheds significant light on the ways the MAS state articulated indige-
neity, development, and decolonization. This is evident in the way the document 
returns time and again to its assertion that the foundation of Bolivian society is its 
indigenous peoples, tying the well-being of all Bolivians and the nation as a whole 
to its indigenous peoples and social movements. By characterizing the majority of 
the population as indigenous, however, it elides the complex relationship between 
race and class that has led poor Bolivians to identify in some periods as campesinos 
(peasant farmers) and in others as indígenas or pueblos originarios (indigenous or 
original peoples) (Postero 2007a; Albó 2000; Canessa 2006). Many urban people 
have very ambiguous identities, adopting the category of cholo, taking pride in 
their indigenous heritage, but also identifying as members of the mestizo middle 
class (Barragán 2006; Rivera Cusicanqui 2010). We have already seen in the dis-
cussion about the collective wedding that the category of indigeneity is a site of 
ambiguity as well as of substantial symbolic and discursive work. Who counts as 
indigenous remains a central question in Bolivia today, and one that is susceptible 
to multiple and contested interpretations. Here we see how the authors of the PND 
utilized this ambiguity, combining values drawn from the indigenous repertoire 
with tried and true values of liberalism, then linking them to the internationally 
recognized discourses of multiculturalism, environmental sustainability, democ-
ratization, and human rights. The document demonstrates what a very rich rep-
ertoire indigenous culture and values can be, and how flexibly it can be adapted.
The PND articulates indigeneity to national development in a second, related 
way, by linking neoliberalism and colonialism as stages in a coherent long-term 
model of cultural and economic exploitation. The document explains that its au-
thors reject the neoliberal definition of development as strictly economic or mate-
rial, and intentionally redefine it to include cultural and political rights, especially 
focusing on human dignity and human rights. Thus, for these authors, develop-
ment must be understood in terms of cultural values and forms of social organi-
zation (Bolivia 2006: 12). The MAS rhetoric challenging colonial neoliberalism 
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articulates a reality that Bolivia’s poor and indigenous people know all too well: 
the market is not a neutral site, but one that reinforces already existing power 
relations of race and class. That is, the MAS did not offer its project merely as 
a different economic model to be debated among dueling economists. Rather, it 
represented itself as creating a new decolonized nation based on social justice and 
multicultural equality. To use Rancière’s terms, this is a form of politics, calling for 
the formerly invisible indigenous and poor peoples of Bolivia not only to be seen 
and heard but also to be the beneficiaries of national development.
THE MOR ALES DEVELOPMENT PROJECT: 
REASSERTING THE ROLE OF THE CENTR AL STATE
The most salient aspect of Morales’s anti-neoliberal program had already begun as 
the PND was being developed. In May 2006, Morales “nationalized” the oil and 
gas sector, sending the Bolivian army to take over the foreign-owned natural gas 
installations in the eastern section of the country. Gas and mining resources were 
nationalized by the state after the 1952 revolution and run by state-owned compa-
nies until the neoliberal era, when they were privatized. As a result, there is a long 
collective memory of the state’s involvement in exploitation of what is considered 
the national patrimony. Perhaps even more important, the mines constituted a 
large sector of public employment, with good salaries, benefits, and high status 
associated with working for the nation (Nash 1979). The miners’ layoffs in the late 
1980s as part of the neoliberal restructuring were perceived by many as a blow 
to the dignity of Bolivia’s working people (see Nash 1992). Thus Morales struck a 
deeply emotional and nationalist chord when he staged the takeover in May 2007.
Clearly, this reassertion of the role of the state in the economy defies the neo-
liberal model, signaling a reversal of the waves of privatizations of the 1990s. Yet 
it is not just a return to the past. Morales did not seize the assets of the foreign 
corporations working the gas concessions. Rather, the nationalization decree gave 
the companies six months to renegotiate their contracts with the state. It also 
sharply raised taxes and royalties on gas producers, and taxed natural gas profits, 
imposing what are called impuestos directos a los hidrocarburos (IDH). Previously, 
companies had retained some 82 percent of the profits, leaving the Bolivian state 
with only a small portion. The new taxes, royalties, and renegotiated contracts 
changed these proportions; under the new arrangement, the central government 
receives about 54 percent of the profits (Andean Information Network 2007a, b). 
However, this was hardly a “nationalization.” By 2014, transnational corporations 
were producing 86 percent of exports, whereas Bolivia’s state-owned gas company 
YPFB only produces 14 percent (Arze 2016: 14). Thus, this model is neither an 
inward-turning policy like those practiced under so-called import-substitution 
industrialization in the 1970s nor an end to the primary export model so decried 
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in the PND. Bolivia’s national development has remained deeply linked to global 
capitalism.
Vice President Álvaro García Linera explained this reliance on capitalist exploi-
tation of hydrocarbons is part of the state’s overall development model, which he 
calls “Andean-Amazonian capitalism”:
It is a question of building a strong state, which can coordinate in a balanced way 
the three “economic-productive” platforms that coexist in Bolivia: the community-
based, the family-based and the “modern industrial.” It is a question of transferring a 
part of the surplus of the nationalised hydrocarbons [oil and gas] in order to encour-
age the setting up of forms of self-organization, of self-management and of commer-
cial development that is really Andean and Amazonian. Up to now, these traditional 
sectors have not been able to develop because of a “modern-industrial” sector that 
has cornered the surpluses. Our idea is that these traditional sectors should have an 
economic support, should have access to raw materials and markets, which could 
then generate prosperity within these artisan and family-based processes. Bolivia 
will still be capitalist in 50 or 100 years. (Stefanoni 2005)
According to García Linera, as the state invests in modernizing these indigenous 
family-based economies, over time a proletariat will emerge that is able to bring 
about the eventual transition to socialism.
In the meantime, however, as a result of this reassertion of control over profits 
from its natural resources, Bolivia was able to radically alter its financial situation. 
Government income from oil and gas went from U.S.$173 million in 2002 to an es-
timated U.S.$1.57 billion in 2007 (Bolivian Ministry of Hydrocarbons and Energy 
2007, cited in Andean Information Network 2007a). Much of this was due to the 
fact that oil prices rose dramatically for the first years of the MAS administration, 
to nearly five times as much as during the Sánchez de Lozada years (Laserna Rojas 
et al. 2009: 31). The country’s deficit, which averaged 4.9 percent during the neolib-
eral years, was effectively eliminated. For the first time, Bolivia began to run a sur-
plus, which reached 5 percent of GDP in 2008, and it amassed large international 
reserves—almost $8.5 billion (Weisbrot et al. 2009: 13, 20). Using this surplus in 
its fiscal policy, Bolivia was able to manage the financial downturn much better 
than other countries in the region. Moreover, the economy registered 5.2 percent 
annual growth from 2006 to 2009.
In recent years, the economy has faced some challenges. Most important, gas 
and mineral prices dropped, reducing revenue. U.S. trade sanctions imposed on 
Bolivia under the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act in 2007 pro-
hibited Bolivian exports to the United States (Weisbrot et al. 2009: 27). And in De-
cember 2010, citing concerns that much of Bolivia’s highly subsidized oil and gas 
was being sold on the black market in neighboring countries, Morales announced 
he was cutting fuel subsidies and raising domestic prices, classic neoliberal shock 
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therapy. After massive demonstrations and strikes protesting what was called the 
gasolinazo, Morales backed down, urging social movements to come together with 
the government to come up with solutions (Quiroga 2011). This pointed out that 
Bolivia’s challenge is to meet growing domestic demand while still being able to 
export to its neighbors, particularly Argentina and Brazil (Kaup 2010).
However, even during the global recession, Bolivia maintained its positive tra-
jectory due to strong demand for its oil and gas from Brazil and Argentina. From 
2006 to 2014, Gross Domestic Product reached an annual rate of 5 percent (INE, 
as reported in Arze 2016: 3). This dropped to about 4 percent in 2015, and slowed 
slightly in 2016 as commodity prices fell (Economist 2016). Nevertheless, the sta-
tistics for economic well-being have remained strong. Per capita income has risen 
from $1,010 in 2005 to $2,922 in 2013. The country’s exports went from $2.8 billion 
in 2005 to $12.8 billion in 2014 (ibid.). Urban unemployment fell from 8.1 percent 
in 2005 to 4 percent in 2013, and the government raised the minimum wage from 
500 to 1,656 bolivianos a month (about $236) in 2015. Probably most important 
is that the official levels of poverty have dropped considerably. Moderate poverty 
dropped from 60 percent in 2005 to 39 percent in 2013, while extreme poverty 
dropped from 38 percent to 18.8 percent in the same period (Arze 2016: 4).
The government claims that these increased levels of welfare are the result of 
the state’s redistribution of money to the population. Like Venezuela, the Boliv-
ian government began using state hydrocarbon resources for new forms of public 
spending, state subsidies, and social security programs. The 2005 oil and gas law 
established that the direct taxes from natural gas profits, the IDH, should be distrib-
uted to public universities, municipalities, departments (regional governments), 
and indigenous groups. Royalties are also distributed to the departments and state 
Treasury through a complicated formula (see Laserna et al. 2009). At the national 
level, the government has spent about 30 percent of its IDH monies on a popular 
retirement account for senior citizens, called the renta dignidad. (This is a continu-
ation of the Bonosol program begun in the neoliberal years.) This is a universal 
program with no conditions: all Bolivians over the age of sixty now receive about 
$300 a year. There are also two conditional cash transfer programs. This first is for 
children attending school, called the Juancito Pinto program, in which each child 
who attends school receives a small but significant amount (about $28 per year) to 
encourage attendance and minimize dropouts (Yáñez et al. 2011). By 2010, the pro-
gram was extended to cover all students from first to eighth grades—this means 
more than 1.7 million students receive the payment each school year (Navarro 
2012; McGuire 2013). The second is the Juana Azurduy program for expectant and 
new mothers. The IDH also partially funds a $600 million home construction pro-
gram that provides loans to low-income families. Additionally, with Cuba’s help, 
the central government funded a national literacy program in Spanish, Quechua, 
and Aymara; a “zero malnutrition” program to eliminate childhood malnutrition; 
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and a large campaign for eye health, providing checkups and glasses for those who 
need them, as well as over 100,000 eye surgeries (Weisbrot and Sandoval 2007).
Some question the efficacy of these programs, since they do not raise the stan-
dard of living in a significant way (J. Webber 2011). Critics like the social movement 
leader Oscar Olivera suggest that cash transfers are merely neoliberal measures that 
act as simple palliatives, not changing the economic structure of the country in any 
substantial way (personal communication, August 2012; see also Arze 2016: 12). 
Some studies argue, however, that cash transfers are actually very important in 
bringing people out of poverty because they allow the poor to invest in the projects 
most likely to increase their production and income (Laserna et al. 2010; J. Gold-
stein 2013). This is a discussion that is occurring around the world, and cash trans-
fers have become a regular part of many government policies. This is true, as James 
Ferguson (2015) points out, for many neoliberal countries. Ferguson argues that 
it is time to rethink these programs. He suggests that in many places, like South 
Africa, instead of thinking of cash transfers as gifts or social assistance based on 
generosity, many people consider them as part of social transfers, as rightful shares 
that are due to citizens who should benefit from the vast national wealth (2015: 26). 
This is certainly the way the programs are characterized in Bolivia, and part of the 
reason why they are so popular.
It is very hard to assess the results of these programs, however. For instance, 
President Morales declared in a 2013 speech that the Juancito Pinto program had 
reduced the dropout rate from 6 percent in 2006 to 2 percent in 2012, but schol-
ars point out there were no baseline studies beforehand (McGuire 2013: 15). Most 
studies to date show that CCT programs may provide short-term cash or increase 
enrollments, but do not affect long-term poverty rates (Avila 2012; McGuire 2013). 
In her analysis of the JP program, Alieza Durana concludes that the small amount 
of the transfers really do not cover the opportunity costs of attending school, the 
nutritional needs of the students, or other economic factors relating to attendance. 
Instead, the value of the program lies in “its symbolic value as a charisma-granting 
act” of President Morales, which reaffirms his “authority as a moral leader” (2010: 73). 
More study appears necessary, but for now we can say that the programs are enor-
mously popular among Bolivia’s poor and indigenous majority, Morales’s main 
constituency.
Bolivia’s economic model has been widely contested from both the Right and 
the Left. The conservative economist Roberto Laserna argued that the Morales 
government falls into the classic rentier mentality of previous governments, view-
ing hydrocarbon resources as something to be plundered without concern for 
making the country more productive or creating jobs (Laserna Rojas et al. 2009). 
The Marxist analyst Jeffery Webber, on the other hand, characterizes the Morales 
development model as disappointingly reformist, arguing that it reinforces exist-
ing class and capitalist structures through a neostructuralist development model 
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that favors transnational corporations, the agricultural elite, and fiscal security 
over real structural change benefiting the poor (J. Webber 2011). In a more sym-
pathetic analysis, Brent Kaup argues that the Morales government continues to be 
constrained in its options by the “path-dependent” effects of the neoliberal years, 
which set Bolivia on a development trajectory that is very difficult to change. Al-
though it was able to renegotiate the rents from its natural gas resources, it was 
not able to change radically the material constraints of gas extraction, transport, 
and use, which keep it supplying gas benefiting Bolivia’s neighbors’ development 
projects more than its own (Kaup 2010).
In a scathing 2016 review of the first decade of MAS economic policy, the 
 Bolivian economist Carlos Arze brings together all these critiques. He argues the 
government has followed a rent-seeking model that has returned the country to 
dependence on exporting primary materials. The nationalization, he asserts, was 
basically a reform of the tax regime with one central goal: to allow the government 
to capture profits from gas production for use for its populist projects, rather than 
to increase national economic growth. He shows that over the past decade, oil 
and gas exports have taken over a larger and larger percentage of the GNP, while 
agriculture and industry have fallen (2016: 6). Instead of producing goods for con-
sumption, the country is importing more and more. As small-scale agriculture 
gives way to large agribusiness profiting a small elite, many campesinos are mov-
ing to the cities, where precarity and underemployment await them. The statistics 
on employment do not take into account the rise in vulnerable informal labor and 
the “pauperization” of the work force, he argues (11).
Moreover, despite the substantial changes to the economic system the MAS 
has enacted—restoring the state’s role as a critical economic actor, redistribut-
ing resources to the poor, and so on—Bolivia remains deeply embedded in and 
vulnerable to global market forces. Its fortunes depend on global prices for its 
exports, and inasmuch as its reliance on gas-sector imports have increased over 
the decade of MAS administration, this dependency has only become greater. This 
makes the country’s economic picture much less stable and has important implica-
tions for any claim to national sovereignty. Arze documents how the government 
has increased incentives for transnational companies working in Bolivia, allowing 
them to recover many costs. As a result, the transnationals have tripled their prof-
its since 2005 (15).
Arze concludes that there is no sign of the indigenous alternatives promised 
by García Linera; instead, as market capitalism continues to be dominant and 
the state continues to capture rents from extractivism, communal forms of econ-
omy are reduced and the country becomes ever more dependent on monopoly 
capitalism. (27; see also Solón 2016). Eduardo Gudynas, a researcher at the Latin 
American Center for Social Ecology in Uruguay, has called this “progressive neo-
extractivism,” which he defines as an emerging national development model of 
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progressive governments like Morales’s based upon the exploitation of natural re-
sources and the export of primary materials. Gudynas contends that this differs 
a little from the traditional extractivist model because “the state plays a more ac-
tive role, and gives extractivism a greater legitimacy because it redistributes some 
of the surplus to the population.” Nevertheless, “it still repeats the negative envi-
ronmental and social impacts of the old extractivism” (Gudynas 2010: 1; see also 
Bebbington 2010). Far from repudiating the dependence on international compa-
nies and markets, as that first emancipatory PND claimed a plurinational Bolivia 
would do, these progressive leaders maintain this dependence, replacing the nega-
tive connotations of exports and world markets with a new discourse about global-
ization and competition (4). Disappointed indigenous intellectuals point out that 
this return to Western notions of capitalism endangers the planet. Rafael Quispe, 
leader of the highland organization CONAMAQ, observes: “Capitalism or social-
ism is extractive, consumerist, developmentalist. In this sense they are the same. 
We have to speak of a new model of development, an alternative to this system. 
Because both capitalism and socialism will go on changing the planet” (quoted in 
Weinberg 2010).
Let us turn, then, to the environmental effects of the development model.
THE LEGACIES OF EXTR ACTIVISM IN B OLIVIA
It is important to note that, long before the MAS came to power, Bolivia had a less 
than enviable record in terms of environmental protection (see Hindery 2013 for 
a detailed analysis of this record). For instance, in 1996, a tailings dam broke near 
the mining center of Potosí, flooding the Pilcomayo River with toxic materials. 
Because the mine was owned by Bolivia’s president at the time, Gonzalo Sánchez 
de Lozada, the government did not insist on remediation (Farthing 2009: 27). 
Environmentalists and local activists are still pushing for remedies, and to close 
down the many ore-processing plants in the region. In 2000, a pipeline broke 
near a shallow part of Lake Titicaca, spilling thousands of gallons of oil into the 
Desaguadero River, contaminating 2,400 square miles of crop and grazing lands 
belonging to local indigenous people (Farthing 2009: 26; Haglund 2008). Again, 
little has been done to assist the victims.
These brief descriptions demonstrate what scholars and activists have been 
saying for years: Bolivia’s historical legacy of extractive damage is ongoing, and 
it continues to create terrible environmental costs, much of which is borne by 
indigenous peoples at the local level (see Bebbington and Bury 2013). Environ-
mentalists and local people fear that the development model put forward by the 
Morales government will continue this trajectory. The issue that received the most 
coverage at the 2010 Cochabamba Summit was the San Cristóbal mine, in the Nor 
Lípez province of Potosí department, near the famous Salar de Uyuni salt flats. The 
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Japanese Sumitomo corporation had operated the massive open pit mine since 
2008, when it took it over from Apex Silver, extracting silver, lead, and zinc. Over 
the weeks leading up to the Cochabamba Summit, the Regional Federation of 
Peasant Workers of the Southern Altiplano (FRUCTAS) led community members 
and workers in protest, blockading the roads and taking over the offices (López 
Pardo 2010). FRUCTAS representatives said the mine uses 15,000 cubic meters 
of water a day—that is, 600 liters every second—from the aquifer below the mine 
without paying for it. The result, they said, is that local streams have dried up, the 
rivers are polluted with toxic refuse, and agriculture has been ruined (Democracy 
Now 2010a). They demanded that the mine replenish the massive amounts of wa-
ter it is currently using in its extraction processes, and that the usage be subject to 
taxes. For its part, the mine claimed it had lived up to its obligations under the 1997 
mining law, and that it had paid about $350 million dollars in taxes over the past 
ten years, although nothing for water (Carvajal 2010). The community members 
also wanted the mine to fulfill the promises it made when it began operations, 
such as electrification and improved roads (López Pardo 2010). Although FRUC-
TAS had made unsuccessful demands for years, the 2010 blockades finally got the 
government’s attention. David Choquehuanca, Bolivia’s foreign minister, blasted 
Sumitomo, calling it a “transnational that steals our natural resources, plundering 
tons of minerals every day but does not pay” for the water (Agence France-Presse 
2010). The San Cristóbal mine, however, is only one of many toxic mines across the 
country. In 2010, the genetics department at the Universidad Mayor de San Andrés 
in La Paz reported that its tests at the San José Mine in Oruro had revealed genetic 
damage to residents who had inhaled the “contaminated” air near the mine. Sci-
entists reported that 35 percent of mothers and 38 percent of children that they 
examined had alterations to their DNA as a result (Asociación de Teledifusoras 
de Bolivia 2010). The lack of government monitoring gives scientists and activists 
reason to fear that toxic wastes are creating a legacy of health problems, including 
increased risk of cancer, that will trouble Bolivia for generations to come.
Morales’s government gave a huge concession to the Indian company Jindal to 
mine iron ore at the Mutún site near Puerto Suárez in the eastern Amazon area, 
near Bolivia’s border with Brazil. Activists worried about the toxic by-products 
that seem likely to result from what would be the largest iron ore mine in South 
America. In recent years, disputes over the terms of the concession tabled the plan, 
but it might be revived again at any time. This draws attention to the question 
looming over many Latin American countries: overseas investments from the new 
Asian economies, especially China. While many have lauded the large amounts of 
money China has invested across the region, especially in petroleum, mineral ex-
traction, and large-scale agriculture, scholars have noted the dangers that accom-
pany this boom. Rebecca Ray and her colleagues note that Chinese investments 
are concentrated in sectors already vulnerable to environmental degradation and 
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social conflicts about rights and working conditions. Few Latin American coun-
tries have been able to mitigate the social and environmental costs of trade and 
investment with China, they say (Ray et al. 2015: 2). In Bolivia, China has be-
come an important trading partner, signing over four hundred cooperation, aid, 
and loan agreements. It is active in the mining sector and plans to become even 
more involved in exploiting Bolivia’s lithium. China also exports large amounts 
of manufactured capital and consumer goods to Bolivia. Alejandra Saravia López 
and Adam Rua Quiroga report that despite high mineral exports, Bolivia has 
 experienced a significant trade deficit with China (2015: 1). In their examination of 
 China’s Jungie Tin Mine, they conclude that the mine has caused significant clash-
es with local communities over water use and pollution. While the mining com-
pany has engaged in a productive community consultation process that  appears to 
have resolved some of the social conflicts, the authors continue to be concerned 
about the lack of government environmental oversight and especially the new Law 
of Mining and Metallurgy, which gives mining priority use of water.
Mining has many additional associated environmental costs. For example, al-
though the Jindal mine has not yet been opened, there are already huge damages 
from the highway that would support the mine. It is part of the new Bio-Oceanic 
Highway planned as part of the South American Regional Infrastructure Initiative 
(IIRSA; see de Alcantara 2013). The portion of that road already under construc-
tion from Santa Cruz to Puerto Suárez crosses through the department of Santa 
Cruz, across the dry forest lands of the Chiquitano people. The Organización In-
dígena Chiquitana (OICH; Indigenous Chiquitano Organization) has been pro-
testing this road since its inception in 2000 and has documented serious damage 
to the fragile ecosystems along the road’s trajectory, including deforestation, con-
tamination of water sources, land conflicts, and loss of flora and fauna. OICH has 
also decried the lack of consultation with their authorities, bad working condi-
tions, and the increase in social problems, including prostitution (Bailaba 2004; 
Erbol 2010a, b; Hindery 2013).
Bolivia’s main source of income comes from the exploitation of hydrocarbons, 
mainly in the form of natural gas. But what are the effects of oil and gas develop-
ment on local people? Most of the oil and gas wells—about 350 wells—are located 
in the Chaco area, in the dry lowlands in the southeast. Eighty-three percent of the 
reserves lie under the lands of the Guaraní people, who through the land reforms 
of the 1990s were able to get collective title to small areas of their traditional ter-
ritories, called territorios comunitarios de origen (TCOS). Geographer Penelope 
Anthias has documented the struggles of one TCO, the Itika Guasu TCO, where 
the largest gas field, Margarita, is located. Margarita is operated by a consortium of 
transnational oil companies, headed by Repsol and Maxus. Anthias documents the 
dismissive approach the companies took as they planned and carried out the ex-
ploration and development of the wells, ignoring Guaraní protests and demands, 
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and polluting the lands of the communities in the process of drilling and extrac-
tion (Anthias, forthcoming). Years of protest by the people and the Asamblea del 
Pueblo Guaraní (APG) have produced little change, although a 2004 blockade and 
takeover of the well forced the government to establish a fund by which 2 percent 
of gas rents paid to the state would be reserved for development projects in Guar-
aní communities (Perreault 2008:12). Similarly, the geographer Derrick Hindery 
has detailed the effects that a natural gas pipeline through the Chiquitania Dry 
Forest has had on the Chiquitanos’ lands. He argues that one should not analyze 
the effects of specific projects alone, like the pipeline, but instead should consider 
the “synergistic effects” of the whole “extractive complex” of development, includ-
ing the secondary developments that come into the region along with the pipeline, 
like roads, which bring loggers, smugglers, and narco-traffickers, and additional 
projects like gold mines, with their own environmental risks (2013: 209).
The legacies of this form of extraction are well known in Bolivia, especially be-
cause indigenous peoples have been actively protesting against them for decades. 
That is why it is difficult for many indigenous people to understand why, despite 
the strong terms of both the PDN and García Linera’s Andean Amazonian plan, 
the Morales government is aggressively pursuing several new megaprojects that 
have the potential for devastating impacts. First are the giant new lithium fields in 
the vast salt flat in southwestern Bolivia, the Salar de Uyuni. Because ultra-light 
lithium batteries will power cell phones and hybrid and electric cars in the new 
“green” future, there is a huge and growing demand for lithium. It could challenge 
petroleum as the dominant fuel of the future (Wright 2010). The good news for 
Bolivia is that the newly discovered fields contain about half the world’s known 
lithium—an estimated 5.4 million tons—prompting many to predict that Bolivia 
will become the “Saudi Arabia of lithium” (Howard 2009; Romero 2009; Wright 
2010). This effort is under way: a Chinese-funded plant making ion lithium batter-
ies was inaugurated in 2014, and in 2015, Bolivia signed contracts with the German 
company K-UTEC AG Salt Technologies to design a lithium carbonate pilot plant 
and Chinese CAMC Engineering to build a potassium salt industrial plant (Sagár-
naga López 2015). Scholars have serious doubts about the lithium development 
plan, pointing out that the government’s figures do not seem to show the project is 
meeting its widely advertised promise (Guzmán 2014: 6).
Scholars and activists have expressed deep concerns about the environmental 
dangers the project may bring. They argue that like any other non-renewable re-
source, producing lithium will take its toll on the fragile ecosystem of the Salar de 
Uyuni, and the Rio Grande delta, where flamingos breed. To exploit the lithium, 
Bolivia will create large brine beds and evaporation ponds, and then re-inject the 
leftover salt, increasing salinity of the rivers, which local people use to irrigate their 
farms. The simplest way of processing lithium involves mixing magnesium with 
the lithium, producing toxic magnesium hydroxide (Meridian 2008; Tegel 2013). 
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Activists and community members are worried about contamination if this meth-
od is chosen, as well as the big question of where the water will come from for 
all this (Tegel 2013). The Bolivian anthropologist Ricardo Calla has investigated 
the various options, and fears the government has chosen the most dangerous 
form of extraction (R. Calla Ortega 2014). Because the government is not entirely 
transparent about the project, however, it is difficult to make conclusive evalua-
tions. Environmentalists are also concerned about the dangers of highly corro-
sive lithium hydroxide, produced when lithium combines with water. During the 
rainy season, the salar often floods—which is why the birds come to breed there. 
The Foro Boliviano sobre Medio Ambiente y Desarrollo (FOBOMADE; Bolivian 
Environmental Defense League) warns that the government has not carried out 
sufficient water or environmental studies yet, so it is difficult to project what the 
long-term effect might be (Howard 2009; see also R. Calla Ortega 2014). The Sa-
lar de Uyuni is now the most visited ecotourist attraction in Bolivia, and many 
fear the lithium production will harm this critical resource and source of income 
(Aguilar-Fernández 2009).
What will this project mean for local populations? There is no clear answer 
yet, because the project is in its initial stages, but investigators are already seeing 
significant effects. The local indigenous people have traditionally made their liv-
ing mainly by growing quinoa and raising camelid livestock. The local communi-
ties are spread out across the region, and organized in cultural-political entities 
called ayllus, as well as in originary communities and peasant unions, or sindicatos 
(R. Calla Ortega 2014). Agriculture still represents 65–85 percent of their income, 
but they have increasingly turned to ecotourism, construction, seasonal migra-
tion, salt farming, and craftwork to supplement their incomes. Rodrigo Aguilar-
Fernández suggests that using the limited water resources for lithium processing 
will make it impossible for local communities to continue farming quinoa, despite 
its high yield and steady market prices (2009). Calla argues that the project has 
already produced enormous cultural and political change, inasmuch as the Feder-
ación Regional Única de Trabajadores Campesinos del Altiplano Sur (FRUTCAS; 
Regional Federation of Peasant Workers of the Southern Altiplano), has negoti-
ated with the state over the years to title peasants’ lands under the territorial titling 
act, or INRA. To ensure that it would have control over the lithium resources, 
the state cut a deal, giving collective title to three enormous TCOS to local peas-
ant communities. In exchange, the Salar de Uyuni remains under the control of 
the central state. Calla argues this was an enormous loss for the local indigenous 
people, who “lost in favor of the state all property rights over the salar. . . . Thus, 
an ancient and proud centuries-old perception held by the old ayllus and rural 
communities that the Salar of Uyuni had been and would be theirs was juridically 
cut off, perhaps forever” (R. Calla Ortega 2014: 51). He suggests that they remain 
vulnerable to environmental damage, especially if the soils become salinated. An 
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ecological disaster like that, he says, would lead to the disappearance of the cul-
tures of the rural indigenous peoples, who would have to abandon their pastoral 
livelihoods and emigrate to the cities, increasing a trend already under way (53). 
Some local community members are expressing their fears that the water levels 
are already going down, harming the animals, and “killing our Mother” (see inter-
views in Martín-Cabrera and Ramírez Pimenta 2016). Calla notes that for the most 
part, local communities do not know what the project will bring and are waiting to 
see what will happen and what benefits might come.
Yet many other national, regional, and local actors—including some who iden-
tify as indigenous—continue to push for lithium despite these dangers. The gov-
ernment has made it clear that this is a high priority, and has promised to make 
this a new sort of extraction, where, instead of only providing raw materials to 
foreign companies, Bolivia would benefit equally with its international partners by 
producing value-added products. Regional governments in Potosí are supportive 
because they want the state to channel profits from lithium back to the region, one 
of Bolivia’s poorest departments. The large mining sector in the region means there 
are already many people, including indigenous residents, who work as miners and 
see the lithium project as a potentially lucrative source of employment. Many in 
the tourism industry see the lithium industry as a way to attract important infra-
structure, like airports and an asphalted highway (Ströbele-Gregor 2010). These 
desires for work and infrastructure explain, in part, why the local peasant orga-
nization, FRUTCAS, which represents many indigenous farmers, has been one of 
the strongest supporters of the state’s initiative, and especially its anti-imperialist 
stance towards developing it. FRUTCAS is strongly MASista, and has benefited 
enormously from MAS’s continued support—especially territorial recognition. 
FRUTCAS argues that the lithium project is part of a sustainable use of natural 
resources that will benefit all. “This project is ours, because we are the guardians 
and monitors of good development of this strategic project, for the region, the de-
partment, and the country,” FRUTCAS’s leader declared (cited in Ströbele-Gregor 
2012: 62). Here indigeneity is equated with sovereignty over natural resources, and 
not opposed to extractivism or development.
The second mega-project looming on the horizon is the Cachuela Esperanza 
dam planned as part of the IIRSA (Initiative for the Integration of the Regional 
Infrastructure of South America) initiative in the Beni region of the Bolivian Ama-
zon. This dam is part of the Madeira River Hydroelectric Complex, the largest hy-
droelectric project in the Amazon. The project will dam the second largest river of 
the Amazon basin, inferior only to the Amazon River itself. The Madeira River car-
ries half of the sediments of the entire basin and feeds one of the most biologically 
diverse regions of the world, which is shared by three countries: Bolivia, Brazil, and 
Peru. The Complex involves the construction of four hydroelectric plants: two in 
Rondônia, Brazil, near the border with Bolivia, are under construction; a third one, 
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Cachuela Esperanza located in northern Bolivia, is in advanced stage of studies; 
and the fourth one, Guayará-Mirin located in bi-national (Brazilian– Bolivian) wa-
ters, is still in initial studies (Bank Information Center 2010). Indigenous peoples 
all along the river’s trajectory have protested the dams, which will inundate mil-
lions of acres of lands and forests, destroying wildlife and ecosystems. A particular 
concern is the fish population, one of the most diverse on the planet. Critics claim 
that the dams will disturb mercury deposits—refuse from mining over the years—
which will be ingested by the fish, and then by the river-dwelling populations who 
subsist on those fish (Denvir and Riofrancos 2008). Despite these concerns, the 
MAS government is proceeding, and in March 2016, it signed a memorandum of 
understanding with Brazil to spur viability, design, and construction studies for 
both the Rio Madera and Cachuela Esperanza dams. The goal is to expand hy-
droelectric power generation (Fox News Latino 2016). This project is still in the 
planning stages, so there is little reported about how local people are responding.
Finally, we cannot understand Bolivia’s economic and environmental situation 
without calling attention to the growing importance of capital-intensive mech-
anized agribusiness model in the lowlands. As Nicole Fabricant and I have de-
scribed in our 2014 analysis of the long-term patterns of agriculture in lowland 
Bolivia, indigenous labor and lands have long been incorporated into large-scale 
Figure 8. The advancing agricultural frontier in Santa Cruz. Credit: Sam Beebbe. https:// 
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0.
Living Well? National Development    109
commodity production, from rubber to sugar to the current dominant product, 
soy. Since the 1940s Bohan Plan, the government has organized large-scale colo-
nization of the lowlands as a way to bring poor farmers from the dry highlands to 
the fertile lowlands. They cleared an enormous amount of land in the first period. 
But over the past two decades, expanding soy plantations have altered the agrar-
ian structure and led to major environmental changes. Ben McKay and Gonzalo 
Colque describe the development of what they call the mechanization, concentra-
tion, and expansion of the “soy complex.” They argue that in the 1980s and 1990s, 
with the advent of foreign producers and capital, and the introduction of new 
technologies, labor power became less necessary and industrial crops began to be 
exported. Much of Bolivia’s fertile land is now owned by foreigners—especially 
Brazilians, Croatians, and Japanese—and Mennonites (McKay and Colque 2015; 
Urioste 2011). Global demands for soy product, especially from China and Eu-
rope, have exacerbated this process, and the use of industrial fertilizers, geneti-
cally modified seeds, and the large amount of capital needed now make this level 
of production very difficult for small-scale farmers (McKay and Colque 2015: 2). 
The result, they say is a process of “productive exclusion” marked by the proletari-
anization of the rural work force and a concentration of capital and land into a 
small elite of agribusiness interests. Scholars have described the massive deforesta-
tion that this agribusiness system produces, ascribing to mechanization the largest 
cause of loss of forested areas (Mueller et al. 2012; INESAD 2013).
Originally, Morales and the MAS government threatened the agribusiness sec-
tors, calling for massive land reform. Concerns about this new form of latifundio 
as well as its environmental effects were an important source of debate at the Con-
stituent Assembly, where delegates voted to limit the number of hectares anyone 
could control. The Bolivian public voted in a special referendum about the exact 
number, agreeing to five thousand hectares, which is now mandated by Article 38 
of the Constitution. Yet the government negotiated with the agro-industrial groups 
to incorporate an additional provision allowing an unlimited number of business 
associates to hold up to five thousand hectares apiece ( Bolivia 2009: Art. 315, pt. 2), 
“rendering the land ceiling futile” (15). In recent years, Morales has essentially cut 
a deal with this sector, allowing it to export without any trade restrictions, and 
supporting it with infrastructure. The new development plan for the next decade, 
Agenda Patriotica 2025, calls for an expanded agricultural frontier in order to in-
crease the country’s ability to feed itself. Such calls are cause for grave concern to 
indigenous and environmental organizations.
THE TENSIONS IN THE NEW EXTR ACTIVISM
How do we make sense of the dissonance between Morales’s words about protecting 
Mother Earth and these images from Bolivia of the environment and indigenous 
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communities under attack? First, as pointed out above, it is unfair to blame Morales 
for Bolivia’s long history of natural resource development. Bolivia has exported pri-
mary materials since the Spaniards began mining gold and silver, through the long 
years of tin mining, to the recent years of natural gas extraction. “Bolivia’s history 
and environment have been dominated by relentless extraction” (Farthing 2009: 
25). In essence, Morales took on a country that was already “primary resource- 
dependent,” and to alter that model will take time and effort (Denvir and Riofran-
cos 2008). Bolivia does not exist in a vacuum, but is and has long been enmeshed 
in a global economic system that exerts its own force and momentum.
Second, the Morales government has taken a leading role in pushing inter-
national institutions to rethink their approaches to global climate change. Influ-
enced in part by civil society organizations like the Plataforma Boliviana Frente 
al Cambio Climático (Bolivian Platform against Climate Change), which brings 
together indigenous and other popular sector demands, the Morales government 
has urged developed countries to slash their emissions farther than they have 
pledged to do. Morales gave fiery speeches at the Copenhagen Summit in 2009, 
and Bolivia refused to sign onto the negotiated accord, drawing the ire of the 
United States (Schipani and Vidal 2014). In Copenhagen and beyond, Morales 
and his UN representative, Pablo Solón, relentlessly pushed back against the idea 
of a market-based model of carbon offsets, arguing that such a model does not re-
solve the underlying causes of deforestation and degradation of forests. They have 
been key players in the debates over programs like Reducing Emissions from De-
forestation and Forest Degradation (REDD and REDD+) in which industrialized 
countries would purchase offsets and establish funds to pay developing countries 
to maintain forests. Morales and Solón have argued that these “false solutions” 
only reinforce the capitalist production responsible for climate change in the first 
place, while attempting to drag developing countries like Bolivia further into the 
logic of the market. At the Doha Climate Convention in 2012, Bolivia’s Minister 
of the Environment and Water, José Antonio Zamora Gutiérrez, followed suit, 
arguing that the “climate is not for sale,” and declaring that the withdrawal of 
developed countries from the Kyoto Accord was an attack on Mother Earth (cited 
in Hicks and Fabricant 2016: 17). Kathryn Hicks and Nicole Fabricant trace the 
influences the Plataforma Boliviana had on the Morales government in the first 
administration, showing how they used discourses of the “ecological Indian” stra-
tegically to problematize normative models of development and push for more 
sustainable models (ibid.). The alternative Cochabamba Summit, with which this 
chapter opens, was another key site where indigeneity was the frame for critique 
and organizing.
Nevertheless, the Morales government argues it must continue to extract natu-
ral resources in order to provide for the welfare of the poorest and most marginal-
ized people of Bolivia. Defending a government plan to build a highway through a 
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tropical park and indigenous territory (discussed in the next chapter), Vice Presi-
dent Álvaro García Linera made clear the government’s priorities:
We are going to construct highways, we will drill wells, we will industrialize our 
country, preserving our resources in consultation with the people, but we need re-
sources to generate development, for education, transportation, and the health of 
our people. We are not going to turn ourselves into park rangers for the powers of the 
North who live happily, while we continue in poverty. (Erbol 2010c; my translation)
One can read the vice president’s statement as a demonstration of the tensions 
inherent in the model between the indigenous value of buen vivir and the search 
for alternatives to capitalism, on the one hand, and the desire for and the need to 
redistribute the profits from natural resource extraction to the Bolivian people, on 
the other. But even this difficult duality is not so clear. As the preceding chapters 
have made clear, what is “indigenous” is not a given; rather it is a site of politics, 
in which different parties claim indigeneity as either a way to contest the existing 
order, or a site of policing from which to consolidate new orders. Vivir bien is also 
a discursive artifact, useful for the state to push its views at the international level, 
and useful for activists at the Constituent Assembly to push for the alternative 
sorts of development they envisioned. What becomes visible from understanding 
indigeneity as a site of politics and policing is that the changing political economy 
has altered the meanings and potential of all these ideas and terms.
In the first MAS administration, vivir bien was shorthand for challenging the 
neoliberal development projects of past eras, making indigeneity into a vehicle of 
change and a window onto a horizon of possibility. But, as the government contin-
ued its extractivist development model, these alternatives faded in importance in 
the public sphere, and indigeneity and buen vivir became linked to state projects 
like lithium extraction. The call for a just distribution of Bolivia’s natural patrimo-
ny was an essential part of the water and gas wars that brought Morales to power 
in the first place and led to his reelection in 2010. As the poster in figure 9 makes 
clear, the sense that Bolivia was moving forward, “advancing” was important. Note 
that this was not just a call to keep the profits at home, but also a call to industrial-
ize at home. The majority of Bolivians, and that includes many indigenous people, 
are proud of the nationalization, and delighted that Morales and his associates 
reversed the unfair terms of the gas business. They want lithium to be developed, 
and they want their standards of living to improve. This is part of pachakuti, the 
turning of the timetable, the change of destiny. This is the time for the formerly 
poor to receive their fair share. A large number of indigenous Bolivians live in cit-
ies, surviving in difficult economic situations. For them, the most important goal 
of the new decolonized state is to pass the benefits of national patrimony to the 
poor who were traditionally barred from those benefits. They are not as concerned 
about environmental damage to rural lands as they are about overcoming poverty. 
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As Nicole Fabricant points out, for urban people, gaining access to water and jobs 
may be more important than any abstract notion of Pachamama or even climate 
change (Fabricant 2013). Bret Gustafson concludes that “gas in Bolivia is not pri-
marily understood through the lens of climate change—though climate change 
and its effects and causes are clearly part of Bolivian political consciousness—but 
as a medium for negotiating rights, well-being, and exchange between citizens and 
the state” (Gustafson 2013: 64). He points to the public spectacles that have become 
common in recent years, as the president inaugurates new natural gas lines into 
domestic homes in El Alto and La Paz with great pomp and much publicity. Sweep-
ing aside the environmental costs to those whose lands were sacrificed to provide 
this gas to urban residents, Morales tells the public that “Thanks to  Mother Earth,” 
Bolivia has “cheap gas” (ibid.). For many, this was a welcome message.
Oscar Olivera, the leader of the protesters in the 2000 water war in Cocha-
bamba, suggests that this tension existed even before the Constituent Assembly. 
Emerging from the water and gas wars in 2000 and 2003, and then a referendum 
on gas exploitation in 2004, and eventually the nationalization of gas in 2006, he 
told me, most people felt that “a process of transformation, of substantial change 
Figure 9. 2010 election campaign poster for Morales. It reads: “Evo, again. Bolivia advances.” 
Credit: jmage. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/
Figure 10. Morales supporters at 2013 rally in Cochabamba. Credit: Fernanda LeMarie– 
Cancillería de Ecuador. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0.
Figure 11. Morales supporter at 2013 rally in Cochabamba. The slogan on his coat translates 
as: “We are the People / We are MAS / We are more.” Credit: Fernanda LeMarie–Cancillería de 
Ecuador. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0.
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had to pass through a stage of re-appropriation of our natural resources.” But this 
did not have to be accomplished through a “purely state-run process.” Instead, the 
idea was “the social reappropriation of the inherited patrimony of our parents, 
of our grandparents: the natural resources and public enterprises that had been 
privatized” (personal communication, August 2012). The question, of course, is 
how can this “social reappropriation” work in a state dedicated to continued en-
gagement with state-controlled global capitalism?
These tensions have not eased; rather, they have become even more intense. 
What has changed is the government’s discourse, which now links natural resource 
extraction to decolonization. Part of this is because the original makeup of the 
government, as described in chapter 1, has evolved. The indigenista proponents 
of vivir bien have mostly left the government. For example, Raúl Prada, one of the 
architects of the Pacto Unidad’s constitutional proposals, served as minister of de-
velopment and planning in the first Morales administration. He used that position 
to push for sustainable development alternatives based on indigenous customs, 
but left the government as it became obvious how little priority the government 
was giving these options. Now he is now firmly in the dissenters’ camp, writing 
eloquent critiques of the extractivist program of the government (see, e.g., Prada 
Alcoreza, 2012, 2013). At the same time, the vice president’s push to industrialize 
has gained strength, and his vision of development has taken new legal form. This 
culminated in October 2012 when the congress approved the Ley Marco de Madre 
Tierra y Desarrollo Integral para Vivir Bien (the Framing Law of Mother Earth 
and Integral Development to Live Well), which brings the language of vivir bien 
and the goal of integral development together.
While one can read this new law as a commitment to protection of the environ-
ment, a close reading makes clear that the law subsumes the “horizon” of vivir bien 
to the state-led process of “integral development.” This term is not defined, but the 
law’s terms make clear that it is a balancing act, in which capitalism and decolo-
nization must be held in productive tension—similar to the tensions within the 
1990s term “sustainable development.” Vivir bien is described as a “new cultural 
and civilizational horizon” which operates as “an alternative to capitalism and mo-
dernity” and arises from the cosmovisión of indigenous originary peasant peoples 
and nations (Ley Marco, Art. 5, no. 2). So, vivir bien is still the goal at which the 
plurinational state aims, but the mechanism by which it will accomplish this has 
changed. Under the new law, the means by which this horizon is to be reached is 
integral development, which is understood “within the framework of decoloniza-
tion” (Art. 8). The text explains that the move towards vivir bien can only be imple-
mented understanding the complementarity between four sets of rights:
(a) the rights of Mother Earth, as a collective subject of public interest;
(b) the individual and collective rights of indigenous, originary, peasant, 
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 intercultural, and Afro-Bolivians;
(c) the fundamental civil, social, economic, and cultural rights of the Bolivian 
people to live well through integral development; and
(d) the right of the urban and rural populations to live in a society of justice, 
fairness, and solidarity without material social, or spiritual poverty . . . 
(Art. 4, no. 1)
The political economist Eduardo Gudynas argues this new formulation is ex-
tremely significant. He says “it restores the idea of development, legitimating it 
in a political norm and placing it as a necessary element for vivir bien.  .  .  . This 
turnabout should not be understated, because it minimizes vivir bien and robs 
it of its vocation as a radical break with development and the transcendence of 
modernity. Not only this, but now, a certain type of development is necessary to 
achieve vivir bien” (Gudynas 2013: 25). For Guydnas, the new law is a sign that the 
Morales government has for all intents and purposes silenced those hoping for real 
alternatives to development. “This restoration of the idea of development closes a 
chapter in the Bolivian process,” he says. “Now it is possible to promote extractiv-
ism and defend it as a necessary form of integral development without falling into 
contradictions” (ibid.).
In this chapter, I have traced the evolution of the relation between develop-
ment and decolonization since Morales’s election, arguing that after taking power, 
the government was forced to balance tensions between capitalist notions of in-
dustrialization and extraction against alternative visions of development based on 
indigenous customs and values. By 2012, despite its earlier rhetoric, the state ap-
peared to have accepted the inevitability of capitalist models, and justified this as 
necessary to move the country and its peoples forward to decolonization, social 
justice, and living well. Moreover, it accomplished this in great part by using the 
discourses of indigeneity, transforming the site of politics into a kind of policing 
that is difficult to contest. As I show in the following chapters, the consolidation 
of the capitalist extraction model has had several important effects. In the next 
chapter, I consider the profound effects it has had on the question of race rela-
tions and on racism. I show how the Morales government has not only continued 
the development path but also reinscribes the racialized effects of it, sacrificing 
lowland indigenous lives and lands. In chapters 6 and 7, I describe how this new 
discourse increasingly requires local political actors to negotiate their identities 
and demands for citizenship in terms of economic development and class.
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MARCHING TO L A PAZ
The 2011 historic Indigenous March for Life, for Indigenous Rights and for the 
Environment was the eighth such march in Bolivia since 1990, when indigenous 
organizations began a tradition of walking from the lowlands up the Andes to La 
Paz to bring public attention to their demands. Often wearing only sandals, the 
marchers covered nearly 750 miles on their journey from the tropical forest of 
the Beni region to the cold, dry highlands of La Paz. Mothers marched with their 
children strapped to them. As protestors entered Cochabamba, a city halfway 
along the route, they filled the plaza with music and lowland accents. Protestors 
planted the Bolivian flag in the middle of the plaza alongside a banner bearing 
the patajú flower, a symbol now associated with lowland indigenous culture. They 
shouted: “We are defending ourselves from destructive capitalism, long live the 
march!” Urban residents, students, intellectuals, and non-governmental (NGO) 
representatives joined the rally. Surrounding the plaza, they chanted in unison: 
“We are all TIPNIS!”
This march was in response to President Morales’s plan to build a highway 
linking the tropics of Cochabamba to the Brazilian border, to be funded by the 
Brazilian national development bank, opening new possibilities for trade with 
Brazil. The Morales government claimed that the road would bring prosperity 
and trade to lowland peoples and help the state achieve control of the national 
territory. But the proposed highway would run through the forest preserve and 
communally held indigenous land of the Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional 
Isiboro Sécure (TIPNIS; Isiboro Sécure Indigenous Territory and National Park). 
The protesters charged that the road amounted to internal colonialism, and that 
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just like earlier governments, Morales was sacrificing indigenous peoples to capi-
talist extractive development.
At least at the beginning of the MAS administration, its “revolution” and ambi-
tious anti-neoliberal agenda was based on a profound revaluation of indigenous 
and peasant peoples and their customs. According to the new constitution passed 
in 2009, a central goal of the new plurinational state is to end the centuries of 
discrimination against the country’s indigenous peoples, who make up a large ma-
jority of the population. While these reforms have produced enormous advances 
for Bolivia’s poor and indigenous peoples, an analysis of the ways they have been 
experienced and resisted demonstrates that they have also created a new “mo-
ment of danger” in which race plays a central role (Pred 2000: 8). On the one 
hand, the government’s combined focus on reversing neoliberalism and revalu-
ing indigeneity sparked a strong and often racist countermovement among the 
white–mestizo agribusiness elite sectors of the eastern lowlands, who pushed for 
regional autonomy and independence from the central state. On the other, despite 
government rhetoric, the country continues to be deeply enmeshed in an extrac-
tivist capitalist development model that adversely affects indigenous communities. 
In this chapter, I show how indigenous peoples’ bodies and territories continue to 
Figure 12. Indigenous women protesters in the 2011 TIPNIS march. Credit: MMajias. https://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0.
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suffer political and economic violence as Bolivia struggles to negotiate between 
global capitalism and social and economic justice. Ironically, even in plurinational 
Bolivia, a country known across the world as a model for indigenous liberation, 
racist colonial discourses are reproduced in the process.
Here, again, we find discourses about indigeneity on the blurry boundary be-
tween politics and policing as understood by Jacques Rancière (1999). They func-
tion both as a tool useful in the state’s struggle against racism, making indigenous 
people visible, and as a means of consolidating state power and reinforcing rac-
ism. But in emphasizing the ongoing and complex contestations over race, this 
chapter shows how difficult such politics can be to enact. While the emancipa-
tory discourse of indigeneity was fairly successful in the highlands, it was not so 
well received in the lowlands, where entirely different racial and cultural logics 
prevail. If the MAS used politics to claim a “miscount” in previous political ac-
counting justifying the decolonizing agenda of plurinational Bolivia, the mestizo 
elite in Santa Cruz and the protesters in the TIPNIS case made counterclaims to 
having been wronged, producing enormous pushback. More important, because 
the MAS government continued its commitment to extracting natural resources, 
it reinforced the racialized practices linked to it. This chapter examines the racial 
politics of the MAS state to determine what the decolonized plurinational Bolivian 
state became in practice.
THE STRUCTURES OF INEQUALIT Y
During the neoliberal era of the 1980s and 1990s, the traditional white–mestizo 
political class instituted orthodox restructuring, including privatization of state-
owned enterprises, cut backs on social spending, and opening the country to for-
eign capital (Postero 2007a: 190–93). Laying off thousands of (mostly Andean) 
miners at the state mining corporation, the state privatized most publicly owned 
enterprises and cut public sector employment (Arze and Kruse 2004: 27). Bolivia’s 
small-scale farm economy was also devastated by the commercial liberalization, 
because the products of peasant farmers and herders were unable to compete with 
cheaper imports. As the poor shouldered these burdens, incomes for the local eco-
nomic and political elites tied to transnational capital rose (Portes and Hoffman 
2003: 65). The result was an increasing sense among most Bolivians that the elite 
and foreign capital had commandeered control of the national economy, and that 
this continued the colonial patterns of domination and exploitation. As the Plan 
Nacional de Desarrollo (PND; National Development Plan) described in chapter 4 
explained, neoliberalism continued to privilege whites and mestizos, while 
 Bolivia’s indigenous and peasant populations bore the brunt of the reforms.
As elsewhere, neoliberal reforms in Bolivia were not limited to the econom-
ic sphere. Instead, these economic policies were part of a larger set of changes, 
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pairing economic reforms with a discourse of “market democracy” linking free 
trade to the promotion of democracy. This resulted in policies such as decentral-
ization, the devolution of state power to cities/regions, on the one hand, and the 
empowerment of civil society, on the other. The Bolivian Law of Popular Participa-
tion (1994) was a prime example of such neoliberal governance. Under this form of 
“neoliberal multiculturalism,” indigenous and social movements were encouraged 
to participate in development and budget decisions at the municipal level. While 
this scheme did recognize indigenous people as legitimate actors, the overarch-
ing racism in the country and the continuing control of political parties by the 
white–mestizo elite made it difficult for indigenous people and their representa-
tives to gain meaningful access to the political process. But the neoliberal reforms 
had unexpected consequences. Indigenous and peasant activists also began to use 
the neoliberal political structures to contest local elections. As we have seen, in 
2002, the MAS was formed, uniting highland Andean peoples, lowland indige-
nous groups, labor and the traditional Left, and many progressive mestizos, and in 
2005 its leader, Evo Morales, became president.
However, in the eastern lowlands, where the white–mestizo agribusiness elite 
was threatened not only by the MAS’s challenges to neoliberal economic policies 
but also by its racial politics, Morales’s election was bitterly opposed. In the low-
land capital of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, the call to “decolonize” Bolivia and embrace 
indigenous rights was not a welcome one, and it reconfigured the fields of force 
at play in Bolivia, ushering in a period of transition and social upheaval (García 
Linera 2010). With a charismatic leader and a growing indigenous coalition, the 
MAS-controlled state had new grounds to transform the economy and impetus to 
take command of the lowland region’s considerable resources. At the heart of this 
region lies the department of Santa Cruz, which accounts for more than 42 percent 
of the country’s agricultural production.1 The neighboring state Tarija, also part 
of the lowland region, accounts for 80 percent of the natural gas. The highlands’ 
rich deposits of zinc, silver, tin, and other minerals were once Bolivia’s economic 
mainstay, but since the mid twentieth century, the center of economic activity has 
shifted to the lowlands, where agribusiness elites raise cattle and grow soy beans, 
sunflowers, and sorghum for the global market. This large-scale agrarian produc-
tion has involved the usurpation of new lands and resources and the funneling of 
wealth from the periphery to urban centers (Gustafson 2006).
I have worked for the past five years with the anthropologist Nicole Fabricant 
to think about the relation between race and political economy in Santa Cruz. 
Many of this chapter’s insights are the result of our enormously productive col-
laborations. Fabricant and I have described how the lowland’s political economy 
produced and continues to reinforce racialized structures of power. Documenting 
the ways in which particular forms of capital accumulation map and re-map spa-
tial meanings onto territories, bodies, and people (Pred and Watts 1992; see also 
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Fabricant and Gustafson 2011), we argued that the exploitation of the lowland re-
gion has long relied on the vulnerabilities of indigenous people whose lands hold 
exploitable natural resources and whose labor underlies agricultural production. 
Expansive capitalism has defined the lowlands in terms of globalized commodities 
such as rubber, sugar, and soy, creating a class of large landholders whose original 
holdings in rubber and sugar plantations were later transferred to agro-industrial 
capital. The same class continues to hold economic power, now holding huge 
swathes of the lowlands in soy and other agribusiness commodity production 
(Fabricant and Postero 2013). This long history of resource-based extraction and 
large-scale agricultural production in the lowlands came under threat in the 1990s 
when indigenous people began to organize and mobilize for territory. It came un-
der even greater threat when Morales was elected and promised to redistribute the 
patrimony of the country, and even more alarming, promised radical land reform.
Regional elites were strongly opposed to Morales’s agenda, which they saw as a 
direct threat to their economic productivity. They also contested the interference 
in regional politics and business by the central state, echoing narratives of his-
torical domination by La Paz. Cambas (a term used for cruceños, or people from 
Santa Cruz)2 have long rebelled against the control of the central state, mount-
ing a number of independence and autonomy movements over the years (Pruden 
2012; Peña Hasbun 2003). This camba identity is often expressed as a deeply felt 
sense of injustice, especially in relation to Andeans and the Andean capital, La 
Paz. Cambas imagine themselves as racially, ethnically, and culturally different 
from the Andean people whom they see as invading their lands and usurping 
natural resource wealth in the region (Fabricant 2009). They see themselves as 
independent and hard-working, building their frontier state with their own entre-
preneurial efforts. This difference—coded sometimes as cultural and sometimes 
overtly racialized—was mobilized both by the Morales government to justify and 
legitimize progressive reforms and by the camba elite as a basis for opposition. As 
Morales’s power increased, the lowland civic committees, unelected associations 
of powerful political actors, began to organize a regional autonomy movement, 
shaped around historical discourses of being an “oppressed” or “victimized” re-
gion (Pruden 2012). During the Constituent Assembly, the right-wing opposition 
did everything possible to oppose the MAS process of change, and especially the 
agrarian reform, from boycotts of the process to a massive campaign of hunger 
strikes across the lowlands (Fabricant and Postero 2013). This political movement 
was also characterized as a cultural struggle, as cambas opposed their customs, 
values, and histories to those of highland indigenous peoples, often expressing 
these differences through violent acts of racism.
The racism against indigenous people was particularly harsh during the Con-
stituent Assembly held in Sucre. For instance, Morales appointed an indigenous 
woman, Silvia Lazarte, as president of the Constituent Assembly. Lazarte, who had 
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only a few years of schooling, had worked as a domestic and a labor activist. Dur-
ing the Assembly process, she suffered many terrible insults at the hands of the 
opposition, including being called a “llama”—the iconic herd animal of the Andes. 
During the celebrations of the inauguration of the Assembly, the streets were filled 
with international reporters and indigenous delegates proudly wore their polleras 
or carried the whips signaling their positions of authority. Yet, soon, as the busi-
ness of the assembly began, racism reared its head. In the first month of the As-
sembly, a battle emerged about whether to return the seat of government to Sucre, 
Bolivia’s constitutional capital, and make that city the full national capital again (as 
it had been until 1898). The MAS flatly refused to debate this issue, enraging the 
residents of the city and provoking massive street protests against the MAS—and 
indirectly anyone who “looked” like a MAS delegate. What this meant in practice 
was the indigenous or rural delegates were insulted, chased, and on many occa-
sions beaten by local people. Andrés Calla and Khantuta Muruchi see these racist 
outrages as the result of indigenous delegates being perceived as having “trans-
gressed” their traditional place in society, rather than as political disputes over 
the issue of the nation’s capital (Calla and Muruchi 2011: 301). The silent racism 
that always existed in Bolivia became openly visible during the Constituent As-
sembly because historically excluded people like Lazarte were seen as dislodging 
the political elite and taking spaces of political power long denied them, such as 
roles in the Congress or in the Constituent Assembly. Calla and Muruchi describe 
the racism these delegates endured on a daily basis, such as being brushed aside by 
mestizo delegates who could not conceive of such rural persons being fellow del-
egates, or being insulted in the streets for carrying bags of coca. (Coca chewing is 
a regular daily practice of many highland indigenous people, and is also associated 
with the cocaleros, the peasant union led by Morales.) (303–4). Some delegates 
were forced to change their clothes to avoid public humiliation; others avoided 
the main plaza, a potent symbolic site of elite power. One delegate described being 
driven from the streets when wearing her pollera: “They said ‘Indian pigs, mules, 
go back to Oruro’” (305).
During this tense time, racial incidents increased across the country. In Santa 
Cruz, the Autonomy movement led by the Civic Committees was accompanied 
by a thinly disguised racial campaign. Civic leaders argued that Andean migrants 
were invading their city, taking land and economic opportunities from local peo-
ple (Fabricant 2009; Gustafson 2006). Elites openly asked how Morales, an un-
educated Indian, could be the president. A Santa Cruz youth group carried out 
numerous attacks against Andean migrants to the city, and city officials banned 
street vendors, “protecting” the city from the dangers of unhygienic Indian bodies 
(Fabricant 2009). Perhaps the most shocking incident of this overt racism came 
during the last conflicted days of the Assembly in Sucre, in May 2008, when op-
ponents captured a group of Andean MAS supporters. Hurling racist insults at 
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them, the attackers forced them to strip to the waist, and kneel down in the plaza, 
kissing the flag. Humiliated, with tears in their eyes, the victims bowed in shame 
and fear (see P. Calla Ortega 2011). This incident, which was captured on video, 
horrified the country, and demonstrated how close to the surface colonial relations 
of domination and subjugation remain.
Here we see race at the center of the debate: indigeneity, long linked to prac-
tices of domination, took on new meanings in the context of the power struggles 
between the MAS and the lowland elite sector. One the one hand, indigenous activ-
ism and ideas were held up by the Morales government and the social movements 
it represented as the solution to centuries of colonial oppression. On the other, 
the old faces of racism continued to be potent tools of contestation. Allan Pred 
and Michael Watts have pointed out that periods of reconstruction are inevitable 
structural attributes of capitalism, which regularly undergoes transitions. The re-
sult, they argued, is invariably contestation, in which local actors defend their spe-
cific interests and identities through re-mappings of space and forms of difference 
(1992: 11, 17). We can see the pushback from the lowland elite, then, as a response to 
the emancipatory politics of indigeneity in this first period, as the MAS state shook 
the established order, rupturing the status quo and making clear that the old order 
would undergo radical changes. Yet the next part of the story makes us question 
this dualistic characterization. Let us turn to the case that rocked Bolivia: TIPNIS.
THE R ACIAL POLITICS OF MOR ALES’S  DEMO CR ATIC 
AND CULTUR AL REVOLUTION:  SACRIFICING 
INDIGENOUS TERRITORIES
In 2011, the government announced its decision to build a highway from Villa Tu-
nari in Cochabamba to San Ignacio de Mojos in the Beni region. The road would 
pass through TIPNIS, one of Bolivia’s largest and most diverse tropical reserves 
and home to sixty-three Moxeño, Yuracaré, and Chimane communities. President 
René Barrientos Ortuño originally declared TIPNIS a national park in 1965. Then 
in 1990, after the first indigenous march, the March for Territory and Dignity, 
President Jaime Paz Zamora issued a presidential decree declaring it an indig-
enous territory to be co-managed by the three groups living there. Soon, TIPNIS 
was at risk of colonization by the many highland migrants to the Chapare region 
of Cochabamba, who make their living growing coca. In 1992, the TIPNIS indig-
enous leader Marcial Fabricano and Evo Morales, then the leader of the Cocalero 
organization of Chapare, agreed on the borders of the park and drew a “red line” 
setting off areas not open to settlement. Finally, in the neoliberal era, TIPNIS was 
designated a territorio comunitario de orígen, or TCO, under the new agrarian 
reform law. TIPNIS is now a preserve consisting of 3,869 square miles, home to 
sixty-three communities, organized into two subcentrales. The southernmost area, 
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the so-called Polígono 7, is occupied by coca growers and is severely deforested 
(Achtenberg 2011a; Paz 2012).
The proposed road through TIPNIS is part of a 190-mile highway being built 
to connect Bolivia’s heartland to its Amazonian hinterlands and link Bolivia to 
international trade routes. When the controversy broke in 2010, two sections of 
the road were already under construction; the middle section crossing the TIPNIS 
had not yet undergone environmental review or the constitutionally mandated 
consultation process. Some local indigenous communities were pleased with the 
possibilities the paved road might hold: linking them to bigger cities and mar-
kets, and bringing increased access to education and healthcare systems. Others, 
however, feared that the road would bring ever greater ecological destruction to a 
region already deeply affected by cattle ranching, illegal forestry, and coca grow-
ing. Many were particularly concerned that it would open up their lands to further 
colonization by Andean coca growers, who already inhabited Polígono 7. In his 
analysis of the TIPNIS case, John Andrew McNeish (2013) explains these opposing 
views by pointing to differing relationships with resource extraction: some indig-
enous communities are linked to the market in deeper and more positive ways 
than others. Building on McNeish, Anna Laing (2015) argues that the contrasting 
ideas about territory, rights, and nature that emerged on the marches reflected 
competing demands for resource sovereignty. As a result, Cecilie Hirsch argues, 
local leaders were forced to make difficult pragmatic decisions to bring resources 
to their communities, some supporting the road, others, the march (2012).
It is important to emphasize that not all the marchers were opposed to de-
velopment in general, or even to the construction of highway (and not all were 
indigenous). Mónica Tapera, a Guaraní journalist who worked as part of the com-
munications committee of the march, told me that the marchers were mostly con-
cerned that they had not been consulted about the placement of the road or the 
potential damage to the environment. This was the crux of the crisis: the govern-
ment had begun the highway project without carrying out any consultation with 
the local indigenous organizations, and then, when challenged, took an intransi-
gent stance. Morales said that the consultations were not binding and that whether 
the indigenous organizations liked it or not, this road would be built. “Quiero 
decirles, quieran o no quieran, vamos construir este camino y en esta gestión va-
mos a entregar el camino Villa Tunari–San Ignacio de Moxos” (I want to tell you, 
like it or not, we are going to construct this road and this administration is go-
ing to deliver the Villa Tunari–San Ignacio de Moxos highway) (La Jornada 2011). 
Tapera says that for this reason, the TIPNIS struggle represented a much larger 
concern than the highway itself. “If they could enter in this territory that was titled 
by the government, and a national park, they would enter into any indigenous 
territory. So TIPNIS signified the gateway to all indigenous territories” (personal 
communication, July 11, 2016).
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Unsurprisingly, indigenous organizations characterized the government’s posi-
tion as a reenactment of the worst sort of colonialism. They argued that the great 
majority of the indigenous people in the park did not want the road and feared 
the terrible environmental damage that would inevitably occur. Studies show that 
deforestation by the cocaleros has already begun to bleed over the “red line” into 
the park, harming the flora and fauna, as well as threatening the livelihoods of 
the people (Defensor del Pueblo 2011). When their arguments went unanswered, 
the national lowland indigenous Confederación de Indígenas de Bolivia ( CIDOB), 
along with some highland organizations, including the Consejo Nacional de Ayl-
lus y Marcas del Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ), began a massive march from the low-
land capital of Trinidad, in the Beni region, to La Paz. The march, which included 
several thousand indigenous people, including women and children, received 
enormous support from students, environmentalists, and urban labor sectors 
across the country, as well as lowland elite leaders, who used the controversy as 
an opportunity to once again criticize the authoritarian character of the Morales 
administration.
Morales refused to negotiate in what was “the chronicle of a conflict foretold” 
(Prada Alcoreza 2012), and the whole country watched the march on TV. Finally, 
on September 25, 2011, the national police intercepted the marchers and violently 
Figure 13. The 2011 TIPNIS march. Credit: RAraoz. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by-sa/3.0.
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assaulted them, beating them, firing tear gas, and causing many injuries. The re-
port of the Defensor del Pueblo (the National Ombudsman) concluded that the 
police’s actions had been disproportionately violent and amounted to  human 
rights violations. The police also insulted the protesters, using deprecatory  racial 
terms, which is now against the law in Bolivia, and violated their rights to  political 
association. Finally, the Defensor concluded that the government violated the 
indigenous communities’ right to a consulta previa (prior consultation) under 
the constitution and International Labor Organization 169, the binding interna-
tional convention establishing indigenous peoples’ rights to culture and territory 
( Defensor del Pueblo 2011).
This shocking event led to both public anger and confusion. Wasn’t this the 
indigenous president whose allegedly decolonizing plurinationalist state had radi-
cally re-represented indigenous people and their customs? In other words, had 
they not implemented a new distribution of the sensible, making indigeneity the 
central positive value? The increasingly obvious gap between Morales’s discourse 
about indigenous values and his deeds, and particularly the violence against the 
vulnerable marchers, turned public opinion. When the march arrived in La Paz, 
there was a massive and supportive welcome, with crowds holding signs reading 
“¡Todos somos TIPNIS!” (We are all TIPNIS!). The government finally relented, 
Figure 14. The 2011 TIPNIS march. Credit: RAraoz. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by-sa/3.0.
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signing an agreement that TIPNIS would be intangible, or untouchable. In the 
months that followed, the government issued a new proposal for a community 
consultation, which was contested as too late (how can a prior consultation hap-
pen after the fact?) and too restrictive (since it would only take into consideration 
the desires of the communities inside TIPNIS). This would sideline CIDOB, the 
more politically powerful national organization, and make the small indigenous 
communities in the park vulnerable to pressure from both the government and 
the cocaleros.
Over the next year, the government carried out the new consultation process, 
negotiating with several new indigenous and colonizer groups that had appeared, 
many in favor of the highway. Concerns about who had the right to represent 
the TIPNIS communities surfaced, and eventually CIDOB and the TIPNIS sub-
centrales mounted another march in 2012 to demand a fair and legal consulta-
tion. Faced with competing indigenous groups and a government that appeared 
to be negotiating, the public gave much less support to the second march, even 
when the police sprayed the marchers with water hoses and tear gas in La Paz in 
July 2012. When the government adamantly refused to meet their demands, the 
marchers returned to their communities to fight the highway project from within 
their communities.
Then the government orchestrated the takeover of CIDOB, the national in-
digenous organization established in the early 1990s. The 2012 march had exac-
erbated long –existing fractures within CIDOB, and in August 2012, a parallel, 
government-friendly group that does not oppose the highway held elections and 
voted in a new governing board. That group forced its way into CIDOB’s San-
ta Cruz headquarters, backed by the police. Many of my Guaraní friends from 
Santa Cruz tried to avert the takeover, but they were overwhelmed by force. One 
woman, who lived on-site, described the horror of seeing the beloved headquar-
ters of lowland activism taken over by “goons.” She and her newborn twins had 
to flee, suffering beatings from the newcomers and inhaling tear gas. CIDOB’s 
originally elected leaders held a vigil in front of the church in the main plaza for 
several weeks. I spent several days with them there, observing their desperate ef-
forts to gain support from the media and the public. It was literally unbelievable 
to them that the state’s clientelist tactics had defeated their organization. Many 
noted the irony that CIDOB had been able to withstand thirty years of struggle 
with white–mestizo politicians, only to be undone by an indigenous president. I 
come back to this development in chapter 6, to show how this co-optation helped 
consolidate the MAS government’s development agenda throughout the lowlands.
The TIPNIS consultation officially concluded in December 2012 with a favor-
able vote for the road. However, Bolivia’s human rights ombudsman Rolando Vil-
lena issued a harsh critique of the consultation process, which he characterized as 
“authoritarian, colonialist, and unilateral.” “In addition to failing to comply with 
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international requirements for a prior consultation (before financing and con-
struction commitments), to be carried out in good faith and in accordance with 
indigenous customs and governing structures, . . . the process did not achieve the 
agreement of all parties, as required by the Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal 
(TCP), as a condition of its constitutionality” (Achtenberg 2012).
There was an enormous range of opinions within the state apparatus about the 
TIPNIS case. During fieldwork in 2011 and 2012, I heard dissent even from MAS 
militants working in state ministries, especially those indigenous intellectuals 
who had been delegates to the Constituent Assembly and had worked closely with 
lowland indigenous organizations there. The minister of defense, María Chacón 
renounced her position after the Chaparina violence, and the national ombud-
sperson issued a harsh critique of it (Defensor del Pueblo 2011). Yet Morales and 
his closest advisers put up a united front defending the road. Why was the gov-
ernment so stubborn about this project in the face of such substantial indigenous 
and public opposition to it? The highway project would support the extractivist 
development model and dovetails with a larger regional integration project known 
as IIRSA (Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America), which 
will establish trade corridors across the region, and open access to oil and gas 
blocks already contracted to foreign gas companies. The Brazilian Development 
Bank was slated to pay 80 percent of the estimated $415 million for construction 
(J. Webber 2012). There are many concerns about the highway, and growing 
 Brazilian imperialism is one of them (Friedman-Rudovsky 2012). The government 
argued that the road would bring critical resources to the residents of the park and 
access to markets for their products. This would allow greater access for education 
and healthcare, make their products more competitive, and provide opportuni-
ties for new enterprises, such as sustainable forestry and ecotourism (Achtenberg 
2011b). Second, the road would link all parts of Bolivia, giving Bolivia sovereign 
control of its territory. This is a long-held national interest. Finally, the new road 
would challenge the monopoly of financial interests of lowland oligarchy, who 
control much of the lumber, meat, and agricultural production in the zone.
The best explanation of the government’s position is that articulated in Vice 
 President García Linera’s book Geopolítica de la Amazonía: Poder hacendal- 
patrimonial y acumulación capitalista (Geopolitics of Amazonia: Landed  Hereditary 
Power and Capitalist Accumulation) (2012b). As Devin Beaulieu and I have argued, 
this text is a forceful argument for the role of the state and the need to develop 
Bolivia’s natural resources (Beaulieu and Postero 2013). Geopolítica surveys the so-
cial and political history of the Bolivian Amazon to buttress García Linera’s claim 
that the TIPNIS march and CIDOB are tools of what he calls “extraterritorial envi-
ronmentalism.” Real power in the Amazon, he says, rests with foreign companies, 
the governments of developed capitalist countries, regional bourgeois-seigniorial 
landlords, and NGOs. Lands collectively titled to indigenous communities, like 
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TIPNIS, he argues, actually serve to subsume indigenous territory and natural 
resources under the control of a feudal, or patrimonial-hacienda, “arch of power 
and domination.” He says the “pseudo-environmentalism” rallied by the TIPNIS 
march and its supporters against state extractivism is a paternalistic “environmen-
talism for the poor” that in Manichaean colonial fashion divides Bolivia’s popular 
indigenous-peasant bloc between romanticized “good” lowland indigenous com-
munities living in harmony with nature and vilified “bad” highland peasants out to 
ravage nature for illicit drug markets (García Linera 2012b: 75–76). García Linera 
is a brilliant theorist and he rightly points out that indigeneity is not as simple as 
people often assume. Indigenous people do not only live on communal lands, and 
many people in the cities and in zones of colonization also self-identify as indig-
enous. The literature on the TIPNIS controversy initially, at least, tended to pose 
lowland peoples against the coca growers, characterizing the TIPNIS communities 
as  authentically indigenous (but see McNeish 2013 and Laing 2015).
Yet García Linera matches this essentialist regional dichotomy with his own 
dualisms. For García Linera, historically poised against the reactionary “arch of 
power” in the Amazon is the plurinational state, whose foundation is the “syndical 
capture of state power” (2012b: 9). “In the Amazon, it is not the indigenous peoples 
who have taken control of territorial power, as occurred years ago in the highlands 
and valleys, where agrarian unions and communities performed the role of in-
digenous micro-states with a territorial presence, and in reality were the material 
foundation for the construction of the present plurinational state,” García Linera 
argues (25). In contrast to the virtuous highlanders, he portrays the oppressed 
lowland indigenous people as the passive victims of patrimonial-hacienda  power 
(internal capitalist accumulation), on the one hand, and foreign corporations 
( external capitalist accumulation), on the other. Without any apparent agency to 
defend their lands or their livelihoods, he suggests, they can only be saved by the 
state. Thus, García Linera assumes that all indigenous demands must be subsumed 
to the state and to the hegemony of its integral capitalist development model.
García Linera sees the highway as the crucial means of wresting control of the 
Amazon from foreign powers by extending the sovereign reach of the state: “OUR 
State . . . the Amazon is ours, it belongs to Bolivians, not to North Americans or 
Europeans, nor to the companies or NGOs that claim to be ‘teaching us to protect 
it’” (66). Declaring that the Bolivian state will take sole responsibility for protect-
ing Mother Earth, he asserts: “We will never accept the principle of shared sover-
eignty in any piece of Bolivian territory. Whoever at this point is opposed to the 
presence of the state in the Amazon is in fact defending the presence in it of the 
United States. There is no in-between position” (ibid.). Apparently, state will not 
share the Amazon even with the indigenous peoples who live there.
Finally, García Linera argues against anti-capitalist critiques of natural resource 
extractivism. Rehearsing an argument he made previously in a widely debated 
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Le Monde article (2012a), he insists that extractivism is not the fundamental is-
sue for the transformation from capitalism to socialism. Critics confuse a techni-
cal system with mode of production, he says. The capitalist mode of production 
is rather a fundamentally political problem of “planetary geopolitical dimension” 
beyond the scope of one country. Thus, for him, only worldwide communism can 
overturn this mode of production (104). Rather, as a technical form, extractivism 
can be “a point of departure” for overcoming capitalism (107). He argues that cri-
tiques that “fill the mouth with injuries against extractivism” (ibid.) miss the point 
that it is a material means to generate wealth and distribute it with justice, in order 
to satisfy the basic and “urgent necessities of the population” (110). For García 
Linera, the current task is to fulfill these basic necessities, part of a much longer 
historical process that is now understood as decolonization.
Critics point to other reasons for the government’s position. The coca growers 
of the Chapare were anxious to expand their land base, and TIPNIS offered them 
an opportunity to gain more land without having to invade the agribusinesses of 
the Santa Cruz oligarchs or those lands already colonized by other highland mi-
grants. The cocaleros have already invaded the southern part of TIPNIS, and many 
of the lowland indigenous residents have been incorporated into the coca-growing 
business as low-paid labor (J. Webber 2012). Clearly, the Morales government was 
responding to this important constituency, which has been actively advocating for 
the road, in part because it will make it easier to sell their coca, but also because it 
will make more forest land available for farming (Paz 2012). So, it is important to 
recognize that there are conflicting interests among different sectors and classes 
of indigenous and rural peoples in the area (Frantz 2011; J. Webber 2012; McNeish 
2013). Critics also worry that the road will enable illegal narco-trafficking and log-
ging, further benefiting the rich, and by extension the state, through channels of 
corruption (J. Webber 2012). The possibility of there being large reserves of hydro-
carbons within TIPNIS also emerged. The minister of hydrocarbons admitted this 
possibility during the crisis, and gas concessions in the area have already been allot-
ted to two companies (Prada Alcoreza 2011; Paz 2012). The bottom line for the MAS 
government, however, is that this highway will allow for increased state sovereignty 
over the Amazon, as García Linera made clear in his 2012 manifesto (2012b).
The TIPNIS conflict once again brought the relation between indigeneity and 
development into the public arena, but with a different and ironic twist. This time, 
it was an indigenous president who raised the “Indian Question,” suggesting that 
the TIPNIS indigenous communities were acting as obstacles to national develop-
ment. Here we see what Morales’s claim to head “the indigenous state” allowed 
him to do. Having taken the mantle of emancipatory politics, fighting for a new 
decolonized plurinational Bolivia, he felt entitled to define who is an acceptable 
decolonized subject, the descolonizado permitido we saw in the description of the 
collective marriage in chapter 3. Morales used the classic strategy of labeling one 
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set of indigenous peoples as “good Indians” and others as “bad Indians” (see Hale 
2002). In his many public performances, Morales frequently used the symbol of 
the highland Aymara or Quechua as those pushing forward a modern develop-
ment agenda, and Túpac Katari and other highland anti-colonial leaders have be-
come icons of this new, modern progressive nation. A communications satellite 
dubbed Túpac Katari 1 was built and launched in 2013 by China on behalf of the 
government of Bolivia, which has also named airplanes in the military airline after 
Katari and other revolutionary leaders (see Tórrez Rubín de Celis and Arce 2014: 
123). A widely distributed poster inaugurating the satellite has the now familiar 
pairing of Morales and Katari’s faces, along with the words attributed to Katari 
at his death, “Volveré y seré milliones” (I will return and be millions). With this 
satellite, the Bolivian state promises to go beyond the nation-state to “decolonize 
space” (124).
Probably the culmination of this symbolic pairing was the spectacular screen-
ing in 2012 of the film Insurgentes (Insurgents), a state-funded movie tracing in-
digenous and popular rebellions from the colonial period through the republican 
era to the gas and water wars of the early 2000s, and ending in the election of Mo-
rales. Just as the second TIPNIS march ended, somewhat defeated, and its leaders 
headed back to their communities to regroup, the grand opening of the film took 
place in La Paz. President Morales and Vice President García Linera walked down 
a red carpet to meet the famed Bolivian director Javier Sanjinés. In its montage 
style, the various insurrections across Bolivia’s history become continuous, lead-
ing naturally to Morales’s triumph (see Tórrez Rubín de Celis and Arce 2014: 157).
If these performances of the virtuous and heroic Andean past promised a new 
Andean modernity, this was in stark contrast to the ways the TIPNIS protestors 
were represented as living in the past and resisting progress. For instance, the MAS 
militant and national peasant union leader Roberto Coraite suggested that the 
TIPNIS protesters should choose between the road, which would bring them trade 
and development, or else “stay in clandestinity, as indigents, remaining as savages” 
(La Prensa 2011a). Of course, this obscures the fact that many of the protesters 
were not opposed to the construction of the road, but to the fact that they had 
not been consulted about its placement or possible environmental consequences. 
Arguing that the road would bring the benefits of modernity, like health care and 
education, to the TIPNIS communities, as well as access to the market for their 
products, Morales flatly discounted their desires to protect their territories. When 
the communities refused to back down, government ministers accused CIDOB 
of taking money from USAID or being puppets for external NGOs (Achtenberg 
2011a, 2011b). Here we see the government reprising classic racist tropes of earlier 
governments, claiming indigenous people were childlike or too easily manipulated 
to be full citizens. Like the early modernizing states, the MAS government argued 
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that the best solution to the “Indian Question” was for these unruly Indians to 
submit to the larger good of national development.
Yet it is not only the government that is returning to discourses about indigene-
ity to defend its position. Lowland indigenous people I spoke to during the march 
felt the government’s actions represented a horrifying reappearance of colonialism 
and a terrible betrayal of Morales’s claims to defend indigenous peoples. Critics 
characterized the government’s actions as “internal colonialism” and decried its 
cynical efforts to demean the movement (see Contreras Baspineiro 2012). Across 
the country, indigenous people and intellectuals questioned Morales’s commit-
ment to indigenous autonomy and even his identity as indigenous. Rafael Quispe, 
a prominent Aymara leader, suggested that in its dealings with the TIPNIS protest-
ers, “the government has revealed its true identity. The indigenous mask has fallen 
off, and its neoliberal face is revealed” (cited in Orellana Candia, 2011).
These responses make clear that, for these indigenous citizens at least, the MAS 
government’s efforts to make indigenous people visible has not been sufficient for 
emancipation or for a real lived sense of decolonization. The recount carried out 
by the Constituent Assembly was significant, but it appears to have only opened 
the door to contestation, and has not fully reconstituted a Bolivian society where 
there is a consensus about indigeneity. One possible lesson is that politics is not 
made through definitive revolutions, but rather through reiterative disagreements 
(see Arditi 2007). The TIPNIS case sparked ongoing contestation, inasmuch as the 
dispute illuminated the limited ability—or willingness—of the plurinational state 
to enact the promises it had made about representing and protecting indigenous 
peoples and their lands and customs.
Indigenous groups and their allies also resorted to classic tropes of indigeneity 
to support their cause, this time claiming to represent the “good Indians” bravely 
resisting the state and defending the environment. If Morales was not “really indig-
enous,” the TIPNIS protesters claimed they were. Fabricant and I have described 
how, throughout the controversy, the interests of indigenous protesters were rep-
resented in the media, and especially by environmentalist allies, as linked to the 
viability of the Amazonian forest (Fabricant and Postero, forthcoming). This asso-
ciation between indigenous peoples and nature reinforces the trope of the virtuous 
eco-Indian, and also works to link indigenous interests with the larger concerns 
for the environment and global climate. As the battle over TIPNIS raged, images of 
beautiful and vulnerable nature abounded in the massive poster production online 
and on the walls across the country. One iconic image was a poster that read: “Is 
this really progress? Let’s save TIPNIS.” The image shows the lush Amazon forest, 
with verdant trees and a brilliant blue sky, cut through by a highway. A huge leop-
ard lies dead in the foreground, run over by an SUV. Here nature, as represented 
by the tragic leopard, also stands in for the indigenous people of TIPNIS. The body 
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of the lowland Indian and Mother Earth are semiotically linked, tugging on the 
heartstrings of the audience.
But it was the seemingly racist and violent aspect of the administration’s deal-
ing with the TIPNIS case that really shocked people, both in Bolivia and abroad. 
As I have mentioned, the Defensor del Pueblo’s 2011 report determined that the 
military attack at Chaparina violated human rights in numerous ways, including 
racist epithets the police used in the attack and violent acts against the women 
and children on the march (Defensor del Pueblo 2011). If there was any question 
about colonial politics resurfacing, Morales made things crystal clear when he 
suggested to his supporters, the coca growers, that they should go out and seduce 
local indigenous TIPNIS women to garner their support for the road (Erbol 2011). 
A congresswoman from the Left–Center Movimiento sin Miedo (MSM; Move-
ment without Fear) party, Marcela Revollo, summed up the feelings of repugnance 
 Morales’s comment had produced across the country: “Oh, the cost of hurting 
and humiliating the bodies of these women, the indigenous of TIPNIS. . . . That is 
an act that is profoundly patriarchal, sexist, and colonial. That is how the  Spanish 
colony entered the American territories, raping and damaging to conquer the 
 territory” (ibid.).
Revollo’s comment makes an important point: once again, indigenous people 
are paying the costs for capitalist development. The TIPNIS affair provides an eerie 
repetition of previous epochs of state sacrifice of indigenous peoples’ territories 
in the name of progress, as the geographies of exploitation continue regardless 
of who leads the state. While the MAS state faces the complex tensions described 
above and must represent a spectrum of indigenous and non-indigenous constitu-
ents, in the end, its entanglement with global capitalism appears to enable, if not 
justify, a renewed sacrifice of indigenous communities, along with a renewed rac-
ist discourse.
THE WOUNDED INDIAN B ODY
If, in his efforts to push through a highway to support international trade, Morales 
utilized classic racist tropes of the Indian, the right-wing opposition’s reaction to 
the TIPNIS struggle was little better. First, it is important to note that by the time 
of the TIPNIS proposal, the civic committees in the eastern lowlands had lost most 
of their real power. During the Constituent Assembly in 2006 and 2007, they were 
able to mount a strong opposition platform and nearly brought the Assembly to a 
standstill. At home, they were able to convoke huge public demonstrations in the 
streets pushing for departmental autonomy and increased shares of revenues from 
the hydrocarbon industries. At that apex, the Santa Cruz Civic Committee held a 
public meeting attended by a million flag-waving protestors. The civic commit-
tees were backed by the agribusiness sector, which feared Morales’s anti-neoliberal 
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rhetoric meant the end of their successful export business.3 But, after a violent take-
over of public buildings in what was called a “prefectural coup” in 2008 and then a 
bloody massacre of MAS supporters in the northeastern department of Pando the 
same year, the political fortunes of the lowland elites began to diminish. Their op-
position lost further force after the passage of the new constitution, which institut-
ed a form of departmental autonomy. Although lowland leaders complained that 
the new political structure does not give them enough local power (for instance, 
departments do not have authority to raise taxes), the substance of their demands 
was met. The department of Santa Cruz is now an autonomous region, which has 
its own governor, elected by its people, and a new autonomy statute, passed in 
2015. Two further blows decimated the Comite Civico’s opposition to the MAS. 
First, Morales negotiated a deal with agribusiness leaders, encouraging them to 
continue production without fear of nationalization or export bans. In essence, 
he realized how important the business sector was for food sovereignty as well as 
national income. This agreement left the civic committees without their financial 
backers, so their protests began to look like toothless bluffing. Then, government 
agents uncovered a conspiracy to assassinate President Morales and traced the 
funding back to several prominent lowland leaders. This tainted the entire civic 
committee with the possibility of terrorism, and many fled to other countries to 
avoid prosecution.
In this weakened state, the civic committee was forced to push its agenda 
through different means. Camba leaders presented themselves as the victims of 
an authoritarian government set on destroying them through illegal and immoral 
acts. Fabricant and I examined how camba activists framed their cause in  human 
rights terms, arguing that their political leaders were persecuted and exiled. They 
emphasized their victimhood by using social protests of the kind most often used 
by those with few political options, like hunger strikes and posters of “disap-
peared” leaders (Fabricant and Postero 2013). While these acts garnered them little 
sympathy from the highlands or at the national level, they acted, as such forms of 
political protest often do, to foment solidarity among their followers.
The TIPNIS situation offered them a way to expand this strategy. When the 
2012 TIPNIS march ended in defeat and CIDOB was taken over, CIDOB’s leaders 
returned to Santa Cruz to the open arms of the civic committee. A TIPNIS/CIDOB 
encampment in the main plaza with placards decrying government abuse echoed 
the camba’s messages of political persecution across the plaza. The civic commit-
tee held press conferences defending the TIPNIS protesters, drawing similarities 
between the highland migrants to Santa Cruz, who have colonized the rural zones, 
and the highland coca growers who were ready to invade TIPNIS. Many in Bolivia 
argued that the camba elites were cynically utilizing the indigenous to advance 
their own interests. While it is clear that the civicos were trying to breathe new life 
into their badly damaged movement with this alliance with the TIPNIS activists, 
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what I draw attention to here is the way they used a particular representation of 
indigenous people to do so. Like the MAS government, the opposition used racial 
politics to bring political pressure to bear. And, like the government, the Right was 
rewriting history and geography to create a new identity and a new place in Boliv-
ian society. Ironically, they use an old trope of powerless and wounded Indians to 
write themselves into a new role: the protector of Indians.
This was obvious at an August 2012 political rally in Santa Cruz put on by the 
civic committee that Fabricant and I attended. Thousands of people dressed in 
the green and white colors of the Santa Cruz flag jammed the city’s largest soccer 
stadium. At the height of the assembly, camba leaders introduced a young indig-
enous leader from the TIPNIS rebellious communities. Reminding the audience 
of the violent attacks on indigenous marchers and all the sacrifices they had made 
during the 2011 march, he called upon the camba public to join the marchers’ 
struggle for justice and human rights. The crowd, many wearing “Defend TIPNIS” 
T-shirts, roared their approval. Using symbols evoking indigeneity and democ-
racy, the civic leaders created a “representational field” where two bodies—the 
indigenous (symbolically wounded by the highway crossing their community and 
physically wounded in the Chaparina attack), and the mestizo cambas (symboli-
cally wounded by being marginalized and persecuted by the nation-state)—are 
linked and condensed into one single struggle against a state that violates human 
rights. By doing so, this alliance legitimates the struggles of the camba elites be-
cause it associates them with the sacrifice and wounded bodies of the indigenous 
marchers (Fabricant and Postero 2014; Jones 2009).
This surprising strategic political alliance also revealed the highly racialized 
power relations upon which it was erected. At this rally and across the city that 
summer, Fabricant and I heard cambas supporting the TIPNIS protestors using 
sadly familiar paternalistic and colonial tropes. At the CIDOB vigil in the plaza, 
passersby gazed at posters of women and children marching in the cold mud of the 
Andes. They often expressed their admiration for these sacrifices necessary to pro-
tect their traditional way of life in the forest. “Sadly,” one woman said, “when they 
enter civilization, that is when their degradation begins.” Another said “we have to 
defend them, they are ours. . . . If we let them, they [the cocaleros] will overcome 
them. “ Here we see how the sacrificed bodies of the TIPNIS indigenous people 
open the space so the camba elite can play the role of benefactor and  protector of 
the indigenous, who are evoked as childlike and backward. Using a human rights 
framework, they re-represent themselves as allies in victimhood. This is truly 
ironic, given how the lowland elite historically exploited indigenous labor in the 
haciendas and sugarcane plantations, often using violence to discipline the work-
ers. But this truth is obscured by their newfound kinship with the “good Indians” 
who—like the cambas—are victims sacrificed to the MAS agenda.
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Here, once again, we see how enduring colonial and racist images of the Indian 
emerge as a tool for contesting larger political and economic battles. Yet these 
tropes produce new positions for those who use them in this period of transition. 
The camba elite, shaken from its position of privilege by the reordering undertak-
en by the MAS government, responded to the unfamiliar world by a “phantasma-
gorical” rewriting of history and re-remembering of the geographies of oppression 
(Pred 2000). The Bolivian Right in this plurinational period projected a reality in 
which others (the MAS state) were the racists and they were the upholders of law 
and democracy. Yet this “would-be” re-representation was belied by the situated 
practices of racism that escaped the rhetoric.
THE OPEN QUESTION OF R ACE
This chapter has explored the ways in which the remarkable transformations in 
Bolivia since Morales’s election have shattered traditional structures of political 
power, restructured economic models, and challenged cultural constructs. In the 
“process of change,” as the MAS calls its agenda, everyday notions of belonging 
were up-ended, as new geographies of power produced new subjects and mean-
ings. With a new indigenous president and a new constitution enacting new 
valuations of indigeneity, the fields of force radically changed. Yet old imaginar-
ies and meanings of indigenous people haunted this period of change. As the 
 decolonization process shook up the old order of things, actors on all sides of the 
“Indian Question” attempted to rewrite the narrative, using bits and pieces of the 
past, combined with new discourses of indigenous and human rights to suit their 
 present agendas.
What does this tell us about the decolonization and the indigenous state? The 
Bolivian case I have described shows how diverse actors used a politics marked 
by disagreement to restructure notions of indigeneity and to produce decoloni-
zation. In this long-awaited revolution, however, historical continuity appeared 
just as salient as disjuncture. In plurinational Bolivia, so far, colonial relations of 
race have been reconfigured as indigenous people take power, but they have not 
disappeared—even though erasing them is the proclaimed central goal of the in-
digenous state. While it is clear that the MAS reforms are in fact making significant 
improvements to Bolivian society, I suggest the TIPNIS controversy demonstrates 
a troubling continuity: from the colonial period to the current moment, the ex-
tractivist development model continues to be structured around exploitation of 
indigenous bodies and lands. It is precisely in a moment of supposed “restructur-
ing” of this model that the situated practices of racism in place since colonial times 
reemerge in both traditional and new forms. This result has important implica-
tions for the potential and long-term success of the emancipatory politics of the 
136    Chapter 5
MAS. If, despite demanding and, in fact, carrying out a constitutional “recount” 
of the previous orderings of society to make indigenous peoples and their cultures 
visible, the state is not able to put that recount into practice in a meaningful way, 
we must ask whether this politics is successful. Rancière (1999) makes clear that in 
his vision, emancipatory politics does not always produce a reordering, but does 
make visible the wrongful (or scandalous) order and those previously excluded 
from it. It produces a space for new political subjects to disagree with that order. 
If we take this definition, we might say the MAS process of decolonization has 
been successful. The contestations we see in this chapter make clear, however, that 
because the state is so deeply committed to continuing the long-term extractivist 
models of development that produced and maintained that racist order, the pluri-
national state has not yet been able to create a new order. In fact, we might argue 
that it serves to police the existing order. Yet prying open the uncomfortable ques-
tion of race in contemporary Bolivia reveals that it is a site of continued reworking 
and reiterative disagreements, where actors are constantly making new aspects of 
racism visible and challenging them.
137
In July 2015, Pope Francis visited Bolivia. During his three-day stay, he repeated 
the message of his pastoral encyclical calling for a new global ecological ethic link-
ing care for the earth—“our common home”—with care for the poor (Vatican 
2015). Observers expected his message would have important echoes with Bolivia’s 
indigenous president, Evo Morales, who has achieved international attention for 
his left-leaning economic policies, his advocacy for Bolivia’s majority indigenous 
population, and his activism about global climate change. As I have described in 
previous chapters, since Morales’s election, Bolivia has become a site of global in-
spiration for the Left. Bolivia’s new 2009 constitution, with its revolutionary focus 
on decolonization and vivir bien, or living well, has sparked the imagination of 
people across the world.
That spark was tangible at the Global Meeting of Social Movements in the low-
land city of Santa Cruz, Bolivia. I joined thousands of delegates from across Latin 
America who came together to greet the pope and to discuss the Vatican’s broad 
themes for social change: Madre Tierra, Techo, y Trabajo (Mother Earth, Hous-
ing, and Work). As the tropical rains pounded on the roof of the coliseum, people 
waved colorful banners from across the region illustrating the agendas of their 
groups. The participants gave rousing speeches about the efforts of social move-
ments to end poverty and defend their lands against the depredations of transna-
tional corporations. “We are one single river,” declared an indigenous woman from 
Canada, “oppressed, colonized, and tortured.” Over and over the speakers cried: 
“We are fighting one common enemy: global capitalism!!!”
President Morales gave the final speech of the afternoon. Standing against a 
background of huge posters of global peacemakers, like Mahatma Gandhi, Nelson 
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Mandela, and Bolivia’s Domitila Barrios de Chungara,1 Morales waved to the cheer-
ing crowd. “We coincide strongly with the pope on political and social economy,” 
he said. “What can we do with capitalist system? The work now, with the Catholic 
Church and other churches, is to think about natural resources and basic services. 
There is plenty of money, it is just badly distributed.” Describing Bolivia’s “rich ex-
perience” with nationalizing its natural gas resources, he explained that Bolivia now 
has huge national reserves, and as a result, its GDP has tripled. “How the economic 
system has improved here!” he cried. “This is the result of the struggles of popular 
movements. And now we are working for economic, political, and technological 
liberation. ¡Viva Bolivia, Jallalla2 Papa Francisco!”
Morales’s speech is notable as much for what it leaves out as what it includes. 
In contrast to the speeches from his early years that I have described in previous 
chapters, where he argued that indigenous values would save Mother Earth, here 
he focuses on economic development as the solution to Bolivia’s—and by exten-
sion the world’s—problems. “Economic liberation” is a new euphemism for what 
scholars call “progressive extractivism” (Gudynas 2010): a national development 
model based on the extraction and exportation of natural resources on the global 
market, paired with redistribution of profits to the poor. I argue here that this has 
become a powerful new consensus in plurinational Bolivia, building on and, in 
part, replacing previous “revolutionary” discourses of indigeneity, decolonization, 
and global climate change. In this chapter, I show how indigeneity, once consid-
ered the site of ontological alternatives to capitalism, is now rearticulated to global 
capitalism under a new rubric of economic liberation.
What does this shift mean for indigenous communities? What do decoloniza-
tion and plurinationalism mean to political activists at the local level, given this 
shifting terrain? To what extent does indigeneity still serve as a site of politics in 
the Rancièrian sense after ten years of the MAS state? I examine these questions 
from the vantage points of three communities: a marginal Aymara neighbor-
hood in the highland city of El Alto, where residents are aiming for middle-
class status in the booming economy; and two urban Guaraní communities in 
lowland Santa Cruz, where struggles over jobs and environmental justice appear 
to be taking precedence over indigenous identity. In these very differently situ-
ated communities, local actors have very different answers to these questions, 
depending upon their ethnic identification, their economic situations, and their 
relations to land and markets. In some of the communities I describe, commu-
nity members hold tightly to their identities as indigenous and continue to make 
claims on the state to ensure their rights to territory and local self-government. 
In others, especially the urban communities, ethnic identities appear to be giving 
way, at least, in some contexts, to larger questions of development and economic 
well-being.
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THE NEW DEVELOPMENTALISM
There is little doubt that a conjuncture of forces in the 1990s led to important 
forms of resistance across the country and created the political space for the for-
mulation of revolutionary alternatives. Many scholars hoped that Bolivia would 
lead the world into a post-neoliberal moment (see Escobar 2010). Far from being 
a post-neoliberal or post-capitalist reality, however, what we see in Bolivia today 
is a new form of developmentalism based on resource extractivism, industrializa-
tion, and commercial agriculture—precisely what the new plurinational Bolivia 
was supposed to transform. During the TIPNIS controversy, the MAS government 
adopted a compelling discourse linking economic development and decoloniza-
tion. In 2011, the government’s approach to the protests, and especially its violent 
attack on the marchers, were roundly rebuked by the Bolivian public. But Boliv-
ians paid little attention to the 2012 march, even when military police aimed water 
cannons at women marchers in La Paz. What had changed? During the interven-
ing year, the government began a powerful campaign painting the TIPNIS protest-
ers as backward savages who were creating obstacles to national development. As 
we saw in chapter 5, Vice President Álvaro García Linera’s book Geopolítica de la 
Amazonía (García Linera 2012b) articulated the ways in which lowland peoples 
have been exploited by transnational corporations and lowland elites, contending 
that the MAS development model would reclaim control of the region and use 
its resources to redistribute wealth to the poorest people. This ideological argu-
ment was bolstered by showcase public works and co-optation of opposition. In 
many indigenous communities in the TIPNIS region, the government distributed 
goods and services, including schoolbooks, outboard motors, and foodstuffs. In 
the highly contested consultation process carried out by the government over the 
following year, TIPNIS community members were asked, not if they wanted the 
highway, but if they wanted development. Unsurprisingly, a majority of those who 
participated said yes.
In July 2015, I visited one of the most visible spokespeople for the 2011 TIPNIS 
march, Justa Cabrera, a Guaraní woman in her fifties. Doña Justa lives in a small 
community on the periphery of Santa Cruz. I have known her for almost twenty 
years, since my first years of fieldwork with the Capitanía Zona Cruz, the Guaraní 
organization bringing together over twenty communities of Guaranís who mi-
grated to the urban zone in the 1970s. When I first met her in 1996, she was the 
leader of her small community, and the director of land and territory issues for 
the Capitanía. Her husband was a member of the Equipo Técnico Zonal, a group 
of young Guaranís who served as technical advisers to the organization’s leader. I 
documented the work of the Equipo and the Capitania in my first book (Postero 
2007a) and have stayed in touch with them and with Justa over the intervening 
years. She served in a number of roles in the regional and national indigenous 
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movement, always as an outspoken militant for indigenous causes. By 2010, Justa 
was president of the national indigenous women’s organization, CENAMIB, which 
had its office in the compound of CIDOB, the national indigenous organization. 
I checked in with her every few years when I returned to Santa Cruz, visiting 
her at her office and hearing about the work she was doing to advance women’s 
rights. She worked with European NGOs, local Church groups, and the national 
government to find funding for workshops and development projects. She had 
also traveled widely and was invited to international workshops and conferences. 
When the TIPNIS struggle began, Justa participated by gathering funds to keep 
the marchers fed. She gained national and international attention speaking to me-
dia about the suffering women marchers and their children endured. She bitterly 
opposed not only the TIPNIS highway but the MAS government. In a newspaper 
interview, she said that Evo Morales had become a capataz, an overseer for the 
transnational corporations, linking him to the evils of past forced labor systems 
that had enslaved her people (La Cl@se 2011). As described in chapter 5, the sec-
ond TIPNIS march came to a disastrous end, and with little support, the marchers 
returned to Santa Cruz to regroup. In 2012, I met with Justa in the city’s central 
plaza, where the CIDOB leaders had pitched tents to make their plight known to 
the public. Their headquarters had been taken over by MAS supporters, and their 
struggle appeared at an end. Justa was distraught, and told me about her own har-
rowing experiences during the takeover, when the “intruders” pushed her to the 
ground and pulled her hair.
Now, three years later, she and her husband Gregorio are firm supporters of the 
MAS. As we walked through their quiet village, past the traditional mud and thatch 
homes under shady trees, she pointed out an open lot. “Here is where the govern-
ment has promised to build a new coliseum,” she said, “and here the new school 
building.” Justa explains how President Evo called her to a private meeting in La Paz 
the year before, and asked her to support his government. In exchange, he offered 
her a housing project of one hundred new homes for two of the villages in her area 
and promised to buy land for five hundred more homes for families without land. 
Then, in a dazzling show for the media, Evo himself appeared in her village, flying 
in on a helicopter to make these promises public. In exchange, she declared herself 
a supporter of the MAS and the president in his 2014 reelection bid.
Naturally, she has been the subject of enormous critique and speculation as a 
result. This, say many Guaraní, is just how Evo does it: he buys off the vocal lead-
ers, silencing them with obras (public works). “This is egoismo [egotism, or selfish-
ness],” they say, using a term that in Spanish criticizes those who act in their own 
interests rather than those of the larger community, implying also that the person 
is corrupt, receiving personal benefits or bribes. “They have divided us, and this 
is the mechanism,” said one Guaraní friend. Used this way, the term egoismo both 
serves to “out” individuals who do not act within the broader logic of the collective 
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and shows envy of individuals who are skillful at negotiating the clientelist logic of 
the new developmental state. Justa and Gregorio have another, very different per-
spective, and they explained their pragmatic decision to work with the MAS thus:
After the [2012] march, and the [2014] elections [in which Morales was reelected], 
we analyzed the situation and said: Do we continue to confront them? Do we just 
keep marching? No, we need a new process, because to confront them now will take 
another twenty years. We decided instead to enter the government. The other option 
was to keep marching, with all our organizations divided. . . . Of course, once inside 
the MAS government, there are still a lot of fights, many interests. But who has more 
capacity to fight corruption? Them or us? So we say: Who is the dueño [owner] of 
this process of change? Who marched? We have spent twenty years working for these 
opportunities, like those coming from the nationalization of the natural resources. 
Why hasn’t [the benefit of] all that arrived here for us?
Justa and Gregorio are not alone. All across the country, former opponents of 
the MAS “han subdio al tren” (have gotten on the train), voting for and working 
with the MAS in order to channel funds to their communities. And throughout 
the country, there is tangible evidence of these public works: shiny school build-
ings, sports complexes, potable water systems, and modular viviendas (private 
family houses). Signs with Morales’s face frame these works as proof of the process 
of change at work. Evo Cumple, the signs say: Evo fulfills. As the rest of this chapter 
makes clear, I am not criticizing these pragmatic decisions. Most of the people I 
interviewed are happy that the government is funding these important local proj-
ects. Rather, my goal here is to point out the way the government’s policies and 
practices have created a new sphere for local organizing—one that focuses on in-
frastructure, development, and reaping the benefits of natural resource extraction 
instead of decolonization and indigenous rights.
For the government, the focus on redistribution of profits from extraction has 
meant wide popular approval: Morales won his third election in 2014, with 60 per-
cent of the vote, (although he did not win a referendum to change the constitution 
to allow him to run for president again). This popularity allowed the government 
to formulate a new national development plan, called the Agenda Patriótica 2025 
(Patriotic Agenda for 2025) (Bolivia 2013). In it, the government describes how it 
hopes to make Bolivia a “sovereign and dignified” country. Its agenda is based on 
thirteen pillars, starting with eradicating poverty, providing basic services, and 
making sure that all Bolivians have health care, education, and sports facilities. 
The plan calls for a diversified economy to make this possible. Mining and hydro-
carbons will continue to figure largely in the picture, and the country will contin-
ue to move towards nationalization, industrialization, and commercialization of 
these strategic resources. But Bolivia will move beyond the “colonial dependence” 
on these sectors to develop important new sources of income. First, it will become 
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a major exporter of energy, drawing on its hydroelectric potential as well as its 
renewable energy capacities. Second, it will become a producer and exporter of 
food products, converting artisanal farming into mechanized, irrigated, and tech-
nologically advanced systems. This is part of a larger push for “food sovereignty,” 
aimed at ensuring Bolivians’ food security by means of a massive industrialization 
of the production of food and the exploitation of forest products and other natural 
resources (ibid.).
The plan continues to frame the country’s overall goals in terms of vivir bien, 
and protection of the Madre Tierra, but analysts argue this is really window dress-
ing for a modernist capitalist development project based on continued natural 
resource extraction and a radical expansion of the agricultural frontier. Alcides 
Pinto Vadilla of Fundación Tierra, a Bolivian NGO focused on agrarian policies, 
points out that the plan links Bolivian producers ever more to the global market 
and to commodity prices established globally (personal communication, July 27, 
2015). Moreover, critics fear these plans have dangerous implications for the en-
vironment and climate change. For example, in 2014, Morales declared that by 
2025, the country should increase the number of hectares in production from the 
current level of 3.5 million hectares to 10 million (El Diario 2014; Urioste 2015). 
To accomplish this, the government has recently agreed that people can deforest 
up to twenty hectares without any permission from the Forest Ministry as long as 
they use the land to produce food. This is a radical departure from previous regu-
lations, and promises a rapid deforestation of fragile Amazonian lands. Perhaps 
more shocking, in 2015, the government passed a decree authorizing oil explora-
tion within Protected Areas (like national parks and nature preserves) and indig-
enous territories (La Razón 2015). Morales also declared that prior consultation 
with indigenous people was unnecessary and a “waste of time” (Erbol 2015).
These changes belie much of the language and revolutionary character of the 
new constitution, yet there has been very little opposition to them. This is the result 
of meeting the interests of some sectors and silencing of others. The campesino 
(peasant farmer) sector is broadly supportive of this developmentalist agenda. In-
digenous Andean peasants tend to have small plots of land, and they produce for 
both national and international markets. They are linked to urban centers through 
kinship-based commercial networks. The coca-growing sector in the tropics and 
temperate Yungas areas and the large migrant farming population in the eastern 
lowlands are also dependent on marketing their products and support new govern-
ment investments in highways linking their zones to larger centers. (Their support 
for the proposed TIPNIS highway was illustrative of their interests.) All these pro-
ducers welcome the renewed focus on agricultural production and benefit from 
government gas price subsidies and credit programs. As Alessandra Pellegrini 
Calderón (2016) points out in her new work on Yungueño coca growers, these rural 
farmers are an “emerging peasant middle class with increasingly entrepreneurial, 
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market-based activities in both production and commerce.” Rather than seeing 
themselves as indigenous peoples, they situate themselves as both peasants and as 
a socially upward moving group (2016: 149).
Urban indigenous peoples also appear to benefit in both indirect and direct 
ways. As described above, the economy has grown enormously as a result of the 
nationalization of the hydrocarbon sector, and the redistribution of the govern-
ment’s share of royalties and gas rents has been invested at the local and depart-
mental (state) level across the country. The large emphasis on public works means 
growth in the construction industry and growing indigenous employment in the 
municipal and departmental governments. As Nico Tassi and his collaborators 
have shown, this has also led to a booming import and export business linking 
Bolivia to Brazil, Chile, and China, producing a new sector: the Aymara global 
merchant (Tassi et al. 2013). For many urban residents, the hope of economic pros-
perity appears to drive political support for Morales.
Even the lowlands elites have seemed content in recent years. In the initial years 
of the MAS administration, mestizo elites and commercial farmers in the lowland 
region felt threatened by the MAS economic agenda to radically redistribute lands 
and natural resource revenues to the poor (Fabricant and Postero 2013). Their op-
position to the MAS was especially salient during the Constituent Assembly, when 
they organized massive public protests across the country and even a “prefectural 
coup” to push for departmental autonomy. Many of their demands lost force, how-
ever, after the passage of the new constitution, which instituted a form of both 
indigenous and departmental autonomy. But most important, by 2012, the govern-
ment had made an economic pact with this sector, ensuring the ability of regional 
agribusinesses to continue to grow. Morales hopes that Bolivia will soon become 
a regional leader in soy production, further contributing to the booming lowland 
economy. This is a goal that lowland elites share.
While many critics see this new developmentalism as a betrayal of the promises 
of an indigenous alternative, others see it as an inevitable result of class interests. 
Alcides Pinto Vadilla of Fundación Tierra puts it this way:
Many see Evo as a traitor. I don’t see him that way. I see him as who he is, a leader of a 
campesino union. Where did we get the idea that the campesinos were revolutionary? 
They are allied with capitalism when the economy is good, and revolutionary when it 
is not. So Evo is just serving their interests. His proposals are to help his sector, they are 
not transformative . . . [The MAS has] generated a new mechanism for accumulating 
wealth for their followers. They have made a pact with the lowland productive sectors, 
but they have not allowed them to govern. They let them [the rich lowland business 
sector] do their business, but they say, don’t tell us how to spend the resources.
This pact with the business sector, then, allows money to flow, keeps the former 
opposition happy, and promotes a strong, market-based economy. In exchange 
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for almost complete control over the political institutions, the government keeps 
loosening environmental regulations, making extraction and commercial farming 
easier and more profitable.
But what about indigenous people in the lowlands? While many lowland in-
digenous people also live in urban or peri-urban communities, a large propor-
tion live in rural areas, relying on forms of production and subsistence requiring 
large areas of land. As noted in the Introduction, since the 1990s, lowland groups’ 
traditional livelihood strategies have received state recognition and many have 
received collectively titled territories (although many demands are still in pro-
cess). They have been at the forefront of political struggles for self-determination 
and autonomy, seeking to control their own lands according to their customs and 
culture. They were a central voice in the Pacto Unidad, the group of indigenous 
organizations that articulated much of the language of indigenous rights and  vivir 
bien that makes the new constitution so revolutionary. Their demands have been 
consistently different from those of the campesino sector described above (Ri-
vera Cusicanqui 2015). They have defended their territories, their forms of life, 
and their right to make decisions about development, consistently articulating a 
strong concern for the environment, and represented themselves as caretakers of 
the Earth. Thus, the current government policies of economic development based 
on extractivism and the expansion of the agricultural frontier are a substantial 
challenge for them and their abilities to move towards the forms of revolutionary 
political transformation the new constitution promised.
A crucial step in the Morales government’s ability to push through its devel-
opment plan was the silencing of critical voices from the lowlands. CIDOB, the 
lowlands indigenous organization, had been a central protagonist in the push 
for indigenous rights for nearly thirty years, and its leaders had organized and 
spearheaded the TIPNIS marches. I have described the post-TIPNIS takeover of 
 CIDOB in chapter 5, giving eyewitness accounts of how a parallel  organization 
took control of the CIDOB headquarters, backed by tear gas and government 
 police. Its leader, Melva Hurtado, from the Beni region, made clear from the 
 beginning that this new CIDOB supported “brother” Evo Morales, and that they 
just wanted to work for development in their communities (La Jornada 2012). In 
exchange, the new CIDOB received over a million dollars in funding from the 
MAS government. With it, they transformed the headquarters, building a modern 
four-story office complex with air-conditioning and apartments for the organiza-
tion’s leaders. They administered production projects in indigenous communities 
friendly to the government, providing tractors for improvement of pasture and 
wells for cattle and craft and textile projects for women. In her public appear-
ances, Melva Hurtado faithfully echoed the lines from the government playbook. 
In  August 2015, I  traveled to the town of Guarayo, in the eastern part of the coun-
try to observe the Guarayo indigenous organization’s twenty-eighth anniversary. 
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Melva was an honored guest at the ceremony. Speaking from the dais to the crowd 
of residents and visitors braving the suffocating tropical heat, she described the 
projects CIDOB had sponsored there. “We are here to work for the development of 
all,” she told the crowd. “We are searching for peace, for unity among indigenous 
brothers, and to construct the patria grande [the great country]. . . . We have left 
politics behind; we are looking for development. . . . We must work together to move 
forward, without egoismo, without divisions” (emphasis added).
Thus, one of the most important oppositional voices, CIDOB, is now firmly 
in the MAS camp. They did not utter any public protest to the 2015 decrees open-
ing up indigenous territories and protected areas to exploration. To the con-
trary, when I asked CIDOB’s Environmental and Climate Change Officer, Rafael 
 Álvarez, about that, he denied that the MAS government had any responsibility. 
“The government is not causing any damage; it is the foreigners, like the United 
States. Bolivia is the victim of climate change!” All that is left, he says, is adaptation 
to the damages, learning how to live with the environmental changes and moving 
forward. “What else can we do? The industrialized countries just go ahead [pollut-
ing] and we just keep conserving our forests. Should we just stay in poverty while 
everyone else lives well? No! We need development” (personal communication, 
July 28, 2015). But, like Melva, he too gave voice to the fears of egoism and corrup-
tion that circulate in tandem with this developmentalist discourse. A few months 
previously, leaders of the national indigenous fund, the Fondo Indígena, had been 
accused of diverting millions of dollars intended for local indigenous develop-
ment projects. Álvarez denied any wrongdoing on the part of CIDOB, pointing 
instead to the supposed wrongdoings of the prior president, who had led the TIP-
NIS marches. Only a few months later, however, Melva Hurtado herself was jailed 
for improprieties as part of the Fondo Indígena scandal. That case is still pending 
as of this writing.
This leaves the other traditional voice of opposition, the NGOs. They, too, 
are under threat, as the government launched a campaign to discredit and si-
lence them. In June 2015, Morales issued a statement that any NGOs that object 
to the government plans to explore for natural resources in forest reserves or 
indigenous territories would be subject to being thrown out of the country. He 
said that he would not allow NGOs who were the pawns of foreign interests to 
prejudice Bolivia’s interests. “We have the obligation to explore what we have in 
our territory. . . . Of course it is our obligation to take care of our environment, 
but we can’t be the park rangers for the industrialized countries” (Yunasby 2015). 
This created an enormous uproar among NGOs, and made many of them ex-
tremely nervous. Several told me privately they felt very vulnerable and unable 
to exercise what they saw as their role as civil society watchdogs. “Who can speak 
for the environment now?” one NGO worker asked. “They have co-opted the 
indigenous organizations and threatened us.”
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Indigenous communities negotiate this new conjuncture from very different 
perspectives. In the rest of this chapter and in chapter 7, I turn to examples of lo-
cal indigenous community responses. Of course, these communities cannot stand 
in for all indigenous people in Bolivia. Rather, they offer a view of the diversity of 
interests and strategies we see among local peoples. They also represent different 
lengths of fieldwork on my part. My description of the reactions of urban Aymara 
is the result of a few weeks of fieldwork in 2015, based mostly on interviews. While 
I have lived and worked in La Paz and El Alto off and on since 1995, I have not 
carried out long-term fieldwork in El Alto. Thus, the story I relate is descriptive, 
although it squares with longer-term data from other researchers and NGO work-
ers. The case studies in the lowlands, on the other hand, are the result of many 
years of research and participant observation. I have been working in Bella Flor 
and El Futuro,3 neighboring Guaraní communities in peri-urban Santa Cruz, for 
twenty years, returning every year or two since 1995. My first book is based upon 
my research with the federation of Guaraní villages these two communities belong 
to, and I lived off and on in Bella Flor during 1997–99. I first visited Charagua, the 
subject of chapter 7, in 1997, accompanying Guaraní friends from Santa Cruz to 
an assembly of the national Guaraní federation, the Asamblea del Pueblo Guaraní 
(APG). Since 2010, I have carried out three periods of field research there, most 
recently in 2015, observing the autonomy process as it unfolded. My previous work 
with the Guaranís of Santa Cruz opened many doors for me in Charagua. Several 
of my closest Guaraní friends and informants from Bella Flor are, in fact, origi-
nally from Charagua, and I have been able to use their kin networks to establish 
connections. The fact that I wrote a book about Zona Cruz also makes a differ-
ence. It is a helpful entrée in most local communities. When I hand out copies of 
the Spanish translation of my book, people understand I have been collaborating 
with Guaranís for many years and are more likely to be willing to discuss their 
lives with me.
URBAN AYMAR AS:  “C ON PL ATA VIVIMOS”  
(WITH MONEY,  WE LIVE)
In July 2015, I visited the community of Rio Negro, an urban barrio on the out-
skirts of El Alto. I had previously met the community’s leader, Gonzalo León, to 
talk about how urban Aymara communities were experiencing Evo Morales’s “in-
digenous state.” Over the past few years, commentators and scholars had been 
describing the rise of a new indigenous middle class. The excellent work of Nico 
Tassi and his colleagues, for instance, has shown how Aymara merchants lever-
aged kin relations and Aymara logics of circulation to build enormous amounts 
of capital and create transnational circuits from Chile through Bolivia to China 
(Tassi et al. 2013). This has allowed the new Aymara entrepreneurs to develop a 
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distinctive form of conspicuous consumption that has be garnering international 
attention. For instance, the “Nuevo-Tiwanaku” style of the Aymara architect Fred-
dy Mamani Silvestre’s multicolored cholets (a witty combination of cholos—urban 
Andean indigenous—and “chalets”), which have sprung up all over the city of El 
Alto (La Nación 2015), has been lauded by a portfolio in the New Yorker (Granser 
and Thurman, 2015). I was interested to learn if this new affluence and sense of 
prosperity are also felt in the marginal communities. What did decolonization and 
indigeneity mean in these contexts?
Gonzalo and I met in a coffee shop in downtown La Paz, introduced by a 
sociolologist who had worked in his community for some time. Over the course 
of several hours, Gonzalo described his life trajectory and the struggles he and his 
neighbors have waged to build their community from a vacant field on the windy 
plains they took over in 2009 to the growing urban barrio it is today. Gonzalo’s tra-
jectory was similar to those of many in his neighborhood, he said. He was born in 
the provinces, in the department of La Paz, and came to the city at the age of fifteen 
to find work. After his military service, he went to Argentina, where he worked 
for a decade in construction and clothing factories. He returned home with a little 
capital to try to build a life. He bought a minivan and began working as a chauffeur 
for tourists, as well as transporting merchandise from the country to the city. He 
Figure 15. Middle-class neighborhoods in La Paz. Credit: Cliff Helles. https://creative 
commons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0.
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met his wife, also a migrant from the countryside, and together they found a small 
lot in Rio Negro. First, they put up a wall around their lot and built a tiny one-
room house. Gradually, they built up their assets, buying several more minibuses, 
which he rented to family members. With loans from family and friends, Gonzalo 
then began importing cars from Chile. With profits from this business, he bought 
a larger truck, and his wife began a small store on their lot. First, she sold grocer-
ies, and then opened a second, adjoining store selling bricks and cement—a smart 
move in the rapidly growing neighborhood. On the weekends, they added onto 
their house, brick by brick and room by room. I asked if he considered himself 
to be middle-class now. Well, not yet, he said, but “I have a house and two stores, 
five kids all in school. I hope they will be educated. Soon, we will build a salon de 
fiestas, a venue for people to rent for parties. And my biggest hope is to gain a fixed 
job, as a chauffeur or in an office.”
Gonzalo’s answer raises the question of how to measure the middle class. Even 
though only 17 percent of Bolivians meet the World Bank’s criterion of earning 
at least $10 per day, 53 percent consider themselves middle-class, according to a 
2013 Informe Latinobarómetro survey (Los Tiempos 2013), and the figure is even 
higher in El Alto, where fully 70 percent see themselves as middle-class (World 
Bank 2013). As my discussion with Gonzalo makes clear, identifying as middle-
class is a subjective call: “self-positioning in terms of class is not an absolute and 
objective measurement of a quantity of goods, but rather a relative measure of the 
position of each person in society. It has to do with the power that each person has 
to belong to a social group. The poor are not poor only because they are poor in 
goods, but poor in terms of power” (Los Tiempos 2013). In Bolivia, it is argued, the 
election of Morales to the presidency has given many people a sense of power they 
never had before, and this translates into a sense of economic well-being (ibid.). Is 
this so? Or is it the reverse?
Gonzalo made it clear that the money flowing from the government is the rea-
son why many Alteños support Morales:
 NGP: So what do you think about the discourse of Evo about decolonization? How 
about all the work at the Constituent Assembly, and the ideas of vivir bien, 
etc.?
 G: Look, this has served the people, because the transnational companies had 80 
percent of the gas money and the state only had 20 percent. So the Constitu-
ent Assembly changed all that, now it is 18 percent to the TNCs and the rest 
for the country. And this has generated a lot of money! . . . Ha habido mucho 
recurso! [There have been many resources!]
Here Gonzalo makes a common mistake, suggesting that it was the Constituent 
Assembly that nationalized the hydrocarbon sector. In fact, President Morales ac-
complished this through an executive decree. However, this mistake demonstrates a 
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larger “truth”: for most poor people, decolonization is not about colonial legacies or 
the rights of indigenous peoples, but rather the just distribution of the profits from 
national development. As I explained in previous chapters, the government has ar-
gued that its national development agenda based on extractivism and redistribution 
is, in fact, a form of decolonization. Gonzalo’s explanation appears to embrace that 
view. Yet he lamented the fact that these funds have been badly administered by the 
government and make for substantial corruption. He explained that government 
redistribution through public works has produced new kinds of patronage:
Evo has a hold on the social movements. It is through the popular organizations 
that he gets support. The leaders go meet with Evo, and he gives them obras (public 
works). . . . Evo has the power, and so they can say: Evo is going to come to give us 
this obra, so we all have to be there, and applaud. . . . So that makes it really hard for 
other political parties to compete. For example, the Coliseo Cerrado [the public coli-
seum in El Alto] cost two million bolivianos. Without nationalization we wouldn’t 
have had this. That is where the money comes from. So we all say thank you, Evo, 
and thanks to the nationalization of natural resources. And in the process, we are 
campaigning for Evo.
The next week, I met Gonzalo in his community. I made my way on the windy 
dirt lanes to the new sports complex, where the junta vecinal (JV; neighborhood 
association) was holding its weekly meeting. Nearly a hundred people sat on plas-
tic chairs, bundled up in blankets, listening to debates about how to best push 
the city to bring plumbing out to the community. A constant stream of people 
approached the head table, bringing their monthly cuotas, or fees, and their house 
booklets to be stamped. Each household must send a representative to get the 
stamp and pay the two-boliviano (about 40 U.S. cents) fee, or be fined. The trea-
surer carried out a careful accounting with each resident. As the meeting wrapped 
up, I talked to a group of neighbors about how El Alto was changing.
Luís, a thin man in his fifties, shyly told me he and his family were part of the 
land takeover that had formed the community. They were there since this place 
was nothing but dirt and bushes. They put up a little tent to claim ownership of the 
land, and have been struggling ever since to get basic services like water, electricity, 
and sewage. An older man, Samuel, said: “We Aymara are very organized, as you 
can see. We all pay our cuotas, and if we have to, we protest.” Pointing to the sports 
complex, he said, “this center is the result of our protest, marches, and strikes. We 
fought for it.” But they all agreed with the signs I had seen throughout the city 
saying, “Nuestra Cuidad Está Cambiando” (Our city is changing). Luís explained: 
“Life is better in Bolivia now with Evo. Before, all our money was going out of the 
country to the USA and the transnationals. There was no money and no jobs.”
Samuel chimed in: “Yes, now there are jobs. We came here from the provinces 
to educate our kids. In the provinces, there were no schools, no jobs. And we like 
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to have fun just like you in the U.S.! . . . Before Evo, we couldn’t get in to those jobs, 
to those schools. The elite saw us as black, only people like you, white, could go 
to schools. Now it is all the same, we are all equal. He has opened the doors to all 
this. And this is really important! Our kids can become professionals.” So, I asked, 
are you all middle-class? José, a wiry man with his coat buttoned up to his nose, 
nodded enthusiastically. “Yes! Now I have lots of work, I have built a house here, 
and my three kids are in school. I expect them to be professionals and that is the 
point. That’s why we came. There are now jobs and money, and that’s why we sup-
port Evo. We have jobs.”
This positive perspective echoed with what I had heard all over the city. From 
scholars to government officials to taxi drivers, people explained Morales’s popu-
larity as a result of the booming economy. One Aymara woman I interviewed in 
La Paz explained that the economy didn’t benefit everyone equally, but things were 
better. Doña Patricia and her family own a jewelry store where they fabricate and 
sell the ornate gold-plated jewelry cholas wear for dress-up occasions like weddings 
and baptisms. She showed me the huge new synthetic gems that local wholesalers 
had imported from China. “It is the importers who are making all the money,” she 
complained, “not us merchants.” Her intuitions are reflected in the economic data: 
China is exporting large amounts of goods to Bolivia. Alejandra Saravia López and 
Adam Rua Quiroga (2015) show that Chinese imports (notably, mining machinery, 
motorcycles, cell phones, and herbicides) far outweigh Bolivian exports to China, 
resulting in a significant trade deficit (10). They argue this trend has consequences 
for manufacturers in Bolivia, as they are losing their sales position within both the 
national and international market. This “call[s] into question the survival of a large 
number of small and medium-sized enterprises” (10–11). Carlos Arze Vargas (2016) 
makes a compelling argument that the massive increase in imports from China, 
and the large proportion of people working in the informal market—the majority 
in sales of these imported goods—means that Bolivia is increasingly unable to sus-
tain itself by producing its own food or consumer goods. Yet, as Patricia the jeweler 
shows, this has not kept people from supporting the president.
She lamented the corruption in the local juntas vecinales, where local lead-
ers were skimming money off the new urban infrastructure projects. But she 
said, of course, she voted for Morales. “Who else???” she asked, as if that were 
beyond debate.
 NGP: So the president talks about being indigenous . . . Do you identify as indig-
enous or Aymara?
 P: We are Aymara, of course. Indios somos, pero. [Of course, we are Indians].
 NGP: So when he talks about the new plurinational state, or descolonization, what 
does that mean to you? Or, what is decolonization?
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 A: Hmmm, well, it means that things are different from before. [pause] But, 
what does it mean, then? Really, it is all politics.
 NGP: Politics?
 P: Yes, politics, you know, a matter for the political parties.
 NGP: Doesn’t it mean anything for you?
 A: Well, no. I am not against the government, though.
 NGP: Why?
 A: Pues, ha habido mucha plata [There has been a lot of money].
 NGP: You mean there is more money flowing now?
 A: Yes. You know my mother and grandmother didn’t ever know money. They 
didn’t touch it, they lived on haciendas in the countryside. There was a lot of 
oppression then, no? But now, we have money, they have money. Con plata 
vivimos [With money, we live].
In Rio Negro, local leaders like Gonzalo have taken advantage of the new 
political and economic conjuncture to get the city to build the sports complex 
a few years ago, and now a new community nursery school is being built, with 
some foreign foundation funding and some support from the city. They took 
me to tour the construction project, displaying the new classrooms and kitchen. 
Later I spoke with Johnny Huanca, an Aymara migrant who runs a lumber mill 
and hardware store in the neighborhood. We sat in his store, surrounded by 
rolls of wire, PVC pipe, and buckets of screws, as he proudly recounted his 
trajectory. Like Gonzalo, he and his wife began with a small lot and a small 
artisanal lumber mill serving the neighbors. Now his business moves $200,000 
worth of lumber per month from the Beni region in the Amazonian lowlands 
to fuel the construction boom in El Alto. He has just finished building two 
additional floors above his businesses, adding three bedrooms, a living room, 
kitchen, and study.
 NGP: So do you consider yourself middle-class?
 JH: Yes. We have transformed ourselves from what our parents’ lives were in the 
campo. But I still identify as Aymara. We have a house, stores, three kids in 
school. No car yet, but I want to get one soon to drive the kids around in.
 NGP: Is this the result of the MAS? Do you support the MAS?
 JH: Yes, but there is good and bad. The bad thing is that we have to pay a lot of 
taxes now. . . . The good is that thanks to Evo, our people are now working 
in offices, they use the internet—there are cholitas in polleras in government 
offices! This was never the case before. We weren’t allowed to go up to those 
places. I remember as a kid with my grandmother hearing white people say, 
here come those indios. That never leaves you, it is inside you. But now it is 
different, Evo has opened the doors.
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In Rio Negro, then, the most important effect of the “indigenous state” is that it 
has “opened the doors” of both political and economic opportunity to the Aymara 
and poor residents. With money flowing from the state to the city and through the 
social movements, people sense that the Morales government has benefited “the 
people” instead of transnational companies. While they all make clear they iden-
tify as Aymara, these residents’ sense of decolonization does not reflect a simple 
notion of indigenous rights or any notion of indigeneity being an alternative to 
capitalism. Rather, it echoes the government’s discourse of economic liberation: 
for them, liberation implies economic well-being and everyone getting an equal 
piece of the pie. They see themselves rising in class status and a brighter future for 
their children as professionals.
BELL A FLOR AND EL FUTURO:  C OMMUNIT Y 
DEVELOPMENT STRUGGLES
Let us move now across the country, to the outskirts of the lowland capital of Santa 
Cruz, to the communities of Bella Flor and El Futuro. These barrios came into be-
ing in the 1960s, when Guaraní indigenous families moved to the region to work in 
the sugarcane harvest. Guaraní families moved from the Chaco region in the south 
to what was then open land some twenty kilometers outside the city of Santa Cruz, 
building three separate communities on a large parcel of 500 hectares. Through 
the agrarian reform, they received title to the parcel, and over the following years, 
more families settled there. When I did my fieldwork there in 1995–98, the three 
villages were organized as indigenous Guaraní communities, with leaders elected 
in assemblies according to Guaraní traditions (see Postero 2007a). They were part 
of the larger regional Guaraní federation, the Capitanía Zona Cruz, which repre-
sented twenty-five communities around the Santa Cruz region. During that period, 
the Guaranís of Zona Cruz were engaging with the provisions of the new Law of 
Popular Participation, one of the key provisions of Bolivia’s neoliberal multicultural 
reforms. Through this law, indigenous communities were recognized by the state, 
and incorporated into state governance through usos y costumbres, or traditional 
customs. This meant that local politics was organized around ethnic categories: the 
indigenous organization, called the capitanía, was the official representative to the 
municipal government and participated in budget and development decisions. I 
observed as my Guaraní friends learned how to register their organizations legally, 
understand municipal politics, and make demands on behalf of their communities. 
In Santa Cruz, this new form of citizenship produced minimal results for the Guar-
anís because they remained marginalized minorities. In other regions, where indig-
enous people were more numerous, the reforms enabled indigenous organizations 
to win local political offices such as city council and mayoral seats. The Charagua 
case discussed in chapter 7 is an example of this.
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For the Guaranís of Bella Flor and El Futuro, the multicultural years were a 
boom period: they got grants from foreign aid to form and strengthen their in-
digenous institutions; many young people got scholarships for training and some 
went to college; and local leaders were plugged in directly to city funding sources. 
Development projects aimed at helping the indigenous poor targeted them, help-
ing urban women produce Guaraní textiles and crafts. In the following years, how-
ever, their circumstances changed radically. The city overtook their rural villages, 
and migrants from the highlands poured into Santa Cruz. Many Guaranís sold 
their shares in the original parcel, causing enormous disputes in the villages. That 
dispute eventually resolved, giving most of the Guaranís title to some individual 
lots. The result is astonishing: the original Guaraní villages are no longer recog-
nizable, swallowed up by a huge urbanización, or urban housing development. 
Each of these two communities, which had about sixty Guaraní families in 1996, 
now has over twenty thousand residents, the great majority of whom are Andean 
migrants from the highlands. Once quiet rural communities of mud-and-thatch 
Guaraní houses, now they are bustling, peri-urban working- and middle-class 
neighborhoods.
I have watched this process closely over the years, as I have remained close 
friends with the family with whom I lived in Bella Flor during my fieldwork, the 
Taperas. They remain in Bella Flor. Don Jesús, the patriarch, now in his late six-
ties, is an evangelical pastor, and his wife Susana, although quite ill, continues to 
run the household. Their children are all adults now, and the house is filled with 
grandchildren, especially on the weekends. Their daughter Mónica, who received 
a scholarship to train as a journalist, works at a radio station dedicated to indig-
enous culture and politics. She and her small family live with their parents in Bella 
Flor. Mónica’s brother, Samuel, my closest friend, has finished law school, thanks 
to a scholarship, and works as a consultant for the Capitanía. He also teaches 
Guaraní. He and his family live nearby in a rented apartment in El Futuro. Thanks 
to the sale of several lots they received in the settlement, the Taperas have rebuilt 
their home. Now they have a brick construction with three bedrooms. It is not 
fancy—only one of the rooms has a tiled floor, the others are still packed-down 
dirt—but they have electricity, running water, and a separate bathroom outside. 
Susana sells groceries and cold soda from a small storefront building facing onto 
the street, attracting customers from the busy health post across from them. They 
have friendly relations with kolla (people from the highlands) neighbors inter-
spersed throughout their barrio.
Like the residents of Rio Negro described in the previous section, the Taperas 
and many of their Guaraní neighbors are moving from poverty to middle-class 
status. They have urban jobs, stable houses, and their children are being educated. 
They, too, have benefited from infrastructure investments by the state and the city: 
a large sports complex draws people to the central plaza of Bella Flor, and a new 
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secundaria (high school) has just been built in El Futuro. Yet, they have very dif-
ferent opinions about Morales, the “indigenous state,” and decolonization. First, 
it is important to situate their communities for the reader. As I have described in 
previous chapters, Santa Cruz was the center of opposition to Morales. Its white–
mestizo political class mounted a strong pushback to the Constituent Assembly 
and organized a successful regional autonomy movement. Santa Cruz continues 
to be led by opposition parties at both the departmental and city levels. (This has 
begun to change recently, however. In the 2014 presidential elections, the MAS 
won Santa Cruz.)
Perhaps more important, however, many Guaranís have continued to identify 
with the lowland indigenous agenda, and this has pitted them against the Morales 
government. The TIPNIS struggle described in chapter 5 was a central watershed 
for many. The leadership of the Capitanía Zona Cruz participated in the 2011 TIP-
NIS march, and the local communities supported them with money and mate-
rial support. Mónica Tapera was on her way to the march when the Chaparina 
police intervention happened, and so she and others organized a hunger strike 
in the central plaza of Santa Cruz that mobilized public opposition to Morales. 
She spent much of the next few years reporting on the TIPNIS case and contin-
ues to work with former CIDOB leaders to press their case through the Defensor 
del Pueblo (Bolivia’s national ombudsman) and on to the Inter American Human 
Rights Court. For Mónica and Samuel, watching the way the government handled 
the TIPNIS issue made it clear that all the language in the constitution about in-
digenous rights means nothing in practice. They were deeply disappointed and 
hurt. The next year, 2012, Samuel Tapera led a contingent of Zona Cruz Guaranís 
to defend the CIDOB office from takeover by the MAS-allied sector. They camped 
out in the compound for a week, but without material support, were unable to 
continue. Shortly afterward, the current leaders stormed the headquarters with 
police and strongmen. One of the original CZX Equipo Técnico, Rosana Moreno, 
was living at CIDOB at the time and had just given birth to twins a few days before. 
I met with her a few weeks after the event, and she described the hellish experience 
of having to pack up her children and flee through the melee and tear gas. Beaten 
and insulted by the opposing group, she says she will never forgive the Morales 
government for its treason. For these Guaranís, decolonization is a joke, a “cyni-
cal” discourse that Morales uses to justify his power. They lament the way the MAS 
state has co-opted indigenous organizations, reducing everything to money and 
obras. Mónica Tapera explained:
The government has taken over all the possible spaces, CIDOB, the electoral council, 
the judicial sector. There are no spaces left now. And now everything is about money. 
They say, “We will give you this if you support us.” And the indigenous groups have 
no choice, they don’t say anything, because todos tenemos cola [literally, we all have 
tails, meaning, we are all guilty or bought off]. Look how many indigenous  leaders 
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have stopped making any real demands, and now they are all funcionarios con pegas 
[they all have government jobs]. ¡Tan barato se vende!! [How cheaply they sell them-
selves!]
So for these urban Guaranís, their identity as indigenous peoples remains a 
central part of their identity and a central lens from which they evaluate their 
lives. In Bella Flor, they have had to struggle to maintain political power, given the 
demographic change in the barrio. Their kolla neighbors control the school board 
and have argued that the capitanía should cede its position with the city to a junta 
vecinal (JV). Yet the Guaraní leader, Diego Eloy, supported by his community, 
pushes back. I spoke to him one afternoon at his house. He is a taxi driver, and 
his three sons were washing his car before he began his shift in the city. The neat 
house and yard reflect his strong sense of dignity and his aspirations for his family 
and neighbors. “We can’t lose our traditions,” he says. “We are the only barrio left 
where we Guaraní are the majority. In El Futuro, the kollas have already stomped 
on everything. But here, we Guaranís still rule [mandan].” He refuses to let them 
run the show, he says, but he has had to collaborate with them. They have orga-
nized with the city to get the plaza refurbished, create a green space, get some new 
schoolrooms, and so on. His biggest project, though, has been accomplished as 
the capitanía. Everyone agreed that the worst problem facing the community was 
youth gangs, pandillas, who hung out in the streets at night, smoking marijuana, 
drinking, fighting, and robbing people. Don Diego finally intervened, organizing 
with local police to create a youth patrol made up of Guaraní and kolla youth. The 
police donated a vehicle that had been seized in a drug- forfeiture case, and the 
new patrol circulated at night monitoring the barrio and calling the police when 
necessary. This was so successful that the police are beginning a new program 
in which these youth cadets are getting formal training that will (hopefully) lead 
them to jobs with the police. Don Diego says that with this success, he has shown 
the kollas that the Guaranís are still a force to be reckoned with.
In El Futuro, a few kilometers away, however, things are very different. There, 
the Guaraní are working with their kolla neighbors to confront a much bigger 
problem: a huge toxic landfill on their borders. The landfill is run by the city of 
Santa Cruz, and it was set up long after the Guaranís arrived. In the intervening 
years, it has grown precipitously, mirroring the explosive growth of the city. It is a 
horrible stinking mess, venting methane gases and leaking sewage onto surround-
ing roads and lands. In El Futuro, depending on wind direction, an acrid burn-
ing smell fills the neighborhood, stinging people’s eyes and causing respiratory 
illnesses. When it rains, sewage flows into people’s yards and pollutes their water. 
Over the years, surrounding communities have mounted repeated demands that 
the landfill be closed. Time after time, the city has agreed to some of the con-
ditions of the protesters and negotiated an end to the protests. An independent 
audit contracted by the Santa Cruz state government confirmed that the area was 
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contaminated and causing health risks to the residents (CAVE 2015). Yet the city 
keeps postponing the closing, pending finding another site for a new landfill.
In 2015, Sandra Chávez, the segunda capitana, or second in command of the 
Guaraní capitanía of El Futuro decided to start working on this problem with her 
kolla neighbors. She invited me to her house to explain. We sat in the front yard, 
according to Guaraní custom, and she poured a drink she had made from chia 
seeds—to try to be healthy, she said. Her sister, head of the women’s organization, 
joined us, as did her neighbor Patti, and Jorge, a highland migrant from Cocha-
bamba. Sandra explained that the previous leaders had not wanted to work with 
the kollas, but she disagreed. “Why discriminate?” she argued. “We are not pure 
Guaranís here, and we have important problems to face. We have to work together.” 
For her, the health issues they faced as neighbors overcame any ethnic difference. 
With Jorge and other kolla neighbors, they began organizing the barrio, and then 
in March 2015, they carried out a massive blockade of the landfill. Over three hun-
dred people took over the entrance, preventing the entrance of waste disposal and 
garbage trucks from the city. They lasted five days, surrounded by police with all 
the pressure of the mayor’s office and public disapproval. As garbage piled up, the 
neighbors held on. The mayor came to negotiate, but they had signed an agree-
ment ahead of time that they would not be bought off like the leaders of previous 
protests. Eventually, they were dislodged and did not gain any major concessions. 
However, they felt happy with their efforts. The press had been supportive, and a 
big article ran in the local paper saying the landfill should be closed (El Deber 2015). 
Their blockade had forced the release of the independent audit, which supported 
their position. They are not naïve enough to think this alone will force the city’s 
hand, but they do have hopes that the evidence will push public opinion forward.
Like Sandra, their highland neighbor Jorge felt that it was worth overcoming 
the tensions between ethnic groups. He privileged their shared class struggles, 
born from the precarious situations in which they lived. Patti, Sandra’s neighbor 
made that especially clear:
When we held the blockade, they worried that people in the city would get sick [be-
cause garbage was not being picked up]. But what about us getting sick? They say: 
why did you buy out there next to the landfill? But we are poor, we have nowhere else 
to go. The people in the richer parts of the city—their rights are getting protected. 
What about our rights? Y por el hecho de ser pobre, ¿no tenemos derechos? [Just be-
cause we are poor, don’t we have rights?]
Jorge agreed:
Our rights have to be respected, these are human rights at stake. With the laws that 
Evo has made, he says he values the environment, worries about contamination, 
 prioritizes health. But this is a discourse. They don’t respect human rights, or is it 
that they don’t think we are humans?
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For these neighbors, then, organizing around ethnicity sometimes gives way to 
more basic pragmatic issues of justice. In the case of El Futuro, as Patti suggested, 
“this was a civic movement, demanding rights of life and health.” Their ethnic 
differences have not disappeared, as Don Diego of Bella Flor makes clear, but in 
contrast to the multicultural era, in this period, working together for basic forms 
of community development appears to be ever more necessary and important.
C ONCLUSION
This chapter has focused on the lived experiences of some of the many indigenous 
communities in Bolivia, to consider the effects of a decade of MAS policy and 
practice. There are large differences between the circumstances and economies 
facing these communities, and their political trajectories are even more opposed. 
The highland migrants to El Alto I describe are part of the core constituency of the 
MAS party, sharing ethnic identity and history with their “brother Evo.” The Guar-
anís on the outskirts of Santa Cruz come from a different trajectory: the lowland 
indigenous organizations that came into being in the 1990s, formed part of the 
Pacto Undidad at the Constituent Assembly, but broke from the MAS as a result of 
the TIPNIS controversy. Having an indigenous president and an indigenous state 
has meant very different things to these communities.
I suggest that in the contemporary period, indigeneity appears to be a less sa-
lient site of organizing as the dominant government discourse shifts to one of eco-
nomic liberation and development. I do not wish to be misunderstood here. For 
each of the people I presented in this chapter, their ethnic identity—as Aymara or 
Guaraní—remains central to their lives, kin relations, and community struggles. 
As we saw in the case of El Futuro, the forms of political representation hard-won 
in the 1990s are not easily relinquished. Yet more and more, in both El Alto and the 
Guaraní communities, other issues and other forms of doing politics are emerg-
ing. Indigeneity was the site of emancipatory politics in the multicultural 1990s 
and into the Morales era, giving people a way of seeing themselves, and expressing 
their demands for inclusion and self-government. The struggles I document in 
this chapter show that indigeneity no longer serves as a sufficient basis for such 
politics. Of course, class and race/ethnicity have always been intersecting catego-
ries, as I showed in the Introduction. They continue to be so today. I suggest that, 
as the Morales government consolidated its hold on the state in large part by justi-
fying its government through discourses of indigeneity and decolonization, those 
discourses lost some of their emancipatory power, remaining important in the 
symbolic dimension, but losing importance in the realm of local politics. As Pa-
tricia, the jewelry seller in El Alto put it, “that is a matter for the political parties.”
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In chapter 6, we saw how three local communities are negotiating the contempo-
rary conjunctures in Bolivia, especially the discourse of economic liberation put 
forth by the Morales government, which privileges public works, development, 
and economic well-being. I argued that in some communities, this emphasis has 
made indigeneity a less salient site of political organizing than ethnic identity, 
which, as we have seen in previous chapters, was central to emancipatory politics 
at the beginning of the Morales administration. For these communities, decolo-
nization signified either an empty promise from a cynical government or a means 
to class advancement. In this chapter, I take up a very different situation: the case 
of Charagua, where indigenous Guaraní activists have won an important political 
victory, establishing their city as the country’s first—and only, so far—indigenous 
autonomous municipality. I show how the Guaranís of Charagua are strategically 
using the rights established in the new constitution to move towards their long-
term goal of reconstituting a Guaraní nation. For the Guaranís, decolonization is 
both an important goal and discourse and set of juridical tools they utilize in their 
own struggle for local autonomy.
The victory in Charagua in 2015 was the first step in what is likely to be a long 
process of seeking autonomous status for indigenous lands—many more commu-
nities are preparing their initiatives. It was also a very significant accomplishment, 
bringing the Guaranís of Charagua one step closer to their goal of autonomy. In 
this chapter, I focus on how Guaraní leaders managed to overcome local tensions 
to win the election. This chapter traces their pragmatic politics as they negotiate in 
the spaces between national, departmental, and local sovereignties, carrying out 
what Francisco Pifarré has called “Guaraní diplomacy” (1989: 294; see also Albó 
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2012: 29). While still subsumed within the liberal nation-state, this new form of lo-
cal government offers the first institutionalized vision of indigenous alternatives to 
liberalism. Here we see a first glimpse of what the “indigenous state” could mean at 
the local level. Here I push further on the notion of politics, arguing that contrary 
to Jacques Rancière’s theory, politics might not only result from disagreements or 
recounts, but also require the hard work of consensus building.
AUTONOMÍA GUAR ANÍ CHAR AGUA IYAMBAE
Charagua is a small town in the high desert Chaco region of the department of 
Santa Cruz, a dry forest crossed by occasional rivers and streams. It is Bolivia’s 
largest municipality in terms of size—well over 28,000 square miles—and ac-
cording to the 2012 census, has about 35,000 inhabitants. It is vast in size, but 
also in social complexity. Albó estimates that about 60 percent of the population 
are indigenous Guaranís (Albó 2012). The Guaranís are organized into four capi-
tanías, or local federations, made of two different groups of Guaranís—the Avas 
of Charagua Norte and Parapetiguasu (Charagua Sur) and the Izozeños from the 
more remote Bajo and Alto Izozog zones. These groups live in small, dispersed 
communities throughout the large municipality, mostly farming corn and raising 
small herds of cattle and other livestock. Their organizations are part of the larger 
national Guaraní organization, the Asamblea del Pueblo Guaraní (APG; Assembly 
of the Guaraní People), founded in 1987, and centered in the city of Camiri, three 
hours’ drive south of Charagua. It was they who put forward the demand for au-
tonomy. But this project was deeply contested by the other groups in the region. 
Throughout the zone, white–mestizo families have large landholdings, where they 
raise cattle for sale. These are the traditional elites, who since colonial times have 
exercised economic and political power over the Guaranís (Pifarré 1989; Postero 
2007a; Albó 2012). Guaranís have worked on their haciendas and in some sec-
tors were held in a form of slavery. The hacendados (large landholders) live in 
the town, called the pueblo, where they have run the municipality until recently. 
They have traditionally been allied with the conservative mestizo political Ver-
dad y Democracia Social party of Santa Cruz, called the Verdes (Greens) (for the 
green and white colors of the party) and now officially called Demócratas. As in 
Santa Cruz, the Civic Committee, run by the elites and their families, has been a 
central site of local politics. The other important organizations are the Asociación 
de  Ganaderos de Cordillera–Charagua (AGACOR; Cattle Ranchers Association), 
which advocates for the cattle owners’ interests, and the Junta Vecinal, or neigh-
borhood association, which represents the urban residents and is run mostly by 
mestizo schoolteachers. As I describe below, these sectors have been vocal public 
opponents of the autonomy process.
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There are two other major sectors. There is a large group of Mennonites who 
have established large colonias, or colonies, in the region. These German-speaking 
migrants live in closed communities where they work extensive holdings, farm-
ing wheat and raising cattle. Their dairies provide milk and cheese for the entire 
region. Although they make up about 20 percent of the region’s population, they 
are not a factor in political calculations, because their religion requires them to 
stay out of political debates. They do not vote. Xavier Albó suggests that Guaranís 
therefore constitute 80 percent of the voting population (2012: 93.) In the past 
few decades, highland Andean migrants have moved to the zone, establishing an 
urban settlement a few kilometers outside town near the old train station. The resi-
dents of this sector, La Estación, are farmers, merchants, and transportistas. Most 
speak Quechua and are supporters of Morales and his MAS party. So although 
they make up a large majority of the population, the Guaraní activists pushing for 
indigenous autonomy were forced to negotiate with the rest of the people living in 
the municipality.
Over the six years of struggle to achieve autonomy—what Guaraní leaders call 
a peregrinación, or pilgrimage, given the endless trips and meetings with state and 
judicial officials—leaders have maintained a dogged commitment to gaining state 
recognition for their autonomous government, what their statute calls Autonomía 
Guaraní Charagua Iyambae (The Guaraní Indigenous Autonomy of Charagua 
Iyambe) (iyambae is a Guaraní term often translated as “freedom,” or “without 
owners or masters”). I have been observing their process since 2010, when they 
held an assembly to draft an autonomy statute, essentially a new constitution for 
their community. In 2010, I asked René Gómez, the president of the assembly, to 
explain the goals of their efforts. What did they mean by autonomy? Patiently, with 
smiling eyes, he explained.
We understand autonomy as being free [ser libre].  .  .  . Not that we aren’t already. 
We, the Guaraní nation, have always been autonomous, free. But there are no laws 
or norms that say we are autonomous. So for us, autonomy consists of when one 
can govern oneself [uno gobierne por si solo], that is self-government [autogobierno], 
without political parties. . . . What we are doing here in Charagua with our assembly 
is the fruit of decolonization and its transversal themes of racism, discrimination, 
and dependence.  .  .  . We are decolonizing because we are thinking from another 
world [or space: en otro ambito]. These are new forms of thinking, seeing things in 
another way, as we indigenous peoples have always done (personal communication, 
August 12, 2010).
Don René is saying what I heard over and over during my visits to Charagua: 
that the Guaranís believe that they are already autonomous and have always been 
so. Their goal with the assembly and in invoking the autonomy law was to make 
this fact visible and functional in the world of liberal laws and norms. Don René 
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hoped the process of decolonization begun by the Constituent Assembly and 
the new constitution would provide an opportunity for them to articulate their 
understanding of sovereignty with that of the rest of the people in the country. 
“Every pueblo has its culture,” he said, “its form of living, its ñandereko [our way 
of being].” Here he used a complex term that has multiple meanings. Ñandereko 
is sometimes translated as “the harmonious life” (Bolivia 2009). However, Bar-
tolomeu Meliá, the most important historian of the Guaraní, makes clear that it 
refers, not only to the Guaraní way of being, its culture and customs, but also to the 
place and medium that make that way of being possible: the interrelated cultural, 
economic, social, religious, and political spaces linking land, beings, and people 
(Meliá in Medina 2002: 100–101).
Don René’s statement here is echoed in the Catalán anthropologist Pere Mor-
rell i Torra’s suggestion that for the Guaraní, autonomy is a set of intersecting 
meanings (2013: 11). First, it is an already existing set of social practices that have 
emerged over hundreds of years. Drawing on historical archives, especially the 
work of the historian Isabelle Combès (2005), Morrell i Torra describes the ways in 
which differing sectors of Guaranís in the Cordillera region have long maintained 
autonomy from one another. Each community has made its own decisions, except 
during times of war. Here we see an iteration of Pierre Clastres’s notion of the 
“ society against the state,” since throughout their history, the Guaranís have privi-
leged the independence of local communities over a centralized leadership (see 
Clastres 1989). Even in the past twenty years, as these autonomous  communities 
formed the Asamblea del Pueblo Guaraní federation to push for territorial rights, 
in practice, each capitanía, or local organization, has maintained its decision- 
making power. This is what Don René means when he says “We, the Guaraní 
 nation, have always been autonomous, free.”
Second, autonomy is a political discourse used by the Guaraní leadership to 
create a united Guaraní nation. Unity itself is a relatively new goal, given the long 
history of tensions between Avas and Izozeños, who have long been at odds with 
each other, and have employed very different strategies in relation to the dominant 
politicians (see Morrell i Torra 2013: 51). As Albó makes clear, the Izozeños have 
more often allied with the Cruzeño elite (2012). Yet since the multicultural era and 
the formation of the APG, the Guaranís have been working together consistently 
towards the control of their territory and towards the formation of an indigenous-
led government. Albó’s comprehensive history of the Guaranís’ efforts demon-
strates a careful and determined strategy of using every possible political opening 
to do so. He shows how the APG worked with various NGOs to create develop-
ment projects for their communities. Then, during the 1990s, they took advantage 
of the many multicultural reforms aimed at including indigenous groups. Most 
important was the APG’s claim to millions of hectares under the 1997 Agrarian Re-
form law, or Ley INRA. By 2011, they had successfully gained title to over 800,000 
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hectares, plus two large protected areas, one of which was named a national park 
(Albó 2012: 98). This new limited form of territorial titling allowed local commu-
nities to negotiate with the transnational oil companies that were pumping oil and 
gas from under their lands. The funds they obtained from this went directly to the 
individual capitanías, to be used for local development (84–85). Albó also docu-
ments the ways in which the Guaranís took up the Law of Popular Participation, 
which channeled state funds to municipalities. Beginning in 1995, the Guaranís 
began participating in municipal politics, putting up their leaders for city council 
and mayor. Tracing their progress election by election, Albó argues that this strat-
egy consolidated the Guaranís as mature political actors able to articulate their 
demands for autonomy. Don René knows this en carne propia, in his own flesh, 
since he served several terms on Charagua’s city council in the 1990s.
Finally, Morrell i Torra suggests, indigenous autonomy is a status of juridical rec-
ognition by the state. This is what René meant when he explained that “there are no 
laws or norms that say we are autonomous.” Thus, even though the status of indig-
enous autonomy was not all they hoped it would be when the  Constituent  Assembly 
met in 2006, the Guaraní saw state recognition as another step towards the larg-
er project. As we saw in chapter 2, at Bolivia’s Constituent Assembly in 2006–8, 
indigenous activists and their allies proposed new forms of self- government that 
would return both territorial control and traditional forms of governance to indig-
enous communities as part of their centuries-old demands for self-determination. 
The Guaranís of Charagua participated in these debates. Don Avilio Vaca from 
Charagua Norte was a delegate to the Assembly and served on the Commission 
on Autonomies. Yet the form of indigenous autonomy in the final constitution is a 
substantially watered down version of what activists had proposed. Instead of the 
far-reaching self-determination indigenous activists had longed for since the Span-
ish conquest, and for which they fought in insurrections up until the nineteenth 
century, the current version of indigenous autonomy in Bolivia is not significant-
ly discernable from a local administrative entity within a liberal centralized state. 
There are some meaningful changes, as I show below, but this form of governance 
continues to be embedded in a strong centralized state model.
Thus, instead of a radical challenge to liberalism, Bolivia’s indigenous autono-
my may be closer to what Audra Simpson calls “nested sovereignties.” Given the 
continuing monopoly of military and institutional power held by settler states, she 
suggests “like indigenous bodies, indigenous sovereignties and indigenous politi-
cal orders prevail within and apart from settler governance” (Simpson 2015: 11). 
“Sovereignty may exist within sovereignty. One does not entirely negate the other, 
but they necessarily stand in terrific tension and pose serious jurisdictional and 
normative challenges to each other” (10). Simpson shows how the Mohawks nego-
tiate these tensions, often “refusing” the offer of citizenship from the United States 
and Canada, the settler states that claim jurisdiction over them, bearing their own 
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passports across national borders they find illegitimate. The Guaranís I describe 
here also find themselves in a complex set of nested sovereignties crossing nation-
al, departmental (state), and local levels. Yet they do not operate through refusal. 
Instead, they have used the resources of the plurinational constitution and alli-
ances with multiple political factions to press forward towards self-determination.
THE PILGRIMAGE TOWARDS AUTONOMY
The path to autonomy was long and complex. The Bolivian constitution estab-
lishes the rights of indigenous people to self-government under what are called 
autonomías indígenas originarias campesinas (AIOCs), or “indigenous originary 
peasant autonomies” (Bolivia 2009: Arts. 2 and 289–96).1 The constitution clearly 
lays out the exclusive and shared competencias, or areas of jurisdiction, at each level 
of government, defining the limited areas where local governments can act, always 
within the framework of a coherent national government. In 2009, Morales began 
the process of autonomy with Decree Law 231, which set up a complex system of 
requirements for local communities seeking conversion to this status. There are 
three possibilities: the conversion of already existing municipalities; the conver-
sion of indigenously held territorios indígenas originarios campesinos (TIOCs), or 
“indigenous originary peasant territories”; or the creation of new regional autono-
mies composed of two or more converted municipalities (see Tockman and Cam-
eron 2014 for a more comprehensive description of the process.) The government 
then put out a formal call for municipalities to apply for the status (see also Tock-
man et al. 2015). Then, in 2010, Congress passed an enabling law, the Ley Marco de 
Autonomía y Descentralización (LMAD; Framework Law on Autonomy and De-
centralization), which formalized all the requirements for creation and operation 
of the autonomies. The second path, that of the TIOCs, only opened in 2012, when 
the Tribunal Supremo Electoral approved Resolution 0075/2012 (Reglamento de 
Supervisión del Acceso a las Autonomías Indígena Originario Campesinas). That 
trajectory, which will arise not from a referendum but by a consultation based in 
norms and procedures, is under way in about ten indigenous territories (see Tock-
man 2014: 248–49).
The first step of this complex process was to apply to hold a public referendum 
to begin the conversion process. As Jason Tockman and John Cameron (2014) 
report, the bureaucratic requirements were onerous. Those who wanted to begin 
the AIOC process had to collect the signatures of 10 percent of the municipality’s 
voting population, provide evidence of precolonial occupation of the municipality, 
and secure from the municipal council ratification by two-thirds of the council’s 
members of an ordinance supporting conversion. Besides that, the deadlines were 
tight, and only twelve communities managed to file these in time (53). Since the 
state did not provide funding or administrative help, the communities had to rely 
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on technical help from local NGOs. The first round of referenda was held in 2009, 
and only eleven were successful in their bids. Charagua was one of only two low-
land communities to pass this step, with 55.7 percent voting yes (Albó 2012: 125). 
The second step was to convene a representative autonomy assembly to elaborate 
formal “autonomy statutes.” This was a time-consuming process, in which the dif-
fering sectors and interests debated whether and how autonomy might serve the 
community’s interests. In several cases, the tensions proved insurmountable. For 
instance, the highland community of Jesús de Machaca, originally presumed to be 
the most likely to gain autonomy, was not able to come to consensus and did not 
press forward (Cameron 2013). Tockman reports that cleavages there between sec-
tors centered on disputes about forms of representation, with those aligned with 
the MAS arguing for a more liberal electoral competition, and those aligning with 
the local ayllu organization arguing for a system requiring service in the tradi-
tional rotational distribution of cargos, or responsibilities (2014: 129ff.).
In Charagua, the Guaranís held an assembly to draft the autonomy statute, 
bringing elected delegates from various sectors to the table. In an assembly last-
ing several months overseen by the central government’s Ministry of Autonomies, 
the delegates drafted a statute establishing a new form of municipal government 
based on Guaraní norms and procedures. Once written, these statutes were sub-
mitted to Bolivia’s Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal (TCP) to ensure they 
complied with constitutional requirements. Charagua’s statute was presented to 
the high court in Sucre in October 2012, and in December 2013, the TCP issued its 
ruling of constitutionality. This ruling was provisional, pending several required 
revisions, the most significant of which was the ruling that the statute’s invest-
ment of broad oversight powers in the ñemboati guasu, the highest deliberative 
assembly, was unconstitutional. As Tockman points out, this intervention in the 
statute’s internal distribution of faculties “seems to be aimed at enforcing a par-
ticular view of the balance of powers—one that favours the independence of the 
executive” (Tockman 2014: 182). After the assembly revised the statute on these 
and several other issues, the final statute was approved in June 2014. The final step 
was a second referendum. If a majority of the public in the municipalities ap-
proved, the process of conversion could commence (53). In September 2015, two 
communities, Totora Marka in the highlands, and Charagua, in the lowlands, had 
passed all these requirements and put their new statutes to the test in referenda. 
Only Charagua won, with a slim but significant margin of 53 percent (Portugal 
2015; Colque 2015).
Thus, Charagua’s new statute is a historic document, one that moves the coun-
try forward in terms of what local autonomy might look like in practice. It is the 
result of a long deliberative process of local democracy. The proponents of the con-
version process organized the assembly in 2010 with help from local NGO Centro 
de Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado (CIPCA; Center for Investigation 
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and Promotion of the Peasantry) and with oversight from the national Ministry 
of Autonomies. The ministers did come to town several times at key moments to 
encourage participation, and did provide some minimal help printing posters and 
copies of the statutes. Nevertheless, the Guaranís relied instead on CIPCA, which 
had grants from private and public Spanish foundations (Morell i Tora 2013: 84).
The Guaranís designed an assembly with delegates from all the sectors of Chara-
gua’s population. The Guaraní delegates attended regularly, although the length of 
the assembly made it hard for everyone, since they had to leave their jobs or their 
farms for weeks at a time. Yet there was very little attendance by the white–mestizo 
sectors. In 2011 and 2012, I interviewed vecinos from the pueblo and found they 
had opted not to be part of the process. These elite made clear their fears. They 
did not participate in the assembly because they felt it was illegal or useless since 
they were the minority, but they raged against the process as having been imposed 
from the outside. One Verde city councilor told me the autonomy process was a 
MAS government project “intended to knock us over” (tumbarnos), meaning to 
overturn elite power in the region. The people of the pueblo also openly expressed 
a deep racism when they spoke of a possible future under indigenous autonomy. 
One cattle rancher called the idea of indigenous autonomy “retrograde, it takes us 
back to ancestral times” using ancient customs. “Imagine, our grandchildren liv-
ing in an indigenous municipality. . . . This is a dark and uncertain future, because 
I know them. They have lots of land, but they do not know how to produce.” Rely-
ing on classic tropes of the corrupt, lazy, or backward Indian, these white–mestizo 
leaders could not imagine ceding or even sharing power with their indigenous 
neighbors. The Charagua cattle ranchers had been part of the departmental auton-
omy struggles described in chapter 5, so they saw indigenous autonomy struggle as 
a part of the MAS agenda they had been fighting for years.
In 2011, I attended the Autonomy assembly, which took place in the Arakuaar-
enda Cultural Center at the edge of town. Besides the large assembly room where 
the main meetings were held, it had a few other classrooms, a big kitchen and 
dining room, and dormitories with rows of bunk beds. I had been there before 
in 1998 with my friends from Zona Cruz for a regional meeting of Guaraní orga-
nizations, but the assembly this time had a very different and decidedly historic 
feel to it. Section by section, the delegates put forward their ideas, drawn from 
commission meetings and discussions with local base communities. Long debates 
in Guaraní and Spanish followed, as the delegates considered the structure of the 
new form of government they wanted to create. The technical team from CIPCA 
sat in the back with their laptops, recording and systematizing the material. The 
long hot days in the hall were broken up by shared lunches and coffee breaks, 
where discussions continued.
Over the process, the delegates designed a new system of local governance, 
based on Guaraní values and notions of autonomy. Because I had followed the 
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negotiations at the Constituent Assembly, and seen how this new legal status was 
so embedded within the liberal structure of the nation-state, I wondered how this 
new system could actually accomplish any real change. In my discussions with 
delegates then, and in the visits that followed in 2012 and 2015, I asked everyone I 
met: How would this new system of governance change things? What would au-
tonomy mean in the light of the constitutional constraints? They returned to sev-
eral themes again and again. First, Guaranís told me that they wanted a system that 
prevented political parties from monopolizing power. At first I did not understand 
the depth of this concern. I assumed it was an expression of the kind that I had 
heard all over Bolivia, a distrust of the corrupting power of the traditional political 
class, which was dominated by whites and mestizos. Yes, it was that, people said, 
but it was also the result of their own experiences in Charagua over the past twenty 
years. Although they had been able to get Guaranís elected to the city council 
and even as mayor, often those leaders had been co-opted by the political parties, 
“betraying” the Guaraní project. This had caused enormous discord within the 
communities, and they wanted to avoid that. “Tenemos que ser unidos, herma-
nos” (We have to be unified, brothers and sisters), they said frequently to each 
other and to me. Second, they wanted to find a way of getting resources directly, 
without the mediation of the mayor’s office, political parties, or the departmental 
government. As I describe in the following section, the current funding process 
requires indigenous groups to present proposals to the governor and to the mayor 
for any development projects they might be trying to implement. Not only was 
this a tiresome and uncertain process, it put them in the position of supplicants 
begging for resources. As they made clear, the resources flowing from the national 
government to the departments are the result of extractivist projects carried out 
on indigenous territories. “These are our resources,” said one delegate, “we should 
control them and decide what kind of development we need.” The capitanías have 
experience with administering development projects, since they have been receiv-
ing payments directly from some of the petroleum companies for some time, so 
this is not a surprising demand.
The statute the delegates designed went through several revisions: first with a 
constitutional lawyer hired to make sure their ideas would conform to the consti-
tution,2 and then in response to the Constitutional Tribunal’s requirements. The 
final statute organizes municipal government in a radically decentralized manner. 
Each of the six sectors (the four Guaraní capitanías, the pueblo, and the Estación) 
will be an autonomous entity, with the right to elect its own representatives ac-
cording to their traditional usos y costumbres. For the capitanías, this will mean by 
consensus at public assemblies. For the other two, this could be by secret vote ac-
cording to liberal notions of democracy, or however they decide to do it. Each zone 
will send representatives to collective decision-making bodies—at the communal, 
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zonal, and municipal levels—as well as to a legislative body. There is an executive 
body, but rather than a mayor and council, it is a body made up of representatives 
from each zone. Is this new system actually different or is this another example of 
indigeneity as emancipatory politics ceding to indigeneity as symbolic window 
dressing for a continuation of liberalism?
I agree with Morrell i Torra that while this statute is in fact “very distant from 
the discourse of ancestrality that prevails in the usual theoretical approaches to 
indigenous autonomy” (2013: 96), it could bring about some important transfor-
mations in the relations of power, forms of territorial control, and sociocultural 
dynamics in Charagua. He points to three specific changes. First, he signals the 
way the statute decentralizes or disperses power from a political institution to a 
collective body (98). This follows the indigenous model Pierre Clastres described 
as “societies against the state,” in which no one leader held the power of violence 
over others. Instead, society as a whole was the site of political power, and leaders 
acted as mediators to promote harmony rather than to exercise command over 
others. Individual people and communities maintained autonomy, only giving 
power to leaders in emergencies, like times of war (see Clastres 1989). The Chara-
gua autonomy statute continued this logic by separating power from a mayor and 
dispersing it throughout a series of collective decision-making bodies in which 
positions are rotated across time and communities. (It is worth noting again, how-
ever, that this effort to disperse power was diminished by the TCP’s 2013 rulings; 
see Tockman 2014: 182–83). In 2015, Mayor Belarmino Solano explained it to me 
this way: “Before the mayor was above everyone and important, now we want the 
leaders to be in contact with everyone, to come down to society. This is a way to 
decolonize, with open doors.”
Second, Morrell i Torra suggests that, like the Bolivian constitution, the Chara-
gua statute has inserted within it indigenous values, like iyambae (freedom, or 
“without owners”) and yaiko kavi pave (a Guaraní notion often translated as vivir 
bien, but also meaning vida plena, a full life) (Morrell i Torra 2013: 113). Following 
Boaventura de Souza Santos’s thinking on the “experimental state,” Morrell i Tora 
argues that this is an “intercultural translation,” a form of hybridity in which indig-
enous logics are inserted into the liberal text as a non-Western and decolonizing 
resource (ibid., 107, citing Santos 2010: 65). He is careful not to romanticize this, 
noting this is not a form of utopian post-development. Instead, he reminds us how 
important development and dependence on gas rents are for the Guaranís (114–
15). Finally, he suggests that the statute goes beyond multiculturalism by including 
all the other sectors and allowing each group the right to organize and represent 
themselves. This was an important selling point in all the public events I attended, 
as non-Guaranís expressed their fears of having to conform to Guaraní customs. 
The statute incorporates others but does not subordinate them (131).
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FROM ASPIR ATION TO REC O GNITION
While the delegates to the Charagua Assembly were busy formulating a new way 
to govern their local communities, politics as usual was continuing around them 
in the nation, department, and the municipality. That is, at the same time they 
were planning a future of autonomy, they were also living and working in the old 
system where political parties and discourses were holding sway. To move from 
their aspirations as expressed in the statute, they had to work in the existing sys-
tem to assure their rights and get the referendum passed to make the conversion 
to AIOC a reality.
During the six years they worked on the autonomy process, the political land-
scape changed radically. When the Guaraní leaders began the autonomy assem-
bly in 2010, the mayor and the majority of the city council members were Verdes 
(Greens), aligned with the conservative Right. They represented the views of the 
whites–mestizos of the city center, who were firmly opposed to autonomy. They 
saw it as a clear threat to their traditional control over the mayor’s office and the 
funding from the state that flowed to the city. As I mentioned above, they also saw 
autonomy as part of the larger MAS project to overturn traditional elite power. 
This was not an accurate assessment: in Charagua, AIOC conversion was not a 
MAS project at all. As Albó points out, most MAS supporters in Charagua were 
Aymara and Quechua immigrants from the highlands who were opposed the 
Guaraní-led process (2012). For the Guaranís of Charagua, however, this was not 
just a MAS project; it was a centuries-long project of territorial self-determination. 
They were, however, able to use the dominant MAS discourse of decolonization 
and indigenous rights to legitimize their struggle. In 2010, the narrative of in-
digenous rights, vivir bien, and preservation of Mother Earth was on everyone’s 
tongues, especially the president’s, and the Guaranís of Charagua took advantage 
of it to push their local demands into the national agenda, moving their project 
through the national level courts.
But by 2011, the president’s commitment to indigenous rights began to be called 
into question. The controversy over the TIPNIS highway, described in chapter 5, 
made it clear that Morales was willing to sacrifice indigenous lands to extractivist 
development projects. The transformation from decolonization to development 
described in chapter 6 had begun. The APG supported the first march for TIP-
NIS, and many Guaranís from Charagua participated. The way Morales dealt with 
the marchers, and particularly the violent repression in Chaparina still counts for 
many as the biggest betrayal of their political lives. The capitán grande of Charagua 
Norte told me that he remembers seeing the Chaparina battle on TV. Still, four 
years later, his eyes filled with tears at the memory. “I was a MAS member since 
the beginning,” he said bitterly. He pulled his tattered membership card from his 
wallet. “See? But that destroyed my faith in Evo. No . . . ” The MAS’s takeover of 
Charagua, Indigenous Autonomy    169
CIDOB, its creation of parallel organizations—all this made the MAS an unsavory 
ally after TIPNIS. But with the autonomy process slowed down and not certain to 
win, the Guaranís decided to keep pushing that long-term strategy but with a va-
riety of tactics: they would work with the Greens (the Demócratas) and the Blues 
(the MAS) at the same time at very different levels of government.
First at the departmental level, they took advantage of the new electoral scheme 
that guaranteed each of the five indigenous groups in the department of Santa 
Cruz one asambleista, or representative to the department legislature. These asam-
bleistas were elected according to usos y costumbres, or traditional customs, that is, 
not as part of any political party. This allowed them the ability to form pacts with 
other parties. Under the current fiscal structure of Bolivia, gas rents and royalties 
are collected by the central government and distributed to departments, universi-
ties, and the Fondo Indígena, the development fund for indigenous peoples. The 
department then distributes these funds to municipalities. So to get money flowing 
to their municipality, and to get the governor and legislature to approve projects, 
the indigenous asambleistas had to work with the Verdes in power. The MAS, of 
course, saw this, as a betrayal. How could indigenous people work with the camba 
elites instead of the indigenous MAS party? But Ruth Yarigua, the current Guaraní 
asambleista, and former capitana grande of Charagua Norte, explained that her 
loyalty is to her people. Their dream for centuries has been to “occupy these spaces 
of power, at all levels, without regard for political colors. . . . This is just what au-
tonomy in Charagua will also provide: the liberty to decide for ourselves, without 
conforming ourselves to any political party” (personal communication, July 27, 
2015). She and her fellow asambleistas put forward development projects to be 
approved for the annual operating budgets and convince their fellow legislators to 
approve them.
More important, though, the five indigenous asambleistas collaborated with 
Demócrata asambleistas to pass a departmental autonomy statute. (Departments 
have a similar constitutional requirement to pass their autonomy statutes.) Their 
goal was to make sure that indigenous rights, especially autonomy, were inserted 
in the department statute. This was critical for the long-term strategy of autonomy, 
but it positioned them right in between the MAS and the Verdes. It is clear that 
Rubén Costas, the powerful governor of Santa Cruz, does not support indigenous 
autonomy, because it takes away some of his territorial and fiscal power. On the 
other hand, by taking a public position allying with local indigenous peoples, Cos-
tas offers a slap in the face to Morales. Ruth Yarigua explained that in meetings 
with their bases, the representatives came up with over eighty points they wanted 
modified in the draft statute. They invited the MAS delegates to collaborate with 
them, but the latter refused. The Verdes, on the other hand, were eager to work 
with them to include their amendments. The resulting legislative session to ap-
prove and amend the statute was an amazing event. The hall was filled with the 
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elite of Santa Cruz, there to witness the historic moment for which their move-
ment had struggled so long. As the president of the assembly called for approval 
of each article, it was the Verde representatives—mostly rich, white members of 
the traditional political class—who proposed amendments recognizing indige-
nous peoples’ languages, territories, and rights to autonomy. When the votes were 
called, all the seventeen representatives on the Verdes’ side of the hall raised their 
hands in assent, along with all five of the indigenous representatives on their side. 
The dramatic physical act of actually choosing sides reinforced the political deci-
sions being made here. This happened for many hours as hundreds of articles were 
approved one by one. On each vote, the president registered the twenty-two votes 
in favor, more than enough to create the two-thirds majority of the twenty-seven 
total votes. The MAS delegates abstained on each vote.
The next day, the legislators presented the approved statute to Governor Costas 
in an even more spectacular event. In the governor’s office on the main plaza, the 
hall was filled with representatives of the press, legislators, and the public. Finally, 
Governor Costas came down the stairs accompanied by the leaders of the five in-
digenous groups and their representatives. Costas said he was sorry to make us all 
wait but he had to meet with these important indigenous leaders to assure them 
that Santa Cruz’s autonomy “was not just for some, but for all.” He said the indig-
enous peoples are iyambae, using the Guaraní word for freedom that has been 
claimed by the departmental autonomy movement (Lowrey 2006). “They have no 
fear, no owners, so they are part of this process of autonomy.” Then, he acknowl-
edged that without the five indigenous votes, the Verdes could not have passed the 
new statute. “Thank you!” he roared, bringing the crowd to their feet. “We will 
continue to coordinate with you, to help meet your demands [reivindicaciones], 
you who have been here even before the republic was formed.” He turned to the 
crowd. “Now we are working on basic services, with women and youth, to create 
a better society. I told our indigenous brothers, don’t worry: now there will be de-
velopment for all! Let us prepare to keep moving forward!”
Outside the hall, people were congratulating each other, but the Guaraní asam-
bleista Ruth Yarigua looked worried. “Well, now we have to insist that they fulfill 
their promises [que cumplan]. Many times they say good things, but they never 
fulfill them.” In fact, few weeks later, she acknowledged their alliance was risky. 
“He gave us his commitment, but we know that if we are not on top of him, he 
won’t do anything.” She also admitted she had been criticized by people in Chara-
gua for having allied with the Verdes. Had she been bribed? some asked. Was this 
another example of egoismo, where the temptations of power had overwhelmed 
her responsibility to her community? On Costas’s side, we can also see a prag-
matic sense of compromise. Including indigenous autonomy in the statute may 
go against the department’s own strategic interests, since it may lead to a loss of 
control over government funds. But it already exists in the national constitution; 
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so acknowledging it does not risk much. In exchange, the Verdes were able to pass 
their statute, a milestone in their struggle for departmental autonomy.
STR ATEGIES AT HOME
While there were both risks and benefits to working with the Verdes at the de-
partmental level, at home in Charagua, things were different. To get the autonomy 
statute passed in town, Guaranís chose another path: an alliance with the MAS. 
Belarmino Solano, a schoolteacher, key advocate for autonomy, and then mayor of 
Charagua, explained their tactical decision. In 2010, he said, the APG had wanted 
to make alliances with other parties, especially the MAS, but the Guaranís were 
divided among themselves, some with the Verdes, some with other particular in-
terests. “And this was a crucial moment for autonomy! We always had indigenous 
autonomy as Plan A, but this had been delayed, so we went for Plan B, making an 
alliance with the MAS and the APG.” They began with the 2014 national level elec-
tions, putting forward a Guaraní candidate, Abilio Vaca, as a MAS congressman 
in the national legislature. Their campaign was successful. Both Morales and Vaca 
won. Then, in the March 2015 municipal elections, they tried the same tactic, all 
the while knowing the alliance might prove transitory.
This was also a positive alliance for the MAS. Having seen the lowland indig-
enous groups migrate towards the Verdes at the departmental level, it was a way 
to exert influence in Charagua, and to have a hand in the autonomy project. As 
Belarmino made clear, the national elections had shown that the APG could bring 
out the vote: “They can see we have the power of convoking people here. With the 
win for Vaca and Evo, they can see that we are part of the proceso de cambio that 
our brother Evo began. We are indigenous people like him, we are brothers. . . . We 
didn’t want to lose this space and the means to move together towards equality.”
So the APG/MAS candidates campaigned with the blue banner of the MAS, 
and handily won the mayor’s position and four city councilors, now holding the 
majority. This was a savvy tactic for a number of reasons, above all because the 
highland residents of the Estación, who were very leery of the autonomy statute, 
are strongly MAS voters. By wearing the colors of Evo’s party, the Guaranís hoped 
to convince their Quechua migrant neighbors they were on the same path. Rosa 
Mamani, one of the leaders of the women’s Bartolina Sisa association, told me that 
this alliance would make the town better. I met her at a rally for the referendum, 
where she and a few other women from the market were waving a flag for their as-
sociation. Speaking shyly in Quechua-inflected Spanish, Rosa told me that previ-
ous mayors had ignored highland demands, like the one her group is pushing for: 
a new municipal marketplace to sell their products. But when Belarmino came to 
see their association during his campaign, he was listening. He promised to help 
them in their demands, and they gave him their support. While she was still not 
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convinced about the autonomy statute, she was opening up to it. Perhaps, she said, 
she would just vote blank and not oppose it now.
This strategy did not impress everyone, however. The junta vecinal and the civic 
committee, made up of white–mestizos who lived in the pueblo, still had strong 
objections to the statute. One afternoon, I went to talk to them as they finished 
their meeting, held in the schoolhouse. We met in an empty classroom, with the 
sounds of children playing noisy games in the schoolyard, and talked for hours 
about their fears. The president of the civic committee, María Antonia Arancibia, 
whom I had talked to on each of my visits, was the most vehement. Her family 
has raised cattle in the region for generations. She argued that the statute was an 
invention that had nothing to do with the real issues of social relations in the 
town. “This whole thing is just made up,” she told me, “it is copied from the Ande-
ans, and from Evo Morales.” CIPCA had written it. “Moreover,” and here they all 
agreed, nodding their heads bitterly, “this new statute excludes us. We don’t even 
appear in the prologue. We too are ancestral here. We, too, care for the fauna and 
the space, but in the statute’s prologue, only Guaranís appear. We also live here!!!” 
The leader of the junta, a schoolteacher named Jorge, said, “Look, we aren’t against 
autonomy, just not with this statute. It doesn’t recognize us as mestizos. We don’t 
appear.” A second teacher, Lilly, a young woman with a worried look, said “we are 
not against the conversion, after all, they are our ancestors. It is that they brought 
us the statute all finished, without letting us intervene.” I had heard this position 
(that they had not been invited to the assembly) over the years, yet, it does not 
square with the facts. In 2011, I had interviewed María Antonia, and then she told 
me that they had been invited, but they refused to be involved. At that point, the 
whites–mestizos could not imagine this process would go forward, and didn’t 
want to have anything to do with it. Now, in 2015, their worst fears were being 
realized. Lilly continued, “we all know what is going to happen. The community 
leaders are going to benefit from this, and they won’t share the money with the 
town or even their own communities. They will completely ignore us from the 
pueblo.” Jorge added, “No, it will create a Guaraní upper caste, and we will end up 
supporting it.” In contrast to the first time I interviewed her in 2011, when she re-
fused to even think about autonomy, this time, María Antonia had read the statute 
carefully. Pointing to various clauses, she argued that the statute would allow the 
AIOC to establish new tax measures. “Who has the money to pay taxes? We, of 
the pueblo, will be taxed and we will lose our lands.” They all remained unmoved 
by the repeated declarations that the statute would allow each sector to govern 
themselves. “The statute requires that all representatives [to the decision-making 
bodies] speak Guaraní!! That excludes us all.”
The Guaranís had heard these objections since they began their push for auton-
omy, and were not deterred. Instead, they used their political control of the may-
or’s office to push towards approval of the autonomy statute in the September 2015 
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referendum. This was evident at a summit meeting co-organized by the mayor’s 
office, the Ministry of Autonomies, and the Electoral Tribunal in July 2015. What 
was called the “Cumbre de Autonomía Indígena Charagua Iyambae” (Summit on 
Indigenous Autonomy of Charagua Iyambe) brought together protagonists for in-
digenous autonomy from municipalities all over the Chaco region with officials 
from various government ministries, cities, and funding institutions. The sum-
mit was a powerful way to raise issues and provoke discussion among Charagua’s 
many sectors. It was held over three days in the same cultural center where the 
assembly had drafted the autonomy statute. The Ministry of Autonomies and the 
Ministry of Health pooled money to be able to make the event happen, and there 
were commissions on health, agrarian development, indigenous justice, and edu-
cation. The Ministry of Autonomies’ staff came from La Paz, and they grumbled 
openly about how little support the central government was giving to this project. 
They represented one wing of the MAS state—the leftist indigenista advocates we 
learned about in chapter 1. These were young anthropologists and social scientists 
dedicated to social change, who were holding on to the one space within the gov-
ernment apparatus where they thought they could make a difference. They said it 
was only a matter of time before their work would be stymied by the more con-
servative Hacienda (Treasury) or the State Departments. Until then, they worked 
creatively to find money for printing, per diems for leaders, and publicity.
The meetings demonstrated the social complexity of the region. My Guaraní 
friends from Santa Cruz had arrived, to support the process and to learn about 
how they might use this experience to move their own demands forward. Sit-
ting next to their aunts and uncles from small villages in Charagua, they caught 
up with family gossip and compared political strategies. I had encouraged María 
Antonia and the junta vicinal members to attend, to participate. She and Jorge, 
the schoolteacher, pushed into the crowded room, listening with frowns on their 
faces. There were representatives from communities all over the Chaco region, 
several of them in process of petitioning for conversions of their municipalities. 
At the inauguration, Mayor Belarmino introduced the ministers of autonomies 
and defense, who had arrived from La Paz, along with indigenous and union lead-
ers who came from across the region to support the process. Melva Hurtado, the 
leader of the MAS-affiliated CIDOB, came with her entourage. Local NGO and 
Church people mixed with ministry staff. Representatives from the four capitanías 
arrived on trucks sent out to fetch them from the outlying villages. Children ran 
around and babies cried, while this amazing mix of people and interests debated 
the complex and intersecting needs of the region: infrastructure, health programs, 
better education, and most important, control over profits from the hydrocarbon 
industry. In the commission on autonomy, which I attended, the young capitán of 
Charagua Norte gave an impassioned speech about how the statute would include 
all sectors of the Charagua community, and how this united community would 
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benefit from development projects and more direct flow of funds to the town. At a 
break, María Antonia continued her disapproval, saying she was not moved. Jorge, 
on the other hand, was impressed with the commissions and the many important 
projects in the works that he was hearing about. He seemed much more open to 
working together. “I’m surprised,” he said.
The final afternoon of the summit, the participants delivered the results of their 
deliberations to the ministers in a public display in the town’s open-air coliseum 
built recently with funds from the Bolivia Cambia, Evo Cumple (Bolivia Changes, 
Evo Fulfills) program. A huge poster with government logos declared “Guaraní 
Autonomy will benefit all the population, without excluding or discriminating 
against anyone.” Many of the town’s residents trickled in, curious to see what the 
Guaraní mayor could extract from the two MAS ministers. In a classic Bolivian 
spectacle format, the program included speeches by honored guests, a MAS sena-
tor, local Guaraní leaders, and the local priest. All affirmed that the Charagua au-
tonomy process was historic and would serve as an example across the country 
and even internationally. After a dance number, where Guaraní girls invited the 
two ministers to dance—a photo op for the journalists, to be sure—the mayor 
made his tactical move, linking autonomy with getting new development proj-
ects. Don Belarmino addressed the ministers, saying how glad they were here to 
see that Charagua was part of the government’s proceso de cambio. “Before, our 
authorities could never get any projects from the government, but now we are 
working with Evo. You ministers are the spokespeople now, to say that Charagua 
is with Evo, and that we will get projects.” He delivered the proposals from the 
autonomy summit, and using the language of the MAS, he declared, “We are going 
to continue the process of change right here. You can’t be plurinational without 
indigenous autonomy. Here we will practice interculturality everyday, defending 
democracy and promoting development for all. This is autonomy!” Then he began 
bringing out bulging binders, with the projects his staff had prepared for presenta-
tion to the ministers. Handing each one to the minister, he called out the projects, 
including the completion of the paved highway to the town (huge applause from 
everyone); construction of a new coliseum in the rural Izozog zone, a new school 
building, a bus terminal (applause from the transportistas), and a municipal mar-
ket (high-pitched shouts from the highland market women, waving their banner). 
Entrusted with taking the enormous stack of projects back to La Paz, the ministers 
were covered with Guaraní textiles and sent on their way.
FIRST STEPS TOWARDS AN INDIGENOUS STATE?
The pragmatic politics of the Guaranís of Charagua succeeded. Only a few weeks 
after the autonomy summit, a majority of the residents of the city voted yes in the 
2015 referendum. The Guaraní leaders are now in the process of implementing the 
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new statute, converting the municipality into an indigenous autonomous AIOC. 
What that will mean remains to be seen over the next years, as it gets put into 
practice. It will undoubtedly be hotly contested. The first steps have shown just 
what is at stake. The margin was slim, declining slightly from the 55.7 percent they 
won in the first referendum to 53.3 percent. The autonomy project declined most 
in the city centers: from 38 percent in 2009 to 33.6 percent in 2015. This includes 
the Estación, so the Quechua market vendor Rosa Mamani perhaps wasn’t so con-
vinced in the long run. It also declined slightly in Bajo and Alto Izozog, where it 
had received 53 percent in 2009, but the Sí vote managed to capture 51 percent of 
that critical electorate (Bolivia 2016). That means that although the Guaranís won, 
they are implementing this new structure of governance with a host of people who 
are opposed to it and determined to make it fail. In September 2016, the town held 
elections for the various new assemblies, putting the AIOC status into force, and 
constituting the country’s first indigenous governed municipality. The fact that 
each sector chose its own way of electing their representatives—some by secret 
vote, and some in assemblies—led some to see this as the first example of an “in-
tercultural public institution” (Villagomez Guzmán 2016). There were all kinds 
of disputes and accusations, however, mainly from the people of the pueblo. In a 
shocking move, the comite civico threatened CIPCA, the NGO that had assisted 
in the autonomy process, calling for it to be expelled from town. The UN High 
Commission on Human Rights in Bolivia had to intervene, protecting its rights (El 
Deber 2016). Yet, the Charagua AIOC has the legal and institutional support of the 
constitution and the Constitutional Tribunal, even if the MAS’s political support 
is grudgingly given.
Compared to the cases described in chapter 6, the Charagua autonomy project 
gives us a very different view of what decolonization and a focus on indigeneity 
can mean at the local level. One the one hand, Belarmino’s performance at the 
summit demonstrates how powerful the developmentalist discourse put forward 
by the Morales government has become and how local actors—both indigenous 
and non-indigenous—must utilize that discourse to win the support of their con-
stituencies. Of course, local governments have always depended on public works 
(see Postero 2007a), but this takes a particular tone these days. Here, Belarmino 
tied indigenous autonomy to economic development in the same way that Morales 
does in his new discourse of economic liberation. Morales links “liberation” to 
successful management of international hydrocarbon markets; here, Belarmino 
linked “autonomy” to successfully channeling the profits from that resource ex-
ploitation to his community in the form of development projects. The Santa Cruz 
governor, Rubén Costas, demonstrated similar pragmatism when he sealed his 
alliance with indigenous leaders with a developmental promise. This is not merely 
mimicry, or instrumental pandering. Local politics is part of these national-level 
transformations. Morales argues that the national extractivist development project 
176    Chapter 7
is liberating and decolonizing because it is under the control of a sovereign pluri-
national state rather than foreign transnational corporations, and the Guaranis of 
Charagua similarly push for an autonomy funded by oil and gas rents, but con-
trolled by them.
The Charagua case study shows something else as well: the complex negoti-
ations Guaraní actors carry out in the spaces between nested sovereignties. The 
Guaraní politicians—Belarmino Solano in Charagua, and Ruth Yarigua in the 
capital—are trying to make visible their own indigenous notion of autonomy in 
the interstices of liberal politics, while all the while taking advantage of the ambi-
guities to make both political and material gains. When Governor Costas used the 
Guaraní word iyambae— “freedom,” or “without owners”—and insisted that the 
indigenous “brothers” were part of departmental autonomy, he was referring to a 
very different understanding of autonomy. His notion implied regional adminis-
trative power in a liberal/neoliberal state system. For many Guaranís, however, au-
tonomy is something entirely different, linked to the Guaraní way of being in the 
world or a set of historical organizing practices. Yet the Guaranís did not contest 
Costas’s use of this word, but rather forged an alliance on the basis of it.
Similarly, in Charagua, Belarmino articulated his local autonomy demands 
in terms understandable in relation to the national MAS discourse: decoloniza-
tion, plurinationalism, interculturality, and most of all development. Again, these 
terms mean radically different things to the various actors who use them, but it 
is this ambiguity, this ability to project various meanings onto them, that makes 
them such useful tools. These ambiguities also make possible consensus within 
the Guaraní communities, where there are also significant debates over visions for 
the future. For some, autonomy is most important because it will bring in more 
development, in the form of economic resources and educational opportunities 
for their children. In this sense, the Guaranís accept what Simpson (2014) would 
call the “gift” of redistribution from state, reinforcing the nation’s sovereignty. For 
others, however, autonomy is closer to that articulated by Don René Gómez above: 
a recognition of their reciprocal relationships with each other and their land, and 
a call to live their own Guaraní way of life. This vision promotes a form of equality, 
where sovereign actors speak nation to nation. For others, these goals overlap. The 
Guaraní leaders’ political negotiations have managed to create spaces for all these 
visions as they come together and swerve apart in the “partial connectedness” that 
is indigenous life in settler societies (de la Cadena 2015).
When I asked my indigenous collaborators in Charagua how they managed the 
dizzying dance between political parties and ambiguous meanings, they shook 
their heads, trying to make me understand. One said, “We have always lived this 
way, in this space. This is how we work.” They are used to holding in tension con-
flicting meanings, the sort of cohabitation Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui calls chi’xi. 
This Aymara concept illuminates the fact that something can be simultaneously 
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white and not white and black and not black. She explains it this way: “It is the 
color that is the product of juxtaposition, in small points or spots, of opposing 
or contrasting colors: the white and the black, the red and the green, etc. It is the 
mottled gray that results from the imperceptible mixture of white and black, they 
may be confused in perception without ever mixing completely. The notion of 
ch’ixi . . . obeys the Aymara idea of something that is and is not at the same time, 
that is to say, the logic of the third included” (Rivera Cusicanqui 2010a: 69). This is 
very different from hybridity; instead, it is a matter of experiencing both strands at 
the same time. Historians have shown that since colonial times, indigenous groups 
have managed this multiplicity, living and working between partially connected 
worlds of rural collective communities on the one hand, and mines and markets, 
on the other (see Harris 1995). The Guaranís, especially, have always been good at 
this, forging temporary alliances with different groups to ensure their survival but 
not disappearing in the process. Pifarré has argued that their central strategy over 
time was to “make pacts without selling themselves to the karais [whites]” (1989: 
295–97, cited in Albó 2012: 30). This “Guaraní diplomacy” (294) has given them a 
practical historical understanding of how to negotiate nested sovereignties.
In this most recent iteration of Guaraní diplomacy, the leaders of Charagua have 
accomplished something they proudly declare to be inédito, or unprecedented. 
Despite the fact that the Morales government’s discourse and practices have 
moved away from indigenous rights, these local politicians have doggedly pushed 
the “indigenous state” to acknowledge their rights to create one at the local level 
in Charagua. Granted, it is not as radical as it could be, but these new institutions, 
when enacted, will incorporate collective decision-making practices into the lib-
eral state structure in a new way. As a pilot case, it will be carefully watched and, if 
successful, emulated. Here, at least, indigeneity and indigenous practices are use-
ful as the basis for emancipatory politics. It remains to be seen whether they will 
continue to be so.
178
In February 2016, Bolivia held a referendum to approve a proposal to amend the 
2009 Constitution to allow Evo Morales to run for a fourth term in 2019. His cur-
rent term expires in 2020. Surprising many observers, the proposal was defeated by 
a slim margin: 51.27 percent voted No (Casey 2016). Most observers assumed that 
the positive economic situation I have described in this book and the overarching 
political support Morales enjoyed from his base would carry him through this 
referendum as it has every other election. Recall that he was elected in 2005 with 
the largest majority of any president since the return to democracy, 54  percent; 
ushered in the new constitution by public referendum in 2009; and then handily 
won the 2014 election with 60 percent of the vote. But this election had a different 
outcome, and the results are significant: 2019 might mark the end of the “indig-
enous state” headed by Morales.
The months leading up to the 2016 referendum had telegraphed possible con-
cerns. There had been a number of scandals involving Morales, including one in 
which he appeared to have abandoned a child resulting from a love affair. Most 
important, the country had been appalled by a scandal of the FONDIOC, the Indig-
enous Development Fund. Millions of dollars had gone missing from phantom de-
velopment projects, and many of the country’s most important indigenous leaders 
had been sent to jail. Critics accused the MAS government both of gross misman-
agement and of setting up the corruption to gain further state power (see Saavedra 
2015). Then, to top it all off, the week before the election, a protest march in El Alto 
against the opposition mayor Soledad Chapetón turned tragic when the municipal 
building was set on fire, resulting in the deaths of six. Two MAS militants were ar-
rested, tainting Morales and the MAS in this incident (Casey and Machicao 2016).
Conclusion
Between Politics and Policing
Conclusion: Between Politics and Policing    179
In his thoughtful postmortem on the defeat, Bret Gustafson (2016) pointed out 
that the No votes came from the classic opposition headed by the eternal presi-
dential candidate Samuel Doria Medina and former president Tuto Quiroga and 
the lowland opposition led by the Demócratas party and Governor Rubén Costas. 
However, even among MAS supporters, Gustafson noted, there was some ambiva-
lence. Although Morales had produced a booming economy, led efforts to help 
the poor, and pushed back against U.S. imperialism, for many people this was no 
longer enough. Gustafson notes
as more than one colleague said, “the people are exhausted.” Desgaste, exhaustion, 
was the word I heard most frequently: Evo’s party suffered from political exhaus-
tion (desgaste político). Too many deals with too many interests had created machi-
nation, manipulation, and corruption within the government. The exodus of com-
mitted pro-MAS militants meant that the party’s vision of democratic and cultural 
revolution had been penetrated by the “neoMASistas” or the “new MAS-istas”—that 
is, politically interested actors of various stripes with little ideological conviction. 
(Gustafson 2016)
Gustafson cites as prescient the many intellectuals on the Left, like Raúl Prada 
and Silvia Rivera Cusicanquí, who have long lamented the unfulfilled promises of 
the democratic cultural revolution. In the weeks before the referendum, several 
intellectuals issued thoughtful evaluations of the decade of MAS government (see 
Arze 2016; Solón 2016). But Gustafson reminds us that nearly half of the country 
voted for the referendum. He concludes that these Sí votes were not all markers 
of blind approval for the MAS. They may have been votes for economic stability. 
Most important, many voted “Yes” because they were concerned that the end of 
Evo would bring a return of the past, an unraveling of all the many gains of the 
process of change. “A ‘Yes’ for Evo was a yes for the longer history of struggle and 
hope for its future” (ibid.).
The contested referendum is an appropriate way to conclude, as it acts to draw 
attention to the disagreements that I have analyzed throughout this book about 
the meanings of the Morales revolution. As this phase of the indigenous state un-
der Morales comes to an end, Bolivians continue to debate and contest the topics 
I have analyzed here: the meanings of indigeneity and decolonization; the form of 
the state; and the national development model. While the long-term legacy of the 
Morales state cannot be known for some time, we can summarize the effects so far.
INDIGENEIT Y AND DEC OLONIZ ATION
Throughout this book, I have explored the meanings of both indigeneity and de-
colonization, arguing that they formed the basis of what Jacques Rancière calls 
emancipatory politics—a revolutionary agenda that brought the MAS to power 
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and propelled its “process of change.” As I have shown, following the rise of the in-
digenous movement in the 1980s and 1990s, and then the insurrections of the early 
2000s, indigenous identity became the platform from which many poor Bolivians 
began to organize for justice. Whereas class had previously been the most salient 
category from which to make claims for inclusion, in recent decades, ethnic iden-
tity has taken precedence. Morales and the MAS party were able to gather these 
demands after the gas and water wars at the beginning of the twenty-first century, 
articulating an agenda that sought to return the profits of Bolivia’s patrimony to 
el pueblo boliviano, the Bolivian people. In his 2005 election campaign, Morales 
merged an anti-imperialist, anti-neoliberal platform with a populist framing that 
appealed broadly to the poor, indigenous, and popular sectors. As I showed in 
chapter 1, from its beginnings, the MAS party and state apparatus was forced to 
balance the tensions between very different agendas: the indigenous, the leftist, 
and the populist. Yet Morales and the MAS state made important use of the dis-
course of indigeneity to legitimate their political, social, and economic agendas. 
Through his public speeches and performances, Morales claimed to represent the 
indigenous population, embodying Túpac Katari and thereby linking his agenda 
to the anti-colonial indigenous insurrections of the past. This was also true in the 
international venue, where he claimed indigenous values like vivir bien could solve 
climate change. His powerful performances of indigeneity were supplemented by 
those of the state, as we saw in the collective weddings analyzed in chapter 3. Cen-
tral to this enactment of indigeneity was the theory and practice of decolonization, 
which sought to reverse the influence of Western colonial legacies and to empower 
indigenous values. As described in the Introduction and the first half of this book, 
the MAS state promised to decolonize not only the state but also the wider society.
It is difficult to overstate the tremendous positive effects this revaluing of in-
digenous identity has had in Bolivia. When I first began working in Bolivia in 
1990, the indigenous people I worked with suffered from structural racism that 
excluded them from the national imaginary and participation in the political 
realm. It made them feel ashamed of their cultural practices. I remember how my 
Guaraní friends would talk about the vergüenza (shame) they felt when talking to 
upper-class white–mestizo people. Their lack of education and perceived inability 
to behave according to mestizo norms made them fearful of discrimination. While 
racism is far from being erased, the past decade has radically changed the ways 
indigenous and indigenous-descended peoples experience their identities. Having 
a president who proudly declared his indigenous identity and filled government 
offices with people wearing indigenous clothes and speaking indigenous languages 
has literally changed their world. As the residents of El Alto we met in chapter 6 
explained: “Evo has opened the doors for us.” Now many people who felt fear-
ful to enter state buildings or banks or universities, proudly claim their rights as 
citizens and residents. They believe the government is the result of their collective 
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activism, and as a result, is responsive to their interests. This opening of doors 
has also had tremendous class effects, in essence altering the class structure of the 
country. Indigenous people now work in commerce, law, and healthcare across 
the country, have attended universities, and make up the burgeoning indigenous 
middle class. As described in chapter 4, the government’s policies have reduced 
poverty, massively grown local infrastructure, and distributed national resources 
to local and state governments. Indigenous people are involved in the country’s 
most fundamental political questions, serving in the Parliament and in the gov-
ernment’s ministries. The anti-racism law means racist talk is no longer acceptable 
and is penalized. These are huge and positive accomplishments of the Morales 
administration, a sort of sea change similar to the civil rights movement of the 
1960s in the United States.
Yet, like the civil rights movement in the United States, which posited inclusion 
and justice for African Americans, the Bolivian proceso de cambio has not resolved 
the structures of racism it promised to overcome. In the United States, many saw 
Barack Obama’s election as the first African American president as evidence that 
liberalism is perfectible, and that, with time, democracy can embrace those previ-
ously excluded from its benefits. Yet the wave of violence and police brutality that 
came to light in the 2010s revealed the ongoing exclusions of American liberalism. 
As the Black Lives Matter movement has made clear, many poor urban blacks are 
still sacrificed every day to racist state violence. In Bolivia, the cultural democratic 
revolution promised a similar redemption: putting the evils of colonialism in the 
past. But because the state has continued to tie its economic policies to a capitalist 
model of natural resource extraction, it continues to sacrifice those indigenous 
people whose lands and livelihoods are “obstacles” to national development. As 
we saw in chapter 5, the MAS state systematically privileges extractivist develop-
ment over the desires of lowlands indigenous communities. The TIPNIS case was 
a watershed for the MAS administration, and rendered visible the fact that capital-
ist development trumped protection of rural indigenous communities. In the era 
of “economic liberation,” national polices focusing on expanding the agricultural 
frontier, supporting agribusiness, and expanding energy production make clear 
that these policies will continue, recontextualizing long-standing patterns of ra-
cialized development. And despite its discourse of decolonization, the MAS state 
has utilized co-optation, police violence, and legal mechanisms to silence its op-
ponents, including indigenous groups. Thus, the accomplishments of the Bolivian 
process of change must also be measured in relation to these ongoing exclusions.
I conclude that, in part because of these tensions, indigeneity and decoloniza-
tion have faded from their initial privileged discursive positions. If Morales and 
the MAS initially relied on their ability to enact decolonization for Bolivia’s for-
merly oppressed poor and indigenous peoples, using this discourse as the basis 
of their emancipatory politics, in the post-TIPNIS period, indigeneity no longer 
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serves that purpose. Morales’s potent indigenous figurations and the state’s grand 
spectacles of anti-Western cultural rituals are increasingly perceived by many—
like the residents of Tiwanaku whom we met in chapter 3—as “shows” used by 
the government to cement its power. Again, I want to emphasize how important 
such shows can be to ethnic pride. However, as time passed, this symbolic di-
mension appears to have lost its power to convene constituents. Increasingly, 
performances of indigeneity serve as tools of state legitimation rather than as 
sites of liberation. Thus, to return to Rancière, we can say that indigeneity has 
become a tool of policing.
The 2012 census may be one indication of this development. In 2001, at the 
height of the neoliberal multicultural era, the census reported 62 percent of the 
adult population as indigenous (INE 2003), or 66 percent of the entire popula-
tion with children included. In 2012, however, the number of people identifying 
as indigenous dropped to 41 percent, with 2.8 million people identifying as mem-
bers of the thirty-six indigenous groups, out of a total of 6.9 million people over 
fifteen years of age. The numbers dropped to about 34 percent in the highlands, 
among Aymara and Quechua peoples, and to about the same amount in the low-
lands, among the three largest groups—Guaraní, Chiquitano, and Mojeño. Only 
where the local peoples were involved in serious disputes with the MAS gov-
ernment—like TIPNIS—did the census show an increase in indigenous peoples 
(Schavelzon 2014).
The census results were interpreted by many as a blow to the MAS project, 
which has based its legitimacy in great part on representing the indigenous “major-
ity” (see, e.g., Mesa 2013: Tabra 2013). Vice President García Linera quickly wrote a 
response to critics (2014), interpreting the census results as a demonstration of the 
administration’s great success. He insisted that indigenous people were a majority 
of the population and that the new plurinational state represented a new Bolivian 
nation, which is itself indigenous. He argued that during the first stages of the 
“process of change,” indigenous people needed to organize as indigenous to defeat 
the white–mestizo oligarchy that had ruled Bolivia for centuries. Not only has this 
been accomplished, but the new plurinational state has itself been “indigenized,” 
leaving indigenous peoples free to identify themselves as Bolivians. Thus, he ar-
gued, the census represents a victory for the indigenous majority.
Others had different conclusions. Pablo Stefanoni (2013) pointed out that the 
census question asked if people identified as “indigenous originary peasant” peo-
ples or nations. This category, which appears in the new constitution, mixes na-
tional identity with class identity, in essence “ruralizing” indigeneity (6; see also 
Tamburini 2013). Many urban people do not feel part of this ruralized vision of 
indigeneity. Salvador Schavelzon (2014) makes a slightly different argument: he 
says the generic or “ecumenical” state-led version of indigeneity is not particularly 
salient for many highland and urban people, because it does into take into account 
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the lived or territorially shaped identities of local people, but rather is expressed 
discursively at the national level. Thus, for most of Morales’s constituents in the 
highlands, this sort of indigeneity indexes a political membership rather than a 
personal or collective identity (2014). But for those in heated struggles over the 
control of their territory, like those fighting over the TIPNIS highway, indigeneity 
means something quite different, quite personal and embodied. For these respon-
dents, their identity as indigenous was indicative of their membership in their 
local communities and struggles.
The case studies in this book support these more nuanced understandings of 
the evolving political relevance of indigenous identity and show how state ver-
sions of indigeneity have lost ground. The participants in the collective wedding 
described in chapter 3, for instance, held strongly to their identities as Aymara and 
were happy to support their president in his political project. Yet they were clear 
that the image of the decolonized indigenous subject they were asked to enact—the 
decolonizado permitido—was a performance that did not represent their daily real-
ity. The urban residents in El Alto presented in chapter 6 also eschewed the label 
“indigenous.” “The indigenous are those who work the land,” community leader 
Gonzalo León told me. They did not understand decolonization as having to do 
with indigeneity, but rather as a form of anti-imperialism allowing the state to re-
claim and redistribute the profits from national resource exploitation. Many urban 
indigenous people appear to be focusing on getting ahead economically and their 
support or critique of the government tends to be framed in those terms. As we 
saw in chapters 6 and 7, however, for many lowland indigenous communities, in-
digeneity continues to be a critical site of contested politics. After the TIPNIS case, 
many lowland indigenous peoples felt deeply betrayed by Morales and the MAS 
state. They perceive the MAS state’s representations of indigeneity as cynical per-
formances enabling new colonial domination of lowland territories. As the case 
of the Guaranís of Charagua showed, this context required leaders to partake of 
the state discourses of development in order to push forward their long-standing 
struggles for local autonomy, in essence performing their own version of the per-
mitted decolonized Indians.
The findings of this book demonstrate once again the malleability of the category 
of indigeneity. I explained in the Introduction that who counts as “indigenous” 
is a fundamentally political question, emerging from struggles over particular 
 social, cultural, environmental, and economic matters during particular moments 
( García 2008; Friedlander 1975). I do not mean to imply by this that it is a simple 
construction without real meaning. The cases in this book show quite the opposite: 
for all the self-identifying indigenous people I describe here, their ethnic identity 
as Aymara or Guaraní is fundamental to their place in nation, their relations with 
neighbors, and their location within the political economy. It defines their sense 
of membership in the plurinational state and in large part structures their hopes 
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for the future. It is deeply meaningful. Nevertheless, the category of indigeneity is 
a slippery one that can be claimed and performed by many actors with distinct in-
terests. I conclude that indigeneity is what Elizabeth Povinelli (2011) would call an 
“ethical substance,” a shared but contestable notion around which actors can frame 
their disagreements about development, environmentalism, and sovereignty. The 
many versions of virtuous indigeneity that circulated around the TIPNIS contro-
versy analyzed in chapter 5 are prime examples of this. Thus, indigeneity acts as 
the site of both politics and policing, providing the cultural material for the blurry 
boundary between the two.
LIBER ALISM,  SOVEREIGNT Y,  AND THE 
INDIGENOUS STATE
If Morales promised to alter the position of indigenous people, his cultural demo-
cratic revolution also promised to decolonize the state. As I explained in chapter 2, 
perhaps the most revolutionary promise of the MAS state was the possibility of 
enacting indigenous alternatives to the liberal state. Indigenous intellectuals 
posed substantial challenges to the classic notions of sovereignty of the nation-
state in the Constituent Assembly, arguing for a form of shared decision-making, 
especially about natural resources. As I have shown, however, the MAS diffused 
these alternatives, using much of the language of indigenous rights and plurina-
tionalism, but in essence retaining the classic state structure of Western liberal 
democracies. The new constitution contains some inspiring language about in-
digenous self-determination and instituted some decentralization, allowing both 
indigenous municipalities and regions to form autonomous governments. But, as 
I have shown, the central state still has jurisdiction over all nonrenewable natural 
resource decisions and channels funding to these entities subsumed to its power. 
Thus, the nation-state retained full sovereignty, despite language to the contrary.
This surprising result becomes less surprising when we return to the makeup of 
the MAS, described in chapter 1. While indigenista activists formed an important 
part of the MAS state, and were especially salient in the face Bolivia presented to 
the rest of the world, another large part of the MAS inner circle were leftists and 
union leaders. Their goal was always state capture: gaining control of the state and 
using its power to accomplish their agendas (see Beaulieu 2008). As I have shown, 
Vice President García Linera has consistently argued that the MAS state is the best 
mechanism by which to accomplish revolutionary justice. In his view, the first goal 
was to overcome the white–mestizo political class that previously controlled the 
state, and then use state power to intervene in the economy and redistribute ben-
efits to the people. He invoked national sovereignty to justify the ongoing extrac-
tivist development project and its most controversial aspect, the TIPNIS highway. 
In recent years, this form of national sovereignty is the basis of the new discourse 
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we saw in chapter 6, that of “economic liberation”—the results of a strong nation 
negotiating in the global market.
Throughout the book, I show the tensions this form of sovereignty produced. 
Even if one accepts the notion that a strong state might be a tool in the search for 
economic justice, it is clear that such power also holds danger. Chapter 2 shows 
the delicate balance at the Constituent Assembly between the actions of MAS 
militants who wanted to reconstitute the state and those who saw their actions 
as violating the rule of law. Most important, the indigenous proposals for power 
sharing were silenced in favor of a powerful central state. In the TIPNIS case, the 
MAS state exerted violent force to put down challenges to its development agenda.
These developments lead us to a difficult question: at what point does the use 
of state sovereignty go beyond liberal state sovereignty to illiberal or authoritar-
ian power? As I suggest in chapter 2, these may be “undecidable” questions at 
the boundary between politics and policing. What appears as overreaching au-
thoritarianism to some may appear to be long overdue popular justice to others. 
Yet it is clear that, until the 2016 referendum, the MAS successfully countered all 
challenges, continuously consolidating its power. Thanks to its “nationalization” of 
hydrocarbon resources, and then to its maneuvering at the Constituent Assembly 
to foreclose regional or local decision-making on natural resource matters, the 
MAS state assured it would reap the massive rents from the hydrocarbon sector. 
This allowed it to distribute funds and infrastructure to its followers, cementing 
its popularity. This strategy was successful for ten years: in the 2014 election, the 
MAS even won a majority in Santa Cruz, the center of opposition in the first years. 
As indigenous leaders explained, it made no sense not to “get on the train,” the 
government gravy train that was guaranteed to provide jobs and benefits. As the 
Guaraní activists Justa and Gregorio make clear in chapter 6, it became a matter 
of common sense to go along with the MAS, even if you opposed it ideologically. 
“Why should others reap the benefits of the revolution we fought for?” they asked.
By 2016, however, this concentration of power suffered fractures, as allegations 
of corruption emerged. At the national level, many MAS-supporting indigenous 
leaders were accused of pocketing money intended for community development 
from the Fondo Indígena (FONDIOC). Leaders were jailed and the central gov-
ernment was accused of either negligent oversight, or worse, setting up these lead-
ers as a way of silencing them. Either way, this ugliness at the center of indigenous 
politics hurt the MAS. Morales’s personal scandals multiplied and painted him 
with a tawdry brush. Across the country, while now legally strictly sanctioned, 
local corruption appeared to be rampant. In every field site in which I have con-
ducted research in recent years, people have told me about how the MAS funneled 
money to its militants by giving them government jobs and, more important, con-
tracts for the big infrastructure development projects. New companies blossomed, 
as the families and friends of MAS civil servants reaped these benefits. I have not 
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been able to confirm these accusations, but this is common knowledge among 
ordinary people I have spoken to in La Paz, El Alto, and Santa Cruz. True or not, 
the sense of widespread clientelism helped undermine the high moral ground on 
which the MAS indigenous state had begun. Instead of a government beholden 
to social movements, as it declared itself to be, in recent years, it appears that so-
cial movements were in fact beholden supplicants of the rentier state. This sense 
may help to explain the results of the 2016 referendum. Ten years of power almost 
inevitably results in these sorts of clientelist structures; they are a feature of all 
incumbency and one reason why term limits are healthy.
We must also consider the Bolivian case in the wider regional context, where 
across the continent, moves to the left, the so-called Pink Tide, have been reversed. 
Once-powerful leftist leaders in Brazil and Argentina have fallen to corruption 
charges, Venezuela’s government is under attack, and even center-left Michelle 
Bachelet of Chile has lost popularity. Observers agree that conservatives are on the 
rise, in part because of a widespread disillusionment with the Left (Romero 2016). 
Bolivian Vice President García Linera ruefully acknowledged this turn: “We are 
facing a historical turning point in the region; some are talking about a throw-
back. . . . We must relearn what we learned in the 80s and 90s, when everyone was 
against us” (ibid).
So, how then do we evaluate the indigenous state? First, I conclude that despite 
the strength of its discourse about indigeneity, this state did not fulfill many in-
digenous demands. The MAS chose to use the liberal nation-state model instead 
of any of the more radical alternatives proposed, and used it to consolidate party 
power. Second, it played up national sovereignty as a way to legitimize its develop-
ment agenda, silencing local people’s objections. I return to this in the next section. 
Third, as we saw in chapters 2 and 7, efforts to institute alternatives based on collec-
tive governance, like indigenous autonomy, received little support from the MAS 
state. It put up bureaucratic obstacles to these efforts, creating a legal structure that 
subsumed these municipalities into the central state. In the few cases where local 
indigenous communities persisted, like Charagua, they were forced to present their 
forms of self-governance within the dominant state discourse of economic libera-
tion, rather than any challenge to Western liberal national sovereignty. I conclude 
that if there is such a thing as an indigenous state, we are only seeing the first glim-
merings of it in local projects like Charagua’s new autonomy statute.
DEC OLONIZ ATION AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM
Finally, there is the question of development. As I suggested at the start of chapter 6, 
many people on the Left hold Morales and Bolivia up as examples of alternatives 
to the evils of global capitalism. The activists who came to the Encuentro Social 
in Santa Cruz in 2015 are like many on the Left I have encountered in the United 
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States as I talk about my research. They assume that the popular discourse about 
vivir bien, or buen vivir, as it is called in other Andean countries, is a reality in 
Bolivia. Given the fears many of us have about the effects of global climate change, 
people want to hear that indigenous wisdom can help stave off the looming di-
saster our Western forms of development and consumption have created. When 
I describe the forms of resource extraction going on in Bolivia, and the plans for 
continued expansion of the agricultural frontier, hydroelectric energy production, 
and lithium mining, laid out in chapter 4, or the struggles over the TIPNIS high-
way recounted in chapter 5, people are often dismayed. They have a hard time 
reconciling their image of Morales with the economic policies and practices I de-
scribe. At one talk, one member of the audience asked me if I wasn’t being too hard 
on Morales. Hadn’t things really improved a lot for people?
As I hope I have made clear throughout the book, things have improved for 
many Bolivians, on many levels. Yet I think it is important to look beyond the 
discourses of decolonization and vivir bien to see what has been produced. In her 
wonderful book on development in Ecuador (2015), Sarah Radcliffe documents 
the disappointment that indigenous women express over the form of sumak kaw-
say (vivir bien) the government implemented. Yet they wonder what a version that 
engaged in the complex social heterogeneity they inhabit might look like—a real 
intercultural state that respected difference (Radcliffe 2015: 433). Many Bolivians 
express this same sort of disappointment. At the end of ten years of MAS gov-
ernment, Bolivia is no closer to adopting a decolonized form of economy and 
has made little progress towards any sustainable development, whether based on 
indigenous values or otherwise. The data show instead a country moving forward 
at full gallop towards natural resource extraction, agribusiness, and continuing its 
dependency on global commodity markets. If the MAS has enabled a shift in the 
class structure of the country, “opening the doors” to indigenous peoples, it has 
not made any substantial change in the basic forms of production. Transnational 
corporations and large-scale agricultural consortiums still produce the majority of 
the goods and make the majority of the profits, with the state raking profit off the 
top. When I was discussing this conjuncture with a colleague in Bolivia in 2015, 
I asked if perhaps Morales had accomplished something unusual, getting capitalist 
forces to support his progressive agenda. My friend shook his head, disagreeing. 
No, he said, “I think it is the other way around. I think the owners of the world 
have won again.”
I do not know if that is the case, but the Bolivian case does show the continu-
ing creativity of capitalism, its ability to adapt to a variety of political and cultural 
conjunctures. In my analysis of the racialized effects of Bolivia’s development proj-
ect in chapter 5, I cite Allen Pred and Michael Watts’s influential work on capi-
talism (Pred and Watts 1992), which describes the complex ways in which both 
spatial meanings and cultural identities are produced as capitalism is reworked in 
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particular moments and places (17–18). Pred and Watts argue that “nonlocal pro-
cesses driving capital mobility are always experienced, constituted, and mediated 
locally” (xiii). “Tradition” and “custom” often provide the symbolic raw material 
with which actors rework and refashion the meanings of such capitalist transfor-
mations (15). Yet, they insist, transitions occur “from within, but within limits, set 
by the logic of capital itself ” (8; see also Pred 1992). In contemporary Bolivia, I 
argue, decolonization has served as a new logic and justification for capitalist pro-
duction. By translating continued reliance on the global market as a form of “eco-
nomic liberation” or a form of decolonization, reversing the racist world order, 
Morales and the MAS have enabled capitalist forces in a new era. Without a doubt, 
as Eduardo Gudynas (2010) has forcefully argued, this “progressive extractivist” 
project shares the benefits of production beyond the classic elite class. That is why 
it is so popular. Yet it is important to acknowledge that wrapping capitalism in 
revolutionary talk—or indigenous textiles—does not alter the underlying political 
economy. Given that the state benefits directly from this development path, and 
given the fact that it has veto power over all projects, it is not surprising that the 
state has continued to sacrifice those who stand in the way. Thus, decolonization 




1.  THE EMERGENCE OF INDIGENOUS NATIONALISM IN B OLIVIA:  
SO CIAL MOVEMENT S AND THE MAS STATE
1. Morales named Manco Inca (who resisted Pizarro’s conquest of Cuzco), Túpac Katari, 
Túpac Amaru, and Bartolina Sisa (leaders of the indigenous insurrection of 1781), Pablo 
Zárate Willca (Andean indigenous leader in the late 1890s), Atihuaiqui Tumpa (Guaraní 
leader of the Kuruyuki rebellion in 1892), Andrés Ibañez (Cruceño leader who advocated 
federalism in the late 1800s), Che Guevara (Cuban revolutionary killed in Bolivia in the 
1960s), Marcelo Santa Cruz (a journalist and politician killed during the military dictator-
ship in 1980), Luís Espinal (a Jesuit priest killed after leading hunger strikes to end the 
dictatorship), cocaleros (coca-growers) fallen in the tropics of Cochabamba in the struggles 
over drug eradication, those fallen defending the dignity of El Alto during the so-called “gas 
war” of 2003, the miners (the traditional backbone of workers’ struggles), and the millions 
of human beings fallen in all of Latin America (Morales 2006)
2. The Tiwanaku Manifesto combined the discourse of indigenous intellectuals strug-
gling against cultural subordination and the discourse of the Left, denouncing economic 
and political oppression (see Rivera Cusicanqui 1983: 118). For the text of the manifesto, see 
www.nativeweb.org/papers/statements/identity/tiwanaku.php (accessed January 16, 2017).
3. Inspired by Spanish fascism, the Falange Socialista Boliviana (FSB) tended to support 
military candidates, including the dictator Hugo Banzer. In the late 1980s, the FSB split into 
two lines, one on the right, supporting neoliberalism, and one on the left, which eventu-
ally changed its name to the Movimiento Al Socialismo Unzaguista. (They later dropped 
the final word). Evo Morales was a leader of this sector, and borrowed the name and legal 
identity for the IPSP.
4. This notion of the “multitude,” then, is quite different from Hardt and Negri’s use of 
the same term (Hardt and Negri, 2004). Hardt and Negri use the term to describe new forms 
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of social organization in the post-industrialized world, where new forms of labor they re-
fer to as “immaterial labor” (like communications or information specialists) produce and 
manage “the common.” For them, this “biopolitical labor” not only produces knowledge, 
information, communication, relationships, and affective responses, but also creates social 
life itself. Thus, it can be the basis of resistance, such as we see in the anti-globalization pro-
test networks and the open-source software movement. The Bolivian scholars also use the 
term to describe an epochal change in labor regimes, but their focus is on the very material 
concerns of local communities and especially those who labor on the land, such as rights to 
water and natural resources. Rather than seeing a sense of global commonality as a source 
of activism, they focus on the ways these groups articulate their interests using indigenous 
and pre-industrial cultural forms.
5. This group is, interestingly, not made up of representatives from the old labor move-
ment, the COB, or the miners’ federation, which are much reduced in power these days and 
actively voice opposition to the Morales government. They argue that Morales is merely a 
reformer in league with transnational mining corporations. During the formative days of 
the MAS, Evo did have close ties to a veteran miners’ union leader, Filemón Escobar, who 
was also active in the cocaleros union, but they split. Escobar later accused Evo of having 
fallen under the influence of what he calls the “old Trotskyite Left” sowing dissention and 
confrontation (Davalos 2008; Cabrera, 2006).
2 .  THE C ONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY:  CHALLENGES TO LIBER ALISM
1. The signatories to the Pacto’s proposal at the Constituent Assembly in May 2007 
were the Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ), a federation 
of highland communities; the Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia (CIDOB), 
a federation of lowland groups; the Confederación Sindical de Colonizadores de Bolivia 
(CSCB), mostly highland peoples living in colonization zones in the lowlands; the Con-
federación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB), the peasant 
workers’ federation; la Federación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas, Indígenas Originarias 
Bartolinas Sisa (FNMCIOB “BS”), the national federation of women peasant workers; el 
Movimiento Cultural Afrodescendiente, the cultural movement of African descendants; 
the Asociación Nacional de Regantes y Sistemas Comunitarios de Agua Potable (ANAR-
ESCAPYS), the national association of irrigators and communal water systems; and the 
Coordinadora de Pueblos Étnicos de Santa Cruz (CPESC), a lowland indigenous organiza-
tion. Other groups, such as the MST, the landless movement, and CPEMB, the Moxeño 
indigenous organization, participated at earlier periods but did not sign on to the Pacto’s 
2007 proposal in Sucre.
2. See Albó 1987, 1994, 2002; García Linera et al. 2004; Postero 2007a; Rivera Cusicanqui 
1983, 2010; Sanjinés 2004; Tapia 2010; Thomson 2002.
3. The distinction between multiculturalism and plurinationalism has been widely de-
bated. See Beaulieu 2008, Lazarte Rojas 2009, Radcliffe 2011, and Walsh 2009.
4. I thank Eli Elinoff for this point, among many others.
5. I am grateful to Devin Beaulieu for this important insight.
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3 .  WEDDING THE NATION:  SPECTACLE AND POLITICAL PERFORMANCE
1. The term “natural” can have many meanings, and is an interesting choice for the 
president. One clear reference is to nature, opposing the natural to the cultural or the civi-
lized. This reminds us of colonial discourse, in which savage indigenous people were repre-
sented as close to nature, emerging from the land, as opposed to the modern peoples of the 
“West,” whose lives are oriented by culture and rationality (Hall 1996). In Bolivia, in fact, 
indigenous people were called naturales, or naturals. Perhaps the president was referring to 
this, reclaiming the term in a decolonized way. Given his frequent citing of the Pachamama, 
the Mother Earth, this seems likely. It may also have been used to index normality, describ-
ing the clothes the participants wore as the natural or normal way for indigenous people to 
dress and act, as opposed to either the white wedding dress and suit of Western weddings, 
or even to Western clothes in general. Perhaps he was opposing this ceremony to Catholic 
weddings, which he deemed to be fake or imposed? These are speculations, of course.
2. For weeks ahead, the public followed who the guests were going to be (they included 
many of Bolivia’s beauty queens), who was going to do the bride’s makeup and hair (a for-
mer beauty queen), and what kind of dress she would wear (it was made in Spain and cost 
U.S.$7,000).
3. Law of October 11, 1911. See www.lexivox.org/norms/BO-L-19111011.xhtml. The 
Servicio Nacional de Registro Civil was created in 1898. See www.lexivox.org/norms/ 
BO-L-18981126–1.xhtml. Before that, all births, deaths, and marriages were registered by 
the Catholic Church.
4. Just the cost of the civil marriage act can be prohibitive. If both members of the 
couple already have their birth certificates or carnets, it can still cost B/300–400, or around 
$40–50. For rural people, traveling to the city is an additional cost. Tramites or getting 
paperwork also entails frequent multiple visits to government offices, lengthy delays, and 
sometimes, bribes. Religious ceremonies vary widely in cost. Mena (2011) carried out a 
survey of the cost of urban weddings, and estimates that the church costs can vary between 
B/140 and B/1590 ($20–227). Rural weddings depend less upon cash and more upon the 
provision of food and alcohol by neighbors and padrinos.
5. This is a pun in Spanish, as casa means both to marry and a house.
6. The PVS was instituted by presidential decree #28794 in 2006.
7. In keeping with the Human Subjects Protocols at UCSD, all the names of the couples 
are pseudonyms.
8. Maria Galindo of the anarcho-feminist collective Mujeres Creando was in fact forc-
ibly ejected from the coliseo trying to document the event. Article 63 of the Bolivian consti-
tution defines marriage as between a man and a woman.
9. The Pukara group are Aymara activists and intellectuals led by Pedro Portugal, a his-
torian and former member of the Katarista Indianista movement. After years of advocating 
on behalf of Aymara culture and politics, Portugal now leads a small group who put out 
Pukara, an online journal critical of the MAS. See www.periodicopukara.com.
10. Weddings have both a public and a private dimension: if registered by the state, 
they are part of bureaucratic practice, but they may also occur in the private or in a reli-
gious arena.
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11. I follow Tolen’s definition of folkloric as a “genre of representation of cultural differ-
ence in which culture or custom is portrayed as distinctive of a group of people, and as an 
essential or primordial quality of the group.” She makes clear that actors are often aware of 
the genre and self-consciously play with the set of conventions (Tolen 1999: 22).
12. The anthropologist Richard Price documented this pre-marriage cohabitation, 
called watanaki in Quechua, and traced it back to the time of the Inca empire (Price 1965).
13. Personal communication, Pedro Portugal, August 2012.
14. Here is the only place where ritual specialists appear to be important, divining aus-
picious places for the couple’s home, helping to cleanse the new space, and then helping to 
make offerings to deities and ancestors during the ceremony (Quispe Churqui 2009).
15. In 2011, e.g., 3,500 couples in India married to call attention to the high suicide rate 
among farmers there (Radio France Internationale 2011). In 2009, the Palestinian Islamic 
movement Hamas, held a wedding in which a hundred widows who had lost their husbands 
during an Israeli offensive in Gaza were remarried to Hamas loyalists (Abu Ramadan 2009). 
In September 2013, after New Mexico began allowing gay weddings, couples held a mass 
wedding to celebrate (Preston 2013).
16. Apparently, collective Catholic weddings continue to take place in communities 
where priests visit infrequently.
17. In all, I spoke with about ten couples. Thus, my observations are not based on a 
comprehensive survey of all the participants. The anthropologist Tatiana Ramos provided 
additional information supporting these general conclusions.
18. Rivera Cusicanqui is now an active critic of the MAS administration, so this earlier 
statement should not be understood as an endorsement of the MAS agenda.
5 .  R ACE AND R ACISM IN THE NEW B OLIVIA
1. The population of Santa Cruz grew from 43,000 in the 1950s to about 256,000 in 
early 1976, and to 1.4 million by the early 2000s. Investment by the central government 
and by U.S. banks in big capitalist farms made the department of Santa Cruz agriculturally 
self-sufficient by the early 1960s (Stearman 1985). This was a combination of colonization 
projects, mostly for highland Andean peasants, and state investments for large-scale agri-
culturalists (Gill 1987).
2. Camba, the Guaraní term originally used for dark-skinned hacienda debt peons, is 
now used to refer to everyone from Santa Cruz and other eastern lowland departments, 
including whites and mestizos (see Fabricant 2009).
3. In fact, in 2008, after prices inside the country spiked, the government temporarily 
banned the export of sunflower oil (Schuttel et al. 2011).
6 .  FROM INDIGENEIT Y TO EC ONOMIC LIBER ATION
1. Domitila Barrios de Chungara was a labor leader and feminist active in the miner’s 
struggles in the 1980s. A founder of the Housewives Committee in the Siglo XX mine, she 
is famous for engaging in protests against the dictatorships in place during that period. Her 
famous testimonio (first person narrative) was called Let Me Speak! (Barrios de Chungara 
and Viezzer 1978)
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2. Jallalla is a Quechua–Aymara word expressing the conviction and hope that what the 
speakers are saying and doing will come about.
3. All the names of the communities here, except Charagua, are pseudonyms, as are the 
names of the people I interview.
7 .  CHAR AGUA’S  STRUGGLE FOR INDIGENOUS AUTONOMY
1. The term indígenas originarias campesinas, which I am translating here as “indig-
enous native peasant autonomies,” is a constructed category that came into juridical being 
at the Constituent Assembly as result of the alliances of highland and lowland indigenous 
organizations with peasant unions (see Schavelzon 2012). Indígenas refers to lowland indig-
enous groups; originarias is a term often used by highland people, similar to “first peoples” 
or native; and campesinas refers to peasants more broadly. This hybrid term was an effort 
to bring unity to a heterogeneous group of social movements temporarily allied for the CA.
2. Pere Morrell i Torra (2013: 88ff.) shows how the liberal constitutional schema influ-
enced the final statute.
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